Transcript

How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW

From Stuff You Should Know · Episode page · Watch on YouTube

· 56 min · 10,644 words · 226 timestamped sections

This is the full, timestamped transcript of "How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW", an episode of Stuff You Should Know published February 11, 2026 (56 min, about 10,644 words). It mentions 21 people, works and ideas, including Cognitive Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Confirmation Bias, Amos Tversky, Behavioral Economics.

What this episode is about

This discussion explains how cognitive biases stem from the brain's use of shortcuts, known as heuristics, to simplify decision-making and maintain homeostasis. While these mental shortcuts can expedite choices, they often lead to errors in judgment by oversimplifying complex information.

Key takeaways

  • Homeostasis isn't just a biological concept; it's your brain's emotional safety net, thriving on shortcuts.
  • Cognitive biases are humanity's universal handicap; we prefer quick judgments, often leading us into irrational pits.
  • Predictably irrational: the brain's default mode is to jump to conclusions, making it a marketer's playground.
  • Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman: academic sparring partners who revolutionized our understanding of decision-making flaws.
  • Unconscious biases: the silent puppeteers of our choices, reminding us that wisdom often hides behind ignorance.

Who speaks in this episode?

What is discussed, and when

  1. – 5:00: Cognitive Biases, Amos Tversky, Behavioral Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  2. – 10:00: Thinking Fast and Slow, John Ridley Stroop
  3. – 15:00: Fundamental Attribution Error, Self-Serving Bias, Hindsight Bias
  4. – 20:00: Anchoring Bias
  5. – 30:00: Cognitive Biases, Dunning-Kruger Effect, Base Rate Fallacy, Gamblers Fallacy
  6. – 35:00: Confirmation Bias, Cognitive Biases, Base Rate Fallacy, Loory Truth Effect
  7. – 40:00: Confirmation Bias, Behavioral Economics
  8. – 45:00: Prospect Theory, Cognitive Biases, Behavioral Economics
  9. – 50:00: Cognitive Biases, Anchoring Bias, Confirmation Bias
  10. – 55:00: Cognitive Biases

Notable quotes from "How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW"

  • Because like I just said, we take mental shortcuts. And the problem, Chuck, is what we're talking about mostly today are unconscious biases, right?
    about Cognitive Biases · at
  • Economics, and they were a couple of psychologists, Israeli psychologist named Amos, and I looked up different ways to pronounce this because we always get guff. And I've heard…
    about Amos Tversky · at
  • Yeah. Daniel Conorman came out with thinking fast and slow which was one of those super popular airport books, you know.
    about Thinking Fast and Slow · at
  • Interference. And system one has a really great tendency to interfere with system two. And there was a psychologist working all the way back in 1935 named John Ridley Stroop…
    about John Ridley Stroop · at
  • One this one I've fallen prey to I'm going to say that probably about all these but that is the first piece of info that you get about something can really affect And even in a…
    about Anchoring Bias · at
  • So, there's another one that you may have heard of before, even if you've not heard of any of these other ones, called the Dunning Kruger effect. It became kind of viral because if you take it.
    about Dunning-Kruger Effect · at
  • Break their own hypothesis. And that's the point of confirmation bias. Let's move on from that experiment. The point of confirmation bias that this shows if you actually can…
    about Confirmation Bias · at
  • Right you can actually basically map how somebody's going to make a bad decision and this became the basis of behavioral economics. Yeah, he well, let's talk about this prospect theory because this was from Diverski and Conoran.
    about Behavioral Economics · at

Who and what is mentioned in this episode?

People

  • Daniel Kahneman — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions
    Presented as Tversky’s key collaborator and as the author of the popular framing of dual-process thinking (“System 1” and “System 2”), used to explain how biases arise from fast, automatic cognition.
  • Amos Tversky — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
    Cited as a foundational researcher (with Kahneman) behind the heuristics-and-biases program and prospect theory, framing much of the episode’s discussion of cognitive biases and behavioral economics.
  • Richard Thaler — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions
    Introduced as a key figure who applied Kahneman and Tversky’s findings to economics, helping establish behavioral economics as a field focused on predictable decision errors.
  • John Ridley Stroop — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
    Credited with discovering the Stroop effect (1935), used as a concrete demonstration of how fast, automatic processing can interfere with deliberate thinking.
  • Dan Ariely — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions
    Referenced for the phrase/idea that humans are 'predictably irrational,' supporting the episode’s point that biases are systematic and exploitable by marketers and organizations.

Books & papers

  • Thinking Fast and Slow — Book · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as a foundational book that introduces the concept of System 1 and System 2 thinking.

Concepts & topics

  • Cognitive Biases — Concept · Core topic · 9 mentions · first at
    Central theme of the episode, discussing various cognitive biases and their impact on human decision-making.
  • Confirmation Bias — Concept · Key argument · 7 mentions · first at
    Discussed as a major cognitive bias where people favor information that confirms their preexisting beliefs.
  • Behavioral Economics — Concept · Framework · 4 mentions · first at
    Discussed as a field that studies the effects of psychological, cognitive, emotional, and cultural factors on economic decisions.
  • Prospect Theory — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
    Mentioned as a theory that describes how people choose between probabilistic alternatives and evaluate potential losses and gains.
    Yeah. which just shows what an outsized impact they had. but they talk about in this paper a lot of attitudes about risk. one is loss aversion which is the idea that you're going to experience more.
  • Dunning-Kruger Effect — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Discussed as a cognitive bias where people with low ability at a task overestimate their ability.
  • Anchoring Bias — Concept · Key argument · 6 mentions · first at
    Mentioned as a cognitive bias where individuals rely too heavily on the first piece of information offered.
  • Availability Heuristic — Concept · Key argument · 4 mentions
    Discussed as a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to mind when evaluating a specific topic, concept, method or decision.
    You have available to call up in your brain at any given moment. So you're you're going to rely more on what you can immediately think of in the moment.
  • Fundamental Attribution Error — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
    Discussed as a bias where people over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing situational explanations.
    Self-serving bias combined with a little fundamental attribution error on the side.
  • Self-Serving Bias — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as a bias where people attribute positive events to their own character but negative events to external factors.
    Self-serving bias combined with a little fundamental attribution error on the side.
  • Base Rate Fallacy — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
    Mentioned as a fallacy where people ignore the general prevalence of a condition in favor of specific information.
    All right, let's talk about the base rate fallacy. that means you put more weight on just like one very specific piece of information instead of looking at all the pieces of information that have come your way.
  • Hindsight Bias — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as a bias where people see events as more predictable after they have happened.
    Something has occurred and we've talked about this one before here and there that we tend to think like oh well of course that was going to happen. In fact not only was that…
  • Gamblers Fallacy — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Discussed as a fallacy where individuals believe that past random events affect the likelihood of future random events.
    You're going to see this all over the place. You're going to hear it spoken out loud. And this is the idea that you find patterns where there are no patterns.
  • Mere Exposure Effect — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Discussed as a psychological phenomenon where people tend to develop a preference for things merely because they are familiar with them.
    That's right. That means just merely being exposed to something has a vast impact. So the more we experience something, the more you like it, which is why you see that commercial for the.
  • Loory Truth Effect — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as a related concept to the mere exposure effect where repeated exposure to a lie can cause belief in it.
    And then there's a related thing called the loory truth effect which is basically that repeated exposure to a lie causes you to eventually believe in it if you hear it enough…

