Can Economic Populism Save the Democratic Party? | The Ezra Klein Show

What this episode is about

The Democratic Party's identity as a champion of the working class is increasingly contradicted by its diminishing support among lower-income and less-educated voters, as highlighted by Donald Trump's successes in these demographics. Two primary theories explore this shift: one suggests a return to economic populism is necessary for Democrats to regain the working class, while the other posits that Democratic cultural progressivism has alienated these voters, leaving them feeling unrepresented and overlooked.

Key takeaways

• Democrats' identity crisis: once champions of the working class, now more aligned with urban elites.
• Trump's gains among working-class voters signal Democrats might be losing their historical stronghold.
• The 'Democratic penalty' shows voters may prefer populist ideas but distrust the D label.
• Economic promises fail when culture wars overshadow working-class concerns—perception matters as much as policies.
• Survey says: a Democrat's party affiliation can cost them electoral support, regardless of populist intentions.

Who speaks in this episode?

• Ezra Klein (Guest) · 40 min speaking
• Jared Abbott (Guest) · 27 min speaking

What is discussed, and when

1. 0:00 – 10:00: Working Class, culture war, Dr. Jack Abbott, Donald Trump
2. 10:00 – 20:00: Working Class, Donald Trump, Dan Osborne, class alignment
3. 20:00 – 30:00: Working Class, predistribution, redistribution, Pennsylvania
4. 30:00 – 40:00: Working Class, class alignment, Green New Deal, New Deal
5. 40:00 – 50:00: Working Class, Dan Osborne, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Green New Deal
6. 50:00 – 1:00:00: Working Class, Donald Trump, Zaran Mandani
7. 1:00:00 – 1:06:19: Working Class, Dr. Jack Abbott, Donald Trump, Pennsylvania

Notable quotes from "Can Economic Populism Save the Democratic Party? | The Ezra Klein Show"

• Been losing ground among these voters for years now. In 2024, Donald Trump won both voters making less than $50,000 a year. And he won voters without a college degree. And the…

  about Donald Trump · at 0:19

• On immigration. A party that doesn't talk like them and doesn't like the way they talk. Jared Abbott is a director of the Center for Workingass Politics. His group has done a huge amount of polling and research on what working-class voters.

  about Dr. Jack Abbott · at 1:36

• So,, you, know,, we, were, sort, of, interested in this idea that shared Brown couldn't win in Ohio, right? It's oh my god, if we're economic populists and the greatest economic populist holding on in a red state couldn't continue.

  about Sherrod Brown · at 2:32

• Party? Maybe it's, you could work somebody up enough to get them to really freak out about the Culture War stuff, but is that really top of mind?

  about culture war · at 4:03

• A guy that had never really been a Democrat or a Republican. he didn't he was sort of a mechanic and he had been a union leader and had taken out his fellow Kellogg workers on…

  about Dan Osborne · at 10:42

• Yeah., [snorts], It, didn't, used, to, be, like that. This is a change. this gets called class alignment. Not my favorite term. Seems very, catchy., Very, catchy., But, talk, me through class alignment. What is it?

  about class alignment · at 16:42

• A, earned, income, tax, credit would, be, redistributive., Exactly., And working-class people tend to like those predistributive policies a lot because they kind of tap into…

  about Working Class · at 26:56

• States, Bernie Sanders for a very long time has overperformed the Democratic party and Warren underperformed the Democratic party and she was very strong among college educated liberals and weaker among working-class voters.

  about Senator Elizabeth Warren · at 40:48

Who and what is mentioned in this episode?

People

• Dr. Jack Abbott — Person · Main guest · 3 mentions · first at 1:41
  Abbott presents the Center for Working-Class Politics' research, including the 'Democratic penalty,' and argues for experimentation in candidates and messaging.
• Donald Trump — Person · Core referenced figure · 5 mentions · first at 0:22
  Trump is described as winning key working-class blocs in 2020 and 2024 and as a cultural/economic messenger reshaping party coalitions.
• Dan Osborne — Person · Key case study · 4 mentions · first at 8:34
  Osborne is highlighted as an independent, economically populist candidate who overperformed by distancing from Democrats and partially aligning with Trump.
• Sherrod Brown — Person · Key case study · 2 mentions · first at 2:33
  Brown's Ohio race is used to motivate the 'brand penalty' argument: even an economic-populist Democrat can be dragged down by the party label.
• Senator Elizabeth Warren — Person · Referenced comparison figure · 2 mentions · first at 40:23
  Warren is contrasted with Bernie Sanders to illustrate how 'left' policy positions can perform differently depending on affect and perceived class representation.
• Tim Ryan — Person · Referenced candidate / example · 1 mention · first at 6:13
  Ryan’s 2022 Ohio campaign is used to show that even explicit anti-culture-war positioning may not overcome the Democratic brand problem.
  Actually running against Brown it's on the cultural side yeah, no, I, mean, I, always, go, back, to, Tim Ryan in 2022 and you know he was like one, of the, strongest also, in, Ohio running against Vance and He was not he.
• Zaran Mandani — Person · Referenced contemporary example · 1 mention · first at 51:06
  Discussed as a media-savvy New York City left candidate focused on bread-and-butter issues, but also as a figure likely to be weaponized in swing districts.
  We're, talking, obviously, in, New, York, City right now. What have you thought of Zoran Mandani? Well, I think, you know he's an exciting candidate for New York City, and to the extent that I've been on.
• Senator Bernie Marino — Person · Referenced opponent / example · 2 mentions · first at 5:09
  Cited as Brown’s opponent whose campaign used culture-war advertising to attack Democrats, illustrating how branding and cultural issues dominate.
  Bunch of reasons, but partly for this podcast, and I was looking into the attack ads that his opponent, Bernie Marino, ran against him.
• Richard Trumka — Person · Referenced labor leader · 1 mention · first at 18:58
  Invoked to argue Trump borrowed labor-style rhetoric in 2016, blending xenophobia with pro-worker language that resonated with disaffected voters.
  You know that was that obviously that was related to Trump and you know he was like cribbing speeches from Richard Trumpa the president of the AFL CIO in 2016 you know and so…
• Nathan Sage — Person · Referenced example candidate · 1 mention · first at 11:17
  Mentioned as part of a 'new crop' of Democrats pursuing cost-of-living-focused economic populism with pragmatic positioning.
  I think it's not unreasonable. And we're seeing a new crop of folks, Democrats mainly, like the like Nathan Sage in Iowa and Graham Platner in Maine and that are all kind of in…

Companies & orgs

• Center for Working-Class Politics — Company · Referenced research organization · 1 mention · first at 1:43
  Abbott’s organization produced the polling/experimental research underpinning the episode’s main empirical claim: the Democratic penalty.
  The way they talk. Jared Abbott is a director of the Center for Workingass Politics. His group has done a huge amount of polling and research on what working-class voters…

Concepts & topics

• Working Class — Concept · Core topic · 47 mentions · first at 0:02
  Working-class voters are the focal constituency; the discussion examines their shifting partisan alignment and what policies/affect resonate with them.
• culture war — Concept · Core topic · 3 mentions · first at 4:07
  Culture-war attacks are presented as a key mechanism Republicans use to translate economic grievances into cultural resentment and to damage the Democratic brand.
• predistribution — Concept · Core concept · 3 mentions · first at 26:12
  Predistribution is presented as especially resonant with working-class values (dignity/status) and contrasted with redistribution-focused liberal agendas.
  A, earned, income, tax, credit would, be, redistributive., Exactly., And working-class people tend to like those predistributive policies a lot because they kind of tap into…
• redistribution — Concept · Core concept · 3 mentions · first at 17:54
  Redistribution is contrasted with predistribution as more vulnerable to 'handout' framing and easier for Republicans to demonize.
  Absolutely., [snorts] A, earned, income, tax, credit would, be, redistributive., Exactly., And working-class people tend to like those predistributive policies a lot because they kind of tap into values of.
• working-class coalition — Concept · Core concept · 2 mentions · first at 0:47
  The episode argues Republicans are assembling a multiracial working-class coalition—ironically the coalition Democrats long claimed to seek.
  Gains among black voters. Republicans are building the multi-racial working-class coalition. The Democrats imagine themselves as speaking for.
• class alignment — Concept · Core analytic frame · 2 mentions · first at 16:45
  The episode uses 'class alignment' to describe the shift of working-class voters toward Republicans and educated voters toward Democrats.
• NAFTA — Concept · Referenced historical policy · 1 mention · first at 17:32
  NAFTA is cited as emblematic of Democrats’ perceived shift away from working-class interests and as part of the betrayal narrative in deindustrialized communities.
  Issues, in, the, 1970s, and, ' 80s, with, you this sort of onset of deregulation and then eventually leading into the Clinton years when you know he signs NAFTA which has…
• New Deal — Concept · Historical reference · 3 mentions · first at 0:58
  Used as shorthand for an older Democratic economic-populist identity that some argue Democrats must 'rediscover' to regain working-class support.
  They, need, to, rediscover, that, oldtime, New Deal religion. The other theory says that the working class knows perfectly well the Republicans cut taxes for the rich and Democrats expand.
• Green New Deal — Concept · Referenced policy example · 2 mentions · first at 31:41
  Used as an example of a spending-heavy agenda that may not read as directly beneficial to skeptical working-class voters and is contrasted with Osborne-style campaigns.
  Focused on yeah, universal basic income say or on you know a sort of some version of a Green New Deal which is much more focused around you know spending you know lots of money on programs that workingass people may be sort of.