Places & events

  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as the institution where Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman developed their theories.
    Especially when it comes to, economics, and they were a couple of psychologists, Israeli psychologist named Amos, and I looked up different ways to pronounce this because we always get guff. And I've heard everything from hard to versi.

Full transcript with timestamps

Welcome to Stuff You Should Know, a production of iHeart Radio. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh and there's Chuck and Jerry's here, too. And we are getting down to business. Getting right to it here on Stuff You Should Know because we got a lot to cover here.

That's right. So, Chuck, I got a little bit of an intro. Let's hear it. Was that it? That wasn't it?

Yep. Um, do you remember how homeostasis used to come up a lot? Yes. So, for those of you who haven't been listening that long, homeostasis is what your body and your mind and your brain wants to return to, right? You just want everything nice and even keel and normal and that and without exerting too much effort and energy, right? That's homeostasis.

That's Are you asking me? Mhm. Sure. Okay. So, one of the ways that the your brain returns to homeostasis as fast as it can is to use shortcuts in making decisions, right? Because if you're having to decide something, you're actively being challenged. You have to you're not in your homeostatic space. So, if you use a shortcut, you can say something like, um, uh, I've had the red apple in the past and it was delicious. I I've eaten the like brown mushy one before and it was awful. I'm gonna eat this red apple, right? Rather than going to the trouble of pulling both apples out and like analyzing them with a microscope and all that, you can just kind of use a little shortcut. That's a huristic and it makes a lot of sense because your brain is like great, I didn't use that much energy. I made the right decision and we're good to go. The problem that comes about though is that with huristics, it you're not always

right. You don't always make the right decision. You're not always taking all the information into account. And when that happens, you start stumbling uh into cognitive biases.

Yeah. Like this is a frustrating episode because I feel like the title could be uh cognitive biases. Everything you think you know is wrong.

Yeah. Well, that's a great title. Let's go with that. Uh it just it made me feel like a dummy the whole time.

Oh, don't it's it's you're not a dummy. All humans are dummies as far as cognitive biases go. It's not just you. And this stuff is hardwired into us because like I just said, we take mental shortcuts. And the problem, Chuck, is what we're talking about mostly today are unconscious biases,

right? There's conscious biases. We just usually call those biases, right? Those are the the active challenges that you need to overcome to be a better version of yourself.

These are like unconscious. So there's not a lot you can do about it. Although at the end we're gonna kind of give you some tips and pointers, but it's a challenge for absolutely everybody. It doesn't it doesn't make you dumb.

Yeah. I mean, I think the tips and things can help for sure, but it's just part of being human. You know, the unconscious bias and there's not a lot we can do to completely eradicate them.

No. Uh and if it's a, you know, if it's a real problem, then uh I'm sorry. Well, one of the big problems that we all kind of face is that they we are um uh we're predictably irrational.

Yeah. As was said by Dan Arieli uh who is a uh um behavioral economist. And because of that corporations marketers um basically everybody who wants to sell you something knows about these things and they can manipulate those things. They can trick you into making decisions you wouldn't otherwise make. Yeah, for sure. Uh, and we wouldn't even be here probably talking about this if it hadn't been for two uh, kind of revolutionary thinkers who ended up being some of the more offsided researchers in the history of research. Uh, as we'll learn, especially when it comes to, uh, economics,

and they were a couple of psychologists, Israeli psychologist named Amos, uh, and I looked up different ways to pronounce this because we always get guff. And I've heard everything from hard to versi

to his colleague Daniel Conaman doing more of one of those verski. Oh, I just heard him refer to him as Big T.

The Big T because it's TV. But uh those were the two guys working together. or they developed this concept in the 70s at uh the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and really like got down to it pretty quickly uh as a result of um Conoran I think taking some issue with the big T's research and I guess they kind of bonded over that or something. Yeah, it was pretty cool because uh Tverki um basically he was a mathematical psychologist which anytime you hear mathematical and it's to do with something other than math what that means is you've taken something and you've you've set it out in a very standardized way. So you can explore it, you can teach it based on certain facets and the upshot of mathematical psychology as far as human behavior goes. These are the people who came up with the croc idea that humans behave as rational actors. We're self-interested.

We take all the best information available to make the best decision for ourselves. And Daniel Conorman was like this is not at all true. And he started challenging Amos Tverk's um theories. and Tiverki instead of saying like no you shut up he was like all right let's go figure out let's get to the bottom of this and because of that yeah like they formed this partnership that had a huge impact on the world

yeah I think it's kind of heartening that they uh as academics you know got together there were no ruffled feathers or at least it didn't end up that way and they worked together it's kind of a heartening thing I think these days

yeah there's got to be at least one yeah that's right uh they came up with a program called the horistics and biases program to basically, you know, study how human beings make their decisions, how they go through life making choices when they don't have um like all the information at hand, all the most perfect information to make that choice or if they don't have like all the time in the world to look at the information that they do have to make that choice. So, like how are people making decisions? How are they making mistakes in their decision-m? And they ended up coming up up with a couple of different um systems. One which is super quick and one which is much more deliberate.

Yeah. Daniel Conorman came out with thinking fast and slow which was one of those super popular airport books, you know.

Yeah. Thinking, fast and slow. Yes. Thank you. Uh eat shoots and leaves. That's right.