Places & events

• Pennsylvania — Place · Key geography / contrast case · 4 mentions · first at 3:26
  Pennsylvania is the notable exception in the study where the Democratic penalty was not observed, prompting further inquiry.
  Better in you know Michigan did 15 points better in Ohio. And interestingly in Pennsylvania, we didn't see much of a Democratic penalty. And that's something that we're kind of…
• Wisconsin — Place · Key geography in study · 2 mentions · first at 3:32
  Wisconsin is cited as another Rust Belt state where the Democratic label imposes a significant electoral penalty in the experiment.
  That's something that we're kind of trying to think more about. But in the other three states, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, we see these massive penalties, just because of…
• Western Pennsylvania — Place · Referenced symbolic geography · 1 mention · first at 22:46
  Used via a Chuck Schumer quote to exemplify elite Democratic strategic thinking that deprioritized blue-collar regions in favor of suburban gains.
  People of well educated people and you know we have I'm sure you've probably played the Schumer clip about the western Pennsylvania.

Full transcript with timestamps

0:00 The Democratic Party sees itself as a party of the working class. To the extent it has any shared selfidentity at all, it is that. But the Democratic Party is no longer the party of the working class. Doesn't matter if you define the working class by income by education, or both. Democrats have been losing ground among these voters for years now. In 2024, Donald Trump won both voters making less than $50,000 a year. And he won voters without a college degree. And the way Trump won these voters wasn't just to rack up a giant majority among the white working class. First in 2020 and then even more so in 2024, Trump made huge gains among working-class Hispanic voters, significant gains among black voters. Republicans are building the multi-racial working-class coalition. The Democrats imagine themselves as speaking for.

0:52 There are two theories of how Democrats lost the working class and what it might take to win them back. One theory says the Democrats were once economic populists and they just need to be that again.

1:03 The, people, of, America, have, no, quarrel with business. They insist only that the power of concentrated wealth shall not be abused.

1:15 They, need, to, rediscover, that, oldtime, New Deal religion. The other theory says that the working class knows perfectly well the Republicans cut taxes for the rich and Democrats expand healthcare for the poor. But the working class feels unrepresented by Democrats in a broader way. Left behind and looked down upon by a party that's moved sharply left on culture, on climate, on guns on immigration. A party that doesn't talk like them and doesn't like the way they talk. Jared Abbott is a director of the Center for Workingass Politics. His group has done a huge amount of polling and research on what working-class voters believe and what they want to see in their politicians. Among their findings is what they call the Democratic penalty, which is a force that should scare the hell out of Democrats. So, I asked him on the show to describe what he's found and what it would take for Democrats to once again

2:08 be the party of the working class. As always, my email as Klein show at ny times.com.

2:20 Jared, Abbott,, welcome, to, the, show. Thanks., Appreciate, the, invitation., So,, I want to begin in a recent study you all did where you found something you called the Democratic penalty.

2:28 Mhm. What, was, the, Democratic, penalty, and, how did you find it? So,, you, know,, we, were, sort, of, interested in this idea that shared Brown couldn't win in Ohio, right? It's like, oh my god, if we're economic populists and uh the greatest economic populist holding on in a red state uh couldn't continue holding on, what's going on there? And so we we we thought and uh you know we had good reason to think that that was probably a brand identity problem and we just kind of wanted to look at that in a more uh you know slightly more scientific way. So what we did was we had these hypothetical candidates that we gave to Ruskbell voters in this survey and they were all economic populists and we we had some of the candidates be Democrats say this is a Democratic candidate and some say that they were independents and the exact same candidates that had an I versus a D did 10 points better in in you know Michigan did 15

3:22 points better in Ohio. And um interestingly in Pennsylvania, we didn't see much of a Democratic penalty. And that's something that we're kind of trying to think more about. But in the other three states, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, we see these massive penalties, you know, just because of the D next to their name. And so we were just trying to quantify how bad actually is it just to have the albatross of the D around your neck. And it's pretty bad especially in those working-class heavy uh Rusbelt states. Was your study able to figure out what it is about the Democratic Party label that is dragging these candidates so far down?

3:57 Well,, we, did, kind, of, like, an, open-ended blue sky question about, you know what's the first thing that comes to mind when you think about the Democratic party? Maybe it's, you know, you could work somebody up enough to get them to really freak out about the Culture War stuff, but is that really top of mind? And so, we had these open-ended questions that we asked, you know, all the 3,000 people in the survey. And um you know we found that you know there was a lot of that of course that some people felt the Democrats were out of touch and focused on the wrong priorities and were you know woke idiots and all that stuff. There was a good amount of that but it was completely dominated by concerns about the performance of the Democratic party and having ideas that they don't follow through on and not being a party that actually is the party of of the working class. And so that tells me that um you

4:42 know while there's a huge mix of things going on and while we can't ignore um the sort of cultural uh you know resonance or lack thereof of the Democratic party in all kinds of different ways not just policies but an affectation and in style um you know a big part of the story here is also people just don't believe that the Democrats are going to deliver on the things that they that they talk about and that's a huge problem. I was looking into Sher Brown's campaign um for a bunch of reasons, but partly for this podcast, and I was looking into the attack ads that his opponent, Bernie Marino, ran against him.

5:13 Brown, backed, Biden,, voting, to, let transgender biological men participate in women's sports and supported allowing puberty blockers and sex change surgeries for minor children.

5:25 That, attack, ad, was, pure, culture, war. Yeah., But, it, seemed, to, move, voters enough that Brown had to put a counter ad on the air.

5:34 Biological, man., What, if, I, told, you, all, of, this, was, a lie? A complete lie. And Bernie Moreno knows it.

5:42 We, can, verify, the claim that Brown voted to let transgender biological men participate in women's sports is false.

5:49 I'm, sure, Brown, and, I, approve, this message. So how do you think about the on the one hand what you find in the study is a more diffuse sense the Democratic party is ineffective it's out of touch it's corrupt but then when you look at how Moreno a car dealer owner who had to settle a bunch of wage theft lawsuits is actually running against Brown it's on the cultural side

6:13 yeah, no, I, mean, I, always, go, back, to, Tim Ryan in 2022 and you know he was like one, of the, strongest

6:18 also, in, Ohio running against Vance and He was not he didn't just run like a kind of counter like shared round did. He like went full boore and he had there was this one funny ad he had where he was like throwing, I, don't, know if, it, was basketballs or baseballs at these little TV screens and one said like defund the police. He's like I'm not doing that.

6:37 And, that's, from, the, people, who, sell, out Ohio workers. I vote against them too. Ohio workers need a tax cut. And here come the culture wars. I'm not that guy. But the point being that even when Democrats go against uh the culture war stuff, it doesn't necessarily help them that much because the Democratic brand is so shot. Um and so I think that's a really big problem. But yeah, is it is it an issue that uh Republicans are weaponizing culture war against Democrats and and we need to um allow our candidates in difficult context to understand their voters and what they need to do in order to relate to their own specific electorate. And if that means, you know, they need to take you know, positions that progressives would get upset about, then yeah, so be it. Because we need to win uh, you know way more seats in order to stop the Republicans. And this is not a time for for for our side to mess around. You

7:30 know, we need to not just win a majority, but if we want to actually do anything that's going to turn things around for working-class people, we need to have a supermajority, which is, you know, unimaginable right now. And so the reality is that yes, um, are these candidates in between swing districts going to have to, you know, [snorts] work hard to push back against these caricatures and, you know, which are often based on actual things that Democrats, maybe not them, but other Democrats have done. Yeah, many of them are, going to, have, to, do, that., And, we need to give them the the room to do that so that we can experiment with all kinds of different populisms out there and figure out which ones work and in which context. And it's always going to be a case- by case basis. I do think it's worth saying that both Ryan in 2022 and then definitely Brown in 2024, they overperformed. If every Democrat in the