Um and in it he basically lays out this kind of shorthand model. He's he's very explicit to say like this is not this is not how like your brain is actually laid out but it's a good metaphor for it. And system one is how you think quickly. You think almost unconsciously. You make rapid decisions. Um and that is kind of how we generally navigate life. System two is much more deliberate. It's where we take into account like different ideas. It's where we really stop and think about something before making a decision. and they're essentially competing. There's something called interference. And system one has a really great tendency to interfere with system two. And there was a psychologist working all the way back in 1935 named John Ridley Stroop who basically discovered the Stroop effect that is a way of demonstrating how system one interferes with the slower, more deliberate system two.

Yeah, I bet. Oh boy. I bet he patted himself on the back after this one because it's one of those things that's so simple, but he I bet he winked at everyone like, "Watch this."

Yeah, this is going to break your brain. It's genius. It really kind of is. So, what they did was they simply wrote down uh the names of colors, but they would write down the name of that color in a different color. And then he would just say ask to the person to read out loud the color of the word that is written, not the color that it's written in.

And it is surprisingly difficult to do that. It's just a little weird brainbreaking thing.

Yeah. Yeah. So he's he's showing that your system one just wants to hurry up and read it.

Yeah. And it's getting it wrong and that's that's interference, right? So that kind of like started to lay the groundwork for this idea that we do have kind of competing ways of seeing the world and um and making decisions. And what Conoran was saying is that um most of the decisions we're walking around making are actually these system one super fast shorthand decisions. But we think that we're using our more rational mind because we make post hawk explanations for why we decided that. And that's not to say we're all walking around with these creepy little secrets that we know we're like fooling ourselves. We don't realize we're doing this. That's why these biases are unconscious. Even if you stop and think about what you're doing, you may still not come up with the answer like, "Oh, yeah, I was making up explanations after the fact to explain why I actually used system 2 when I didn't." It's really

hard to do that. Yeah, for sure. Uh Libby gives a pretty good example of that as far as like hiring somebody. Someone may make an impression in an interview that kind of locks it up from the second they walk in. and maybe they look like their their mom or dad or relative or maybe they remind them of themselves or maybe like who knows what it could be. Then they end up getting that job and later if you ask the person who hired them, you might say, "Oh, well, it was because of this, this, and this, and this." When in fact, that's really just system two kind of confirming like, "No, it was because the guy walked in wearing a a New York Giants t-shirt."

Yeah. And we we'll get into some of the problems with the stuff throughout, but this is a good example, right? If the opposite happened, if like you didn't hire somebody because they weren't quite like you,

that's an example of a a bias, too. Even if you don't think that that's why you did it. If you're looking at their CV afterward and you're like, "Oh, they didn't graduate from college. That's why." But really, it was not because you're racist. It's not because you're a woman hater. It was because you're preserving your own level of comfort because other groups that are different than you make you uncomfortable. And that's how groups can become entrenched, right? You just Once once one group kind of dominates an organization, they tend to continue doing that because people hire other people who they're comfortable around rather than pushing themselves outside of their comfort zone and probably improving their organization. And that's why diversity programs exist in the first place because of that human tendency.

Yeah. Or maybe they were just a Jets fan. That's possible. I mean, no Jets fan is gonna hire a Giants fan.

Yeah. Well, here's a tip. I don't know a lot about interviewing other than be yourself and try and get someone to like you. But don't go into any interview wearing any sort of branded sports apparel.

Yeah, especially a jersey. Yeah, I think that says quite a bit. Yeah, you wear that Giants jersey in there. You Well, I guess you're rolling the dice. You've either got that job,

right? Or there's no way you're going to get it. So, maybe it's not a bad idea then. I don't even know what I'm I might be wrong.

Oh, yeah. I mean, I guess if you dressed it up with a bow tie, maybe you could get away with it, but yes, it is still a gamble regardless.

Well, not all jobs you have to wear a suit and tie. You realize I know, but I'm saying like you dress for the part you want. If you're wearing a Giants jersey with a bow tie, I think you're you're making a good impression out of the gate.

All right, so uh I guess we can talk about um we're going to n go through a list of about 10 different biases. Uh, and they're all pretty interesting and I know everyone can identify with probably each of these at some point. But before we do that, uh, we need to point out that like these are all mental shortcuts or the result of a mental shortcut. But not all of them work in the same way and how our brains work. A lot, you know, there could be a lot of things at play. Uh, emotions can come into play. Um, maybe like we were just talking about like it's hard to reassess something after you've gotten a first impression.

People, humans historically through their life tend to make bad guesses at things

because if you make great guesses then things like you know gambling would be super easy. So all of these things come into play. Um there's not just like a single way that this it's a broken system,

right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But people generally it seems like universally in a lot of these cases behave in these ways under the same circumstances.

Yeah. like some of their stuff wasn't replicatable, but that's sort of standard for um studies in psychology. Like a lot of this stuff, as we'll see, has checked out across cultures.

Yeah. Which is huge, you know, considering the whole weird problem in psychology in particular.

The what weird that weird people are western, educated, industrial, rich, what's the R? Yeah. Rich,

democratic, I think. Uh all right. So we'll start we'll we'll leave the biggest guy for last I think which will be after a break probably but we'll start then with maybe hindsight bias.

Yeah. And this is the idea that after something has occurred and we've talked about this one before here and there that we we tend to think like oh well of course that was going to happen. In fact not only was that should I have seen that coming it was probably inevitable that that happened. Um and a lot of the time it may be because you're um misremembering your expectation before it even happened. Right. Like we can rearrange our memory of how we felt about the event or the outcome of the event afterward to basically match the outcome.

Yeah. I guess because we have this never- ending need to be right. Yeah, that probably has something to do with it.

And I knew you were going to say that. So, uh, I've got another one for you, Chuck.

All right. Self-serving bias combined with a little fundamental attribution error on the side.

Yeah, that's a good one. It's a good side dish. So, um, self-s serve these things basically go hand in hand. It's basically how we see ourselves in great a great light, how we see other people in a more negative light. Self-s serving bias is basically saying, um, if something good happens to you, it's because you are good. Like you earned it. It's because of you doing something right. Something bad happens to you, it's external forces that made that happen. And fundamental attribution error is the exact opposite with other people. If they do something right, it was just luck. If something bad happens to them, it's their own fault. So, a good example of this is like if a co-orker comes in late one day, you're like, they're just lazy and slack.

But then you come in late the next day and you're like, it was traffic, right? That's basically those two things going hand in hand. And those are those are both biases.

Yeah. And I hope people understand that like all of those things can also be true, you know?

Sure. So if you're if you're thinking like, well, no, but some, you know, sometimes I did deserve the thing and sometimes it was someone's fault. Yeah, sure. That can happen. That's we're not these aren't absolutes.