8:15 country had run as far ahead of Kla Harris as Sher Brown ran ahead of Kla Harris,

8:20 the, election, would, have, looked, very different,, at least, congressionally., So, so something I mean the connection he had with Ohio, the campaign he ran

8:27 it, was, a, strong, campaign. Absolutely. It, just, wasn't, enough, to, get, out, of, the gravitational pull

8:32 of, the, Democratic, party., And, then, and you know even like uh even like a Dan Osborne you know that's the independent you know run who overperformed even more uh than than Sherid Brown did you know he had to make a lot of the same decisions right he you know he he's had platforms around immigration that you know would completely anathema to to progressives right he said I'm with Trump on building the wall right he literally said that in his campaign ads and

8:54 in, fact, why, don't, we, play, that, out because we have it oh, nice and, I, approve, this, message, across Nebraska people are tired of a corrupt Washington controlled by corporations and billionaires. Deb Fischer, they love her. Heck, they own her. And that's exactly why they're spending millions lying about me. Social Security to illegals. Who would be for that? I'm where President Trump is on corruption China, the border. If Trump needs help building the wall, well, I'm pretty handy. Devon, the career politicians they tried to stop Trump just like they're trying to stop me. So Osborne arguably the most overperforming candidate in that whole election

9:30 and, runs, with, neither, party, and, is, very economically populist and also runs pretty far right

9:38 on, some, other, issues., What, did, you, make of that campaign? What are the lessons of it? What should people take from it? I mean, I think it was, you know extremely impressive and encouraging and it shows that, um, to the extent possible, uh, the folks who are opposed to Trump and the Republicans, be they Democrats or independents, they need to be much more experimental in the way that they handle elections particularly, you know, maybe not so much in swing states where it's going to be a hard cell to get Democrats to like not run a candidate in in in Pennsylvania or something, but like in Nebraska, you know, they were able to get the Democrats to just sort of sit it out and allow Osborne to sort of uh be a real challenger against against Fiser.

10:20 And if we can find more states where uh you know deep red states like that um you know it's going to be we can take on Republicans on their own on their own turf and I think that's going to be a huge part of the the path forward. Although it's extremely hard to find candidates like like Dan Osborne, you know, he had a very specific profile has a very specific profile. Do

10:40 you, want, to, describe, his, profile, and where he came from? Um, you know, he was a guy that had never really been a Democrat or a Republican. You know, he didn't uh he was sort of a mechanic and he had been a union leader and had taken out his his fellow Kellogg workers on strike a few years before the you know he ran for office and he's just this sort of like very humble, plain spoken guy. Um, who's just really compelling as a as a tribune of of the sort of he embodies all of the economic populace and working-class ideas that he's putting forth. And that's that's not an easy combination of of features. So, but I think it's not unreasonable. And we're seeing a new crop of uh folks, Democrats mainly, you know, like the like Nathan Sage in in Iowa and Graham Platner in Maine and that are all kind of in the similar kind of space of, you know strong economic populace who are completely focused on cost of living and

11:32 on sort of the the the need to center working class issues and call out, you know, economic elites for screwing us over for decades. And they're also taking pragmatic positions to to greater or lesser degrees on issues where, you know, their particular electorates are are not with progressives. And, you know, we need to allow them to to do that experimentation or we're we're not going to be competitive uh at all nationally. And that's obviously not just a problem for Democrats, but that's a problem for the future of our democracy.

12:02 So,, when, you, look, at, that, Osborne, ad,, he doesn't just move right on policies, he actually aligns himself with Trump. Yeah.

12:10 And, one, just, reality, in, a, lot, of, the places that Democrats want to win is that Trump is popular in those places

12:17 politically., If, you're, just, being strategic, does it change how you should talk about Donald Trump? Do they do they need to be in a different place than most Democrats are on him?

12:29 Yeah., I, mean,, if, I, were, on, that campaign, I mean, I would have probably thought that was a smart thing to do right? because if you it's kind of an inoculation like if you you know it's part of the Democratic penalty issue right? Is that like to the extent that you're really just vilifying Trump all the time then you're kind of signaling you're a Democrat, right? And so they they were trying to inoculate Osborne against those attacks because Trump is overwhelmingly popular among the people they're trying to get to vote for Osborne. Is that going to change now that Trump's in office and all the stuff he's done are, you know is, you know, pushing our democracy to the brink and is, you know, historically a frightening period that we're now living in. You know, is he going to be able to or or do the same thing? I I don't know. May maybe it's maybe that maybe it's changed now that Trump, you

13:14 know, has had almost a year in office and done some of the damage that he's done., But, at least, in, 2024,, yeah,, I mean, that was definitely rational. So one lesson you could take from Osborne is that in states where the Democratic Party is 25 points underwater, just stop running Democrats, try this independent play. I I guess my question about that, because it definitely makes sense, is whether or not that would work for any length of time. Y

13:41 because, if, it, began, to, work,, but, then they're voting in a more democratically aligned way once they're in office, does it just begin to be seen as a scam? Right. It's maybe something you can do in one or two places, but ultimately you need to figure out a way to rehabilitate the Democratic party's brand.

14:00 Yeah., And, either, you, either, you're successful in doing that and then the Democratic Party of Brand somehow incorporates the things that made those independents distinctive and then we're in good shape. You know, we're now the party of the working class again. Or the the independent candidates need to continue using that tension to differentiate themselves from the party going forward. And that's I don't know if I had to guess, I would say that's that second outcome is probably more likely. But you're absolutely right that after a certain amount of time, you know, people are going to like notice that wait a minute, these guys are just Democrats unless they legitimately break with Democrats unless they're actually not. Yeah. And so to some degree, they absolutely are going to have to do that.

14:39 And the strategy for doing that that you know that we as sort of like economic populists in my camp would would want to see is breaking with Democrats when it comes to, you know, not standing up for workers. But that's not the only way in which, they're, going to, do, it, obviously. Is there a case for just a worker oriented third party? People always want to do a third party presidentially which is very very hard to do.

14:57 Yeah. But, you, could, absolutely, imagine uh some kind of third party that is just running candidates in a couple of congressional districts or Senate races and and if they get in, you know, they begin to be a little voting block together.

15:12 Yeah., Well,, I, mean,, I'm, a, little, bit traumatized from like arcane debates on the left about this question that I've had for a long time. So, but but but nonetheless, um I I think that that's a very good possibility like like why why can't the Teamsters and the Steel workers get together and have their own you know, sort of mini party structure that's just about union stuff or, you know, and and you know, like you already have, the, union, caucus, in, in in, the, House where a lot of ide in, you know, the the politics of the of the of the chamber, but nonetheless like they have a lot of ideological diversity on many different things, but they can come together around core worker issues. And if you had the an organization like that being supported by some of the bigger, you know industrial unions which have a lot of Republican voters in them, then yeah, I think that would be valid. And but I

15:59 think we need some test cases first right? You need you need to show that an Osborne can actually win and you need to show that, you know, you can do something like this in more places. And then once you do, I think it would make a lot of sense for those folks to try to do something like that to like not just have independent candidates, but build an independent organization. I just think it's something that should emerge organically rather than I don't see what benefit we get from just sort of saying we're doing this now and like let's hope people flock to our banner. I think it goes in the other direction.

16:26 I, want, to, get, at, the, broader, question behind this conversation. Democrats have been losing working-class voters steadily for some number of years now. Uh it's been a decline decline decline and now you see Republicans winning [snorts] uh among both non-ol and uh you know lower income voters.

16:42 Yeah., [snorts], It, didn't, used, to, be, like that. This is a change. Uh this gets called class alignment. Not my favorite term. Seems

16:51 very, catchy., Very, catchy., But, talk, me through class alignment. What is it? What's the story behind it? The basic story is that um you know the Democrats on surveys you know in the 60s7s and 80s the vast majority of working-class people and Americans in general said the Democratic party what they think of when the Democratic of the Democratic party is that's the party of working people right, and, by, the, you, know, ' 90s, 2000s that that was no longer the case and um you know my version of the story anyway um is that Democrats started to move away from their focus on working-class issues, in, the, 1970s, and, ' 80s, with, you this sort of onset of deregulation and then eventually leading into the Clinton years when you know he signs NAFTA which has devastating effects on [snorts] um communities leading to you know not just job loss but community devastation and [snorts] the Democrats you know there's

17:45 a great paper called compensate the losers that sort of gets into this and and that's basically what they said is you guys got screwed okay but you know we're going to do different kinds of redistribution that's going to make you whole again uh we're not going to necessarily get you good jobs. Again we're, not, [clears throat], not, going, to necessarily give you the social status that you used to have when you had high paying jobs that you felt good about and that were meaningful in your community but we're going to make sure that, you know, you have something like a decent education., We're, going to, get, you, some kind of better health care, whatever.