No, it's more just Yeah. your the your your tendency to think in certain ways. Yeah. Sometimes you're going to be right, sometimes you're going to be wrong. For sure.

Like humanity's tendency. So yeah, you got to take a big broad view here. Yeah. but also you specifically

right you James Kirkland listening in Baltimore there's one oh man James Kirkland is gonna pull over to the side of the road right now and really freak out

I hope man I hope I nailed it yeah I think you picked a common enough name we'll see

all right so anchoring bias is another one um this one I've fallen prey to I'm going to say that probably about all these but that is the first piece of info that you get about something can really affect And even in a very disproportional way, uh things that happen after that, like once something is kind of locked in, it's hard to un unwind that.

Yeah. That first piece of information, it's like, oh, okay, this is this is going to basically prime you in your answer, your decision, right? So, a good example I saw is there was a a study that said like, okay, the Mississippi River is less than 2 miles long. How long is it? And those people would say something like 1500 miles. And then other people would say, "Okay, the Mississippi River is less than 500 miles long." And people would say like, "It's like 300 miles." And then another group was the Mississippi River is less than 80 miles long. Those people would answer like 60. The it's the same thing, the length of the Mississippi River, but they were presented with this basically this priming number, a large one, a middle number, or a smaller number. And their answers were related to that first piece of information that they got. And that's anchoring bias.

Yeah. And Livia pointed out another little side dish here which is called the decoy effect. And that's when you uh will go into a restaurant and they might and this is how just kind of one way this can affect economics which will come up a lot. But you'll go into a restaurant and they might have one super expensive bottle of wine on the menu and maybe it's even placed at the top so you see it first

and then the other bottles of wine might seem like a decent deal after that even if they're also overpriced. Yeah, exploitation.

But all wine in restaurants is overpriced. I hope everyone realizes that. I mean, by a lot, right? Don't they make most of their margin on that?

Oh, totally. It's it's frustrating, but it's uh that's that's the business. Well, that's also I think, Chuck, this anchoring bias is why they say you should never lead in a negotiation with your actual price, that you want to go higher or lower depending on your position.

Oh, like if they ask what you want to get paid. Yeah. or like you're trying to buy a car or something like that, you know?

Yeah. I I hate all that stuff. Yeah. Yeah. If somebody it's like, "Well, what do you think I should get paid?" You know?

What do you What are you looking to make at this job? But that's what I'm saying.

What you make is should always be the answer. Exactly. You just want to add, I don't know, 50% to what you actually want and then you have room for negotiation.

Right. Right. There's the one other thing that's related to this framing bias and that's basically the same thing but rather than the first piece of information guiding you. This is more directly guiding you. So for example, some drug uh maker says 10% of patients die. You're like, "Oh god, that's a lot,

right?" You could say it the opposite way. 90% of patients live. You're like, "Oh, that's great."

Same amount of people dying. It's just framed differently to to exploit your your response,

to exploit your aversion to dying pretty much. And that's a human thing, isn't it?

For sure. Uh shall we take a break? Yeah. All right. Josh said human thing. So, it's time for a break and we're going to come back with more biases right after this. All right, Chuck. Up to bat is number 23. availability heruristic.

Can we put like a stadium echo effect on that? Next up, many moto. Very nice. Uh, so what is that availability heristic and and um there I'm sure this has happened to you before, right?

Yeah, I'm This is none of these have ever happened to you, which is the funny thing about us doing this episode. But the uh availability uh heristic is what you have available to call up in your brain at any given moment. So you're uh you're going to rely more on what you can immediately think of in the moment.

Mh. Um and chances are what you're immediately able to think of in the moment is something that probably aligns with your world view or something like that, which is a sort of a Well, we won't talk about the the the sea bias because that's coming up.

Well, yeah. or something that like really kind of gooseed you emotionally. Like that's that's very available because it's like, you know, loud and and scary in your mind kind of, you know, like if you uh saw something about um a plane crash in the last like day or so right?

And somebody asks you how frequent plane crashes are, you're probably going to give a much higher estimate than you would have before that. You know, maybe based on the number of times you've flown and nothing bad happened.

Yeah, that's a good one. Um, there's also inintentional blindness. And before anybody, before we talk about this, because we're going to spoil it.

Yeah. Yeah. I want to send everybody, if you have the means to do this, go on to YouTube and search for selective attention test, and this is Daniel Simon's YouTube channel, and then watch the test where the people are passing the basketball back and forth. We'll wait a second. Okay,

that's enough. All right, great. So, hopefully you pressed pause and you didn't just try to watch it while we were while Chuck was doing the Jeopardy theme.

It is short, but it's not that short. It's It's like a minute and a half or something right?

Yeah. So, tell them tell them about this video, Chuck, because it's pretty great.

That's right. Uh in the video, they have a group of uh what was it like six people? Probably.

Six on the nose. Six college students. Uh, I guess three are wearing white shirts, three are not wearing white shirts. Yeah.

And they're in a in a very tight small circle. Yeah. It looks very awkward. They have a basket I think was it two basketballs?

Mhm. There's two two groups. Yeah. Two groups. Two basketballs. And you're what you're told is the task at hand is to count the number of times that people in white, the white team are passing the basketball. So you're counting, right? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7.

Mhm. And that's all you're supposed to do. And at the end, you're supposed to say, you know, how many times they pass a basketball,

right? And now, now hit them hit them with the good stuff. So apparently uh half of the people who do this, which is astounding to me, half of the people who who watch this video and take this test don't notice that in the middle of it, uh person in a gorilla suit walks into frame and turns to the camera and I think beats on their chest and then walks out of frame. Like in the middle of these people throwing these basketballs around the gorilla, half of the people are paying such close attention to counting how many times the the people wearing white t-shirts are passing the basketball that they do not notice the gorilla until the end of the video when it's pointed out.

Yeah. And we're assuming it's a person in a gorilla costume. I'm hoping. First of all, that might be a bias at play that it's not a real gorilla.

Well, I guess it depends on the amount of funding they had. Yeah. It looks actually like the gorilla from Trading Places.

It totally does. Which is like, were they even trying? No. Okay, good. I just wanted to make sure.

Uh, did you watch this video before you knew about this? I had heard it from some friends who uh were who do magic and they were basically talking about this on a little podcast that they made.

Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. You have friends who do magic? Um, so you know our friend Toby?

Oh, yeah. He has very good friends that do magic. Wow. Like professionally? Yes. I became um kind of friends with him. So yeah, I guess I do. I have friends that do magic.

Well, buddy, next time we are in Los Angeles at the same time, our good friend and friend of the show, Adam Pranica.

Yeah. Is a member of the Magic Castle and it's one of his and his wife Elaine's favorite thing to do is to take friends to the Magic Castle. So, have you ever been?

No. And it is great fun. Adam Pranica just keeps getting better and better, doesn't he?

Yeah. I haven't been with him, but I've been been a couple of times. Uh, once many, many years ago, then another probably 10 years ago. But it's a lot of fun. I'm a big fan of magic.

Yeah. And it's it's pretty magical when people don't see that gorilla in a very tight frame. It's not like it's on a big basketball court and the gorilla sneaks in there. Like there's six people and then there's a seventh. Very clearly,

it is. It is very obvious. So, I mean, what this is showing is that our attention is limited, right? When we're really focused on a task, you you saw that gorilla, those half of the people who didn't notice the gorilla, you still saw it, but you were so focused on the task that your brain was just getting rid of information that was unrelated to the task because it's it's not pertinent. It can become pertinent though when that gorilla decides to attack you. And so this is a a cognitive bias we have where we're ignoring potentially unimportant information to take in this the stuff that's related to the task at hand.

Yeah. Well, you know where they could really get away with this cuz where you have great concentration is it a a professional sports game on the jumbotron when they have the the baseball under the helmet or whatever.

Uhhuh. And then they're moving them around and you got to find, you know, it's like three card money.

Yep. uh because you're concentrating so hard on that. They could they could put whatever they wanted on that screen while that's going on and and I bet you most people would not. Or maybe I guess it's half if that's what they found.

Yeah, I'll bet you're right. I'll bet you're right, man. I was trying to think of something where you're super trying to follow because I was I was happy I came up with the correct amount of passes at the end.

You did. You said, "What does it mean if I noticed the gorilla and got the the correct number of passes?" And I said, "It means you're a perfect human."

That's right. Which we all know is not true. Um, none of us are, Chuck. None of us are.

Yeah, I know. So, there's another one that you may have heard of before, even if you've not heard of any of these other ones, called the Dunning Kruger effect. It became kind of viral because if you take it through the pop culture meat grinder, it becomes much more simplified and kind of loses some of its

actuality, but yeah, people still like it because it's a good way to put other people down.

Yeah, it is. Uh this is the idea that the correct idea is that people with little understanding in an area tend to overestimate their ability

uh and their knowledge about something. Right. Um because they don't they know so little they don't even know what they don't know kind of.

Right. Exactly. Um but what you were talking about it's kind of been transformed into like morons have the are the most like braggadocious which can be true. It it can be, you know, I think that's one of the things like you said, you can be right with cognitive biases. You're not wrong with them all the time. So, yeah, that kind of supports that. But that's not what the Dunning Krueger effect actually says. You said it. And then there's the opposite way, too, where the more experience you have, the more expert you are in a field, the more you assume that it should be easier for you than it is.

Yeah, that's a very valuable thing to understand, I think. And you get much further in life if people are like, "Well, you're the expert." And the expert's usually the one going, "Yeah, but I don't know. Maybe we should hold off because, you know, x, y, and z."

Right. Yeah. So, um, that's the actual Dunning Krueger effect. And I saw that it's it's being assailed right now. People are starting to question even the basic version of it, like the actual academic version of it. Yes. So, we'll see what happens with that.

Oh, interesting. Uh, we've got the gam gamblers fallacy next. And that is, oh boy, if if you have ever gambled um anywhere, but if you like go to casinos and stuff like that,

you're going to see this all over the place. You're going to hear it spoken out loud. And this is the idea that you find patterns um where there are no patterns.

Yeah. So, if you're at the blackjack table and you hear the the person next to you like, well, oh man, see, I've lost four in a row, so I'm going to bet like, I'm going to go all in on this because I'm I'm bound to win because I've lost four in a row. There's no way I'm going to lose five in a row,

right? The problem is is those each of those hands of blackjack are unrelated to one another. They don't form a pattern, but you are predicting a pattern that just doesn't exist.

Yeah. That means you're a facious gambler. it can get you in real trouble. Uh I mean you could it's you can do the same thing on the playground with coin tosses. In fact, coin tosses I think is a lot of a lot of times the way they sort of try and uh prove this.

Yeah. Because each coin toss considering like you're playing with a perfect unfgged coin that has no bias whatsoever.

Each coin toss is totally unrelated to the last. So you could get a hundred heads in a row and that doesn't mean anything. It doesn't mean a tail is coming because that each of those hundred heads in each of those coin tosses had nothing to do with the last one or the next one.

I know that's that's hard to break out of though because it seems very human to think like they flipped four heads in a row. There's no way there's going to be a fit.

Well, that's another reason why this is so hard. We're hardwired to find patterns and stuff. It's a way to um navigate the world. It's the way we navigate the world is by finding patterns so that we can recognize things in the future and thus spend less energy getting back to homeostasis.

That's right. This is all so interesting to me. I love this stuff. I knew that you loved it. This is Josh Clark Central.

I love observing it because I I I can't grasp what it feels like to suffer any of these. So just to discuss it in in this way is really fascinating to me.

All right, let's talk about the base rate fallacy. uh that means you put more weight on just like one very specific piece of information instead of looking at all the pieces of information that have come your way.

Yeah. And usually it's um individuated information meaning like say some quality or characteristic of one person and then you're ignoring the base rate which is like pure statistical information about what you're trying to figure out. And a really good example of this is like let's say that you're looking at somebody who is super fit, a woman who's very fit and athletic and you're asked, "Do you think that woman is a personal trainer or a teacher?" Because the basically the only evidence you have there is that this woman is very athletic and fit. Um you might say personal trainer. But if you took all the base rate information into account, you would know that even the very say very small portion of um teachers who are very fit and athletic uh may be small compared to the total number of teachers, it's still much larger than the total number of personal trainers in the world. So statistically speaking,

it's much likelier that that very fit athletic woman is a teacher and not a personal trainer. You don't do that because you think personal trainer athletic fit must be a personal trainer. You've just fallen uh prey to the base rate fallacy, my friend.

Yeah, but she has on yoga pants and hocas. Exactly. That doesn't narrow down anything these days.

You know, how about the mere exposure effect, Chuck? And I like mirror is part of it. I'm not making a judgment about it.

That's right. That means just uh merely being exposed to something has a a vast impact. So the more we experience something, the more you like it, which is why you see that commercial for the thing over and over and over, that Burger King ad over and over and over. Although I wouldn't say that you might like that one the more you heard it.