18:12 Um, and that wasn't enough. You know, it was not nearly enough to to send the tide of stagnating wages and stagnating quality of life. And so, working-class people generally, many of them started to feel betrayed um by the Democratic Party. And um you know it was in fits and starts you know um but then in 2016 you know the the floodgates opened and uh you know that was that obviously that was related to Trump and you know he was like cribbing speeches from Richard Trumpa the president of the AFL CIO in 2016 you know and so if you listen to those speeches then of course you're going to hear all the crazy stuff the xenophobic stuff and all the hate but you're also going to hear a lot of stuff that you know any like union organizer would probably find to be like right on in terms of the way that both parties have just completely ignored working people. Um and you know that really that really touched the chord and uh it set

19:05 off the alignment to a much greater extent in 2016 starting with uh primarily white working-class folks. But then you know it been moved toward Latinos and and some black men in 2020 and then to a much greater extent you know like half of Latinos roughly voted for Trump in 2024 and quarter of African-American men. So now this is a you know multi-racial movement away from the Democrat

19:28 multiracial, working-class, coalition the thing Democrat think Democrats wanted to build.

19:33 The, hugely, ironic, aspect, of, this, right is that the Republicans now have that multi-racial working-class coalition that the Republicans or that the Democrats promised you know was their um permanent majority.

19:44 So, I, want, to, push, on, a, couple, pieces, of this, story, that, I always, think, are complicated.

19:47 So, politics, is, always, a, choice, right? You're Democrats didn't just lose working-class voters. went somewhere right? They went to Republicans.

19:56 You, know,, this, whole, period,, Democrats are still the party that wants to raise taxes on rich people. Republicans still the party that wants to cut them. Democrats are still the party trying to create universal healthcare and under Obama, get, a, hell, of a, lot, closer, than we've ever been before. Republicans still the party

20:09 trying, to, repeal, that,, trying, to, cut Medicaid, which they just did in the big beautiful bill.

20:13 Uh, Dem, Republicans, are, voting, for, these trade bills, right? George W. Bush is very pro- free trade. Um Republicans have proposed a lot of these bills. the Republicans vote for NAFTA uh in the House and send in very very high numbers. There is this story that I hear the Democrats abandoned um all of these economic policies. Biden is I think probably the most left president on economics of my lifetime.

20:39 Yeah. Um, you, know, more, aggressive, on, antitrust than you know any other president uh since I was born. You know on labor issues on everything. Yeah

20:49 it, is, hard, for, me, to, tell, the, story where working-class voters are deciding on economic issues. They want a more populist proworker party and the party supporting unions trying to tax rich people, trying to expand healthcare benefits, trying to protect social security, trying to protect Medicare right? All the things we know is hemorrhaging them year after year to the party doing the reverse on all those things. How do you make that add up?

21:16 Yeah., I, mean,, there's, a, couple, things., I mean, one is the nature of our two-party system. And if if if you're really pissed off with the party you've been voting for for a long time, you know, I guess you could vote for Jill Stein or whatever, the Libertarians, but you know, the vast majority of people are just going to go to the other side. And you know, if they were in a parliamentary system or a multi-party system, maybe that, you know, they would go somewhere else. But in this case, you know, a protest vote against the Democrats is a vote for Republicans. And so, I think that's a part of the story.

21:43 But I think the much more important part of the story is that economic grievances get picked up on by conservatives. And you know the way that these economic grievances get you know transformed into um you know politics is often through culture right like it was you know economic elites versus the working class but then but then they're able to sort of transform it into you know it's the liberals and it's the cultural elites against the working class. And it's basically the same kind of grievance and it's touching on the same underlying issues, but it gets transmuted into into into cultural grievances. And that's very much facilitated by the [clears throat], Democratic, Party, by,, you know, not doing very much to try to actually relate to and be, you know culturally competent in the way that they talk and think about working-class people. And you know they are um you know basically increasingly a party

22:39 during this period of higher income people of of well educated people and you know we have I'm sure you've probably played the Schumer clip about the western Pennsylvania.