That's the outlier for me, too. But uh that that's the idea, though. is just just mere exposure will will get you there.

And then there's a related thing called the loory truth effect which is basically that repeated exposure to a lie um causes you to eventually believe in it if you hear it enough times even if you initially knew that it wasn't true. So that makes me wonder if like it just wears you down over time. Like your brain is tired of defending itself against being assailed with a lie and it's just like fine that's true. I don't I don't care.

Yeah. I I mean, sure, politics certainly comes to mind. Repeat the lie. Repeat the lie. Repeat the lie.

Yeah. And I mean, like, it's a viable way to exploit people's cognitive biases in that in that respect.

Uh, should we end up should we close out with with the big daddy of them all, the big C, the big confirmation bias?

Yeah, let's do it, baby. All right. Why don't you why don't you start this one?

Okay. So, there's a guy named Peter Wson back in the 60s. he um coined the term confirmation bias and he basically had an experiment that's really clever. It's hard to understand at first, but it's very clever.

He basically said, "Hey, here is a sequence of numbers 2, four, and six. Figure out what the pattern is." Just to be clear, this is really hard to explain. If if you find somebody who can explain this well, you'll get it. But I don't think I'm a candidate for that. I think we all know that I'm not going to explain this very well.

Oh, I don't I don't think that's true. Do you want to take a crack? Okay. The original numbers were 246 and people might tend to go with like all right 8 1012 and they thinking it might be all right it's even number uh sequence ascending even number right

and they would say no that's not correct and you said well maybe it's 4 812 and it's like doubled or something

and they would say uh well that's also incorrect and then you you're at wits end because what you haven't done is just done any ascending order you didn't go 179 9300.

All right, let me take a crack at it. You ready? Sure. So, the original number is 246 and the participants would try to come up with the explanation of why like what are the what pattern are those numbers following right?

So, you might say uh the like does uh 8 10 12 work and they would say yes. And you'd say okay well then you're just looking at even numbers. and they would say, "No, you still got this right. This still fits the pattern, but your your hypothesis for it is wrong."

Right? That's Yeah, that's the key. Right. Here's where the confirmation bias came in. People would then go back and continue trying to find versions that fit their hypothesis to explain this even though it was wrong.

Yeah. Rather than take their hypothesis and say, "Okay, this is right. This fits the pattern, but it's still not correct." and start trying to break their original hypothesis by coming up with like just completely random stuff that doesn't fit their original hypothesis. In which case they might have said something like um does 1 six or 27 work and they would say no that's not that doesn't fit. And then that might lead the person to see that actually the only the only thing that has to be correct to be part of the model is that the numbers have to ascend in order. That was it. But people people

man just you might even try you might even try and break it by saying 357 but you're still using that original uh a version of that original hypothesis.

Exactly. That that there's Yes. Say like that you think it goes up by two or something like that. Yes. You're like very few people go back and um try to break their own hypothesis. And that's the point of confirmation bias. Let's move on from that experiment. The point of confirmation bias that this shows if you actually can understand it from other people than us um is that we tend to take our initial ideas, our beliefs in a lot of cases and look for information that supports those and discard information that doesn't support it.

Right? And that's of course, you know, I mentioned politics a minute ago. That's where you most firmly see that these days is uh you are in a media bubble probably. Uh I don't know a ton of people that get their news sources from completely disperate points of view

uh in news these days that you're getting is so uh a lot of it is so slanted to begin with. It's probably not even the best example anymore to use. Um but you're probably a long way of saying you're probably going to be seeking out news that confirms your beliefs because you don't want your beliefs challenged.

Yes. I I mean I'm like everybody else I have trouble with that as well but I have to boast Yumi is actually really good about getting news from different sources.

Yeah. And one reason that I find it difficult to do is because I have like physical reactions sometimes.

Yeah. And that is a thing that's one of the reasons why they think we have we use confirmation biases because it sucks to be to have your beliefs challenged. Right. It's really difficult to overcome that. And there's this thing called belief perseverance which is even when your beliefs are challenged with say like a indisputable fact. You can still use confirmation bias to preserve that belief because we usually uh attach our identity or build our identity around our beliefs. It's who we are. So it's like we're being personally attacked. And then even more than that, there's the backfire effect, right? Did you see that?

I did not. So, the backfire effect says that in the in the face of being presented with information that is um that that basically counters your own beliefs, it can make you actually solidify your original incorrect belief in the first place, right? You'll you'll you'll believe it even more strongly even though you've just been given facts that contradict it. So we really really hang on to our beliefs as much as possible and that is a huge huge thing that humans trip over. That confirmation bias is probably the granddaddy of all biases I think.

Yeah. That's why I saved it for last. Yeah. Uh and you know a lot of reasons people do this. You might be protecting your your yourself like your self-esteem because otherwise you can you're admitting that you're may have been wrong about something. Uh and it, you know, takes a big person to do that. Uh you want to believe that you're right about stuff

and uh it also might just be difficult to to process more than one hypothesis at once. It like might just be a little too brainbreaking.

Yeah. Because once you lock into an explanation, your brain just it's like I no, we've got it. We don't have to figure this other thing out. Homeostasis. Homeostasis. You know, it's it is very hard to entertain something that is counter to what we already think is true. That's right. Uh, all right, everyone. As you can tell by the clock, we are taking our second break. Uh, this is a long one, and we're going to come back and talk about behavioral economics right after this.

Well, wait, before we do that, let's try to to explain this confirmation bias study again.

Yeah, we should. All right, we'll be right back. Okay. I promised to talk about behavioral economics. Um a lot of the work that uh Terski and Conorman did was uh super applicable and kind of revolutionary in a lot of ways for the world of economics

and how people buying behavior is affected. Uh they didn't invent it like Adam Smith wrote about stuff like this.

Um and starting about World War II is when they started really kind of homing in on stuff like this like using mathematical models. Um, and it all kind of started with the assumption that people and companies and organizations are really just trying to pursue their self-interest at the end of the day.

Yeah. And they're going to make the most rational decision. Yeah. And that's just they and they were like, "Yes, we know people make irrational decisions, but these are outliers. Like if you take all of the information and data in aggregate, you'll see that humans generally try to make the most rational decision." That's just not true. People don't do that. We make all sorts of irrational decisions that very frequently run counter to our own best interests. And again, we'll even reject stuff like information that would help us make decisions to our own best interest if they counter our our beliefs. So um there's a guy named Richard Thall who ended up becoming a colleague of Diverski and Conorman and he took some of their papers and he realized that these mistakes these cognitive biases they can be predictable right you can actually basically map how somebody's going to make a bad decision

and this became the basis of behavioral economics. Yeah, he um well, let's talk about this um this prospect theory because this was from Diverski and Conoran.

Uh it was an article from 1979 from uh this idea prospect theory colon an analysis of decision under risk and Livia says it's probably the most cited economics paper of all time. Like this was a revolutionary landmark paper and they didn't write a ton of papers for researchers. They did like eight total.

Yeah. uh which just shows what an outsized impact they had. Um but they talk about in this paper a lot of um attitudes about risk. Um one is loss aversion uh which is the idea that you're going to experience more emotional suffering when you lose money than you will uh gain happiness if you gain something.

So you may pass up an offer that gives you equal odds of winning 25 or losing 20. Um, there was another example I think kind of gets it across more is there was an experiment in 1996 where they gave participants a lottery ticket and before you scratched it off or whatever, let's say it was a scratch off, they said, "All right, well, hold on. Before you do that, I'll give you um another lottery ticket plus $10 in cash." And for no logical reason at all, people tended to think that that first ticket was the one. Even though there was no, it was a lottery ticket. It was no difference at all. They would turn down that extra 10 bucks. I think less than 50% of them took that deal.

Yeah. Because in giving away or trading that first ticket, they they risked a loss even though the gain was right there. Just trading the ticket, you got an extra 10 bucks, right?

That's that's fairly irrational. Um we also have a lot of trouble um with rare events.

Yeah, we tend to overestimate them. It can be a positive event, it can be a negative event, but we're really bad at probabilities and statistics. And um this is essentially it it's like um you you won't let your kid walk to school because you're afraid of that your kid being kidnapped. Even though the chance of your kid being kidnapped is just ridiculously low,

it's technically irrational, even though very few people would fault you for that. Um but it's still an irrational decision.

Yeah, for sure. Uh we talked about that in the um well, was it freerange kids maybe? I can't remember. It tied in with the satanic panic and stuff like that. I think

definitely did back in the day. Um relative rather than absolute terms. That is a theory uh a monetary theory where uh and this is a great example. Um, you might drive an extra 10 minutes in a car to buy a shirt that you know is selling the shirt for 20 bucks rather than one than the one closer to you that sells it for 30,

but you're not going to do that because that saves you 10 bucks. You won't save $20 on a car even though uh you may even have to drive 5 minutes down the road because you're like, "Oh, it's $20. The car is 20,000." But it's really a relative uh you know absolute thing is you're saving twice as much money as you did on that t-shirt purchase,

right? But it's it like you said it's all relative. Yeah. Again, totally irrational, but all this stuff relates to economics. And um like you said, this stuff can be replicated. There's a 2020 study that looked at um the prospect theory in particular and and this major study was conducted in 19 countries in 13 different languages and that held up.

Not bad. No, that's not bad at all. And so it's not just economics. It's not just being exploited by the wine list or um you know Kentucky Fried Chicken or something like that to to make you buy their stuff.

Um this actually this can have like life and death consequences too. Although I guess so can wine and Kentucky Fried Chicken.

You know what you're going to get at K Kentucky Fried Chicken? What? Pepsi. That's right. You will get some Pepsi.

You know how I know that? Because you just had Kentucky Fried Chicken. I did after our tour. I was a little tired and needed just some fried chicken. So, I got fried chicken.

What do you get? Just the original or extra crispy because you're crazy if you don't get extra crispy.

I get extra crispy, but they were out uh that they could satisfy. I got the three-piece. They had two more pieces of extra krispy and they asked if one piece of uh o was available and I was like, "Yeah, sure. I'm not going to not eat a piece of chicken."

It is good. They do chicken, right? Yeah, they do. Um, did you get the mashed potatoes and gravy?

You know it, buddy. Times two and extra biscuit. I went all in. It was a rare um treat

eating eating frenzy. Did you drink a Pepsi? I did. Awesome. Well, that all fits somehow. I don't know how, but it somehow fits this

this episode. Um, so where I was saying that this is uh can be life and death is with medicine. Because although doctors have god complexes and like to present themselves as infallible, they are quite fallible. They're humans and they can suffer the same cognitive biases as us, but they have your life in their hands. We rarely have others lives in our hands.

Yeah. Do you watch the show The Pit? I tried and it just did not grab me. I gave it like 10 minutes, but I hear nothing but good things.

Yeah. I mean, I really like it. I've never been a hospital show guy, so this is kind of my one of my first foray into it, but I I like it a lot. I haven't started season 2, but I noticed when reading through these bias, like medical biases

that they do a uh or at least Noah Wy does a really good job on the show with these younger residents trying to bust through and a lot of this stuff comes up. He doesn't say, "Hey, that's affect horistic." He just will talk about what that is. And now that I know the definitions, I'm like, "Oh, what he's talking about is an outcome bias or an anchoring bias." Um, it's it's fairly interesting.

Yeah. Rather than say like being presented with a really high price for a bottle of wine to make the other overpriced wine seem like a bargain, this can be like your first lab work comes back and that forms the anchoring biased impression of your condition. And even as new lab work comes back, that doctor may fail to adjust their view of your condition because they're not taking into account this new stuff. They're giving more weight to that original that original number. So yeah, and that's just the anchoring bias, the way that it can affect. There's, like you said, there's all sorts of other ways for it to happen and all of it can result in poorer outcomes for patients just because their doctors are humans and we don't really approach cognitive biases in a really uh methodical or deliberate way.

Yeah, they in fact, now that I'm thinking about it, they do this so much on the show, the show could be called medical confirmation bias.

Nice. The show because you see it all the time. Outcome bias is when a shift in the patient's health you're convinced is the result of a treatment

like it's because of that thing I did or affect horistic that I mentioned uh an emotional reaction to a patient you know kind of overrunning you know deliberating on this thing in a logical way. This happens all the time on this show.

Yeah. Well another field that it happens with is forensic science which we've gone to great lengths to kind of point out is junk in the most in most cases. Uh, and a lot of that junk is just based on cognitive biases.

Yeah, for sure. I mean, uh, certainly the way they do lineups is flawed. The I mean, the way they I feel like you're right. We've done this a lot on the on the show. Uh, the way they have done a lot of this is super flawed. And I think maybe they're looking at it some, but not a lot.

No. Um, so if you want to fight cognitive bias in your own mind, Chuck, what do you do? What do you do?

Well, there's a list of good tips here, and I think these are pretty good tips. Um, the first one is just being aware that you have these, which is something that we've already kind of kind of worked through on this episode, except for you, of course, because you don't have these.

Sure. Um, but studies show that like just being aware, it's not one of those things where like, well, being aware is half the problem. It's like being aware seems like 2% of the problem.

Yeah. It's like you're aware that you have an unconscious bias. It doesn't make you understand the bias. You just know that they're there, right? That's the problem with is unconscious.

Um, what else? There are some like actual things you can do like delay decisionm

like don't don't come to snap judgments. Go get more information. Go get information from a contradictory source or different source or something like that. Um, and then it like kind of tied into that, you can have like personal like rules like if there's a big decision, you will not make that decision until you've slept on it.

Yeah. For example, um, don't buy a TV unless your friend says, "Yeah, good idea."

Uh, try and consider your past experience for sure. Uh, because optimism bias could come into play. Um, like, "Hey, worked out last time."

Yeah. like why why would I why would I take more time this time? Yeah. And that's another way that you can kind of do that. An exercise you can do is write down your expectations for an outcome and then go back and look at it afterward and see if you were right or not. And that can kind of help you realize like uh I do kind of tend toward the optimism bias.

Yeah. Because I believe that was one of the other biases is even like it's hard to recognize because you're biased and that you misremember what you thought going into it. So writing it down is a good that's a good one,

right? But if you're super super unconsciously biased, you might be like, "Someone else wrote this in my handwriting,

right? I've never been this wrong." Uh what about Thomas Bae and basian reasoning?

So he was a minister from the 18th century and he basically came up with a standardized formula for taking into account the probability of an outcome, right? That things aren't essentially. So I saw this on less wrong.org or founded by one of the guys who wrote um if anyone builds it everyone dies about AI Elazer Yukowski

the whole point of less wrong.org or is to overcome your biases in a methodical way. And they love basian reasoning. And it basically says there's no such thing as something is just true. Everything is just a probability and you can kind of try to determine how probable something is based on whatever evidence you can gather about it. Just basically going through life like that.

You know who hates that website? Who? L E S R O N G. That dude who started his own personal comedy website, less wrong.com.

That's right. He's just getting smashed. What else, Chuck? Um, what else is I cultivate a growth mindset?

That's a big one. Hey, I I make mistakes. I screw things up and like I need to recognize that and try and grow from that rather than, you know, just being uh confirmed with my own biases constantly.

Yeah. Maybe like looking around at some of the ways that you're commonly exploited say like by advertisers like scarcity is one. When somebody says act now supplies are limited they're creating a scarcity mindset in you.

Uhhuh. Um social proof basically like these people like this so you probably should too and you're like oh I should like that too.

Yeah. And then two other things I saw. There's something called um cognitive bias u mod modification I think is what it is.

Okay. You can use this for like treating anxiety, right? Like people like tend to seek out negative facial expressions.

Oh yeah. And this treatment is like uh like here's a thousand frowny faces. Find the smiley face in there. And just screen after screen, you're looking for the smiley face and you're training your brain to stop putting as much weight on negative facial expressions. Just using like basically exploiting your cognitive bias to get over your cognitive bias.

Oh wow. And then the last thing, Chuck, is apparently AI are starting to show signs of emergent cognitive biases because they use heruristics too. So they're starting to make cognitive they're starting to make errors in judgment in predictable ways which are cognitive biases just like humans.

Rob Zombie more human than human. That's right. Uh you got anything else? I got nothing else.

This is a good one. This is fun. Chuck, I'm I'm glad you like this. Uh well, since Chuck and I both like this episode, that means we have no choice but for listener mail to be triggered right now. Uh, I'm going to call this followup on Sebastapole because I wondered what the connection there was.

Sure. Uh, hey guys, because if you didn't listen, Sebastapole, California, and we were talking about the Seistoal in the Crimean War and I was like, there's no way that's coincidence and it's not.

Hey guys, listening to the podcast on the light brigade from Soma County, our Sebastapole was named after Sevestop. And here's a little information. And uh the settlement was apparently originally named Pine Grove and the name changed to Sebastapool was attributed to a bar fight in the 1850s um which allegedly compared by a bystander to the the long siege of the Seapport of Sebastto during the Crimean War.

Wow. Uh so the original name survives in the name of the Pine Grove General Store downtown only and that is it. Uh there's also the Russian River there. Russian River Valley. So, apparently there is some Russian influence in that area which I didn't know about. And that is from Marsha Ford.

Yeah. Um, also we want to apologize to all of our um Iron Maiden fans who wrote in to be like, "Dude, that song The Trooper is about that whole battle."

Yeah. I didn't know. I uh am not I like Iron Maiden, but I didn't have as much shame upon my head as you. But you didn't you reading the lyrics, it doesn't say, you know, Crimean War. in charge of the light brigade. Does it?

I don't know. I haven't heard it in a while. I'm a big fan of the poster. I love the poster a lot.

Yeah, me too. Um, well, sorry all of you Iron Maiden fans out there. We'll try to do better next time.

Yeah, missed opportunity. Who was that that wrote in about Sebastapole? That was Marsha, I believe.

Thanks, Marca. Marsha. Marsha. Marsha. We really appreciate you. And if you want to be like Marsha, you can email us as well. Send it off to stuffodcast@ iiheartradio.com.

Stuff you should know is a production of iHeart Radio. For more podcasts, iMheart Radio, visit the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

Questions about this episode

Who speaks in "How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW"?

Josh Clark (Host), Chuck Bryant (Host).

What is "How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW" about?

This discussion explains how cognitive biases stem from the brain's use of shortcuts, known as heuristics, to simplify decision-making and maintain homeostasis. While these mental shortcuts can expedite choices, they often lead to errors in judgment by oversimplifying complex information.

What is mentioned in this Stuff You Should Know episode?

21 people, works and ideas are mentioned, including Cognitive Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Confirmation Bias, Amos Tversky, Behavioral Economics, Richard Thaler. Each one on this page links to its own page with every episode that mentions it.

How long is "How Cognitive Biases Work | STUFF YOU SHOULD KNOW"?

The episode runs 56 min; the transcript is about 10,644 words in 226 timestamped sections.

More from Stuff You Should Know

About this transcript: the episode's spoken words as captioned on YouTube, split into timestamped sections. Reclip.Me locates every person, work and idea in the text, keeps the time it is first named, and quotes the words around it verbatim. Last updated February 11, 2026.