22:49 For, every, bluecollar, Democrat, we, will lose in Western PA. We will pick up two three uh moderate Republicans in the suburbs of Philadelphia. And you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin,

23:06 you, know,, like, that, kind, of, stuff, adds up. And you know, Clinton saying the basket of deplorables. Of course, the context was like more complicated whatever, but that was the that was the soundbite and she said it and all the major media institutions and academic institutions of the country used to be kind of nonpartisan. And there's a great book by by um Grossman and Hopkins about this about the the diploma divide and sort of showing the ways in which media and culture, you know, came to be completely dominated by by progressives.

23:31 And a lot of working-class people have just felt really alienated by that. And all of these things are part of the same bundle. It gets it gets wrapped up in sort of animosity toward toward elites and and you can't it's very difficult and some academics have tried to do this in different kinds of ways to separate the you know the cultural and economic aspects of it. But I think the reality is that they're all tied up and together to create this toxic democratic brand that then Trump comes along and you know he's, his, a, effect, [clears throat], is something that's refreshing to a lot of people. He's not bullshitting people.

24:02 He's not he's using ordinary language. You know he's he's cursing. He's just sort of bombastic and you know people are, like, well, at least, you, know, that doesn't that seems more authentic to me and to and on top of that he's saying he's going to bring back manufacturing jobs and he's saying he feels our pain. So I don't it doesn't seem to me like as much of a mystery. So you've done a lot of work over the years on how different issue attitudes, different uh ideas have changed for the working class, for other social classes in the country. Give me the high level of that. What's happened over the past 20 years in people's views?

24:37 Yeah., Well,, I, mean,, I, think, there's, a perception, among, at least, a, lot, of progressives that the uh the working class has gotten so conservative on, you know, cultural issues, da da da. Um but that's not true. you know, working-class people have gotten more progressive on virtually everything uh over the last 20 or 30 years. There are some exceptions to that starting to show, especially among Republican men, you know, who are at kind of moving away from some progressive positions around, you know gender rights and, you know, and and family issues and and and LGBTQ issues.

25:10 Um, but generally, yeah, you're seeing uh clear posit progressive movement among working-class people. But the issue is that middle class people and professionals have just gone way farther in a progressive direction on on social and cultural issues over the last few decades than working-class people have. And so that's creating this representation gap where Democrats feel they need to really cater to the more progressive positions of the of the middle class and of the upper middle class. And that creates this perception that somehow the working class is reactionary. No, they've actually been moving in the same direction, just not to the same degree. And when it comes to economic issues, um here's actually a coalitional story that's really positive potentially for Democrats, right? Which is that working-class people are quite progressive on many, many, many economic issues, particularly, like I said, the

26:03 so-called predistributive issues around things like union rights. Can, you, describe, this, predistributive redistributive divide here for a minute?

26:11 Absolutely., So,, you, know, predistribution is things that sort of affect your bargaining power or your um you, know,, sort, of, your, uh, place, in, in in in in the labor market. And so, you know, that's things like, you know, your wage structure. That's things like you know, your capacity to uh you know, get benefits or better working conditions. And it's things like, you know, pensions and it's uh you know, uh things like uh that that that provide jobs uh for people of different kinds. Um, and then redistribution is like, okay, well after the labor market process has occurred, uh, you know, we're going to take some money from those that are, you know, doing really well and we're going to give it to other people in the form of healthcare benefits or in the form of education or in the form of, you know welfare or social insurance.

26:54 A, $15, minimum, wage, is, predistributive. Absolutely., [snorts] A, um, earned, income, tax, credit

26:59 would, be, redistributive., Exactly., And working-class people tend to like those predistributive uh policies a lot because they kind of tap into values of of like respect and dignity and status right? It's like I actually care about having a job. You can say that I'm going to get I lose my job to AI or to you know automation or whatever and then I you know I'm going to get a universal basic income even a high one. Um and then most people would say many people would say that's okay but like what am I going to do? you know, like I've lost my status in society. I don't have a job.

27:32 That's where I found my respect and that's where I found my sense of meaning or, at least, an, important, part, of, meaning in my life. And predistribution sort of taps into that of, you know, maintaining your social status, maintaining your uh means of providing for your family. Um whereas redistribution, you know, is often perceived as something that is sort of like a handout. It's putting people in a vulnerable position where in which they kind of feel like, you know they're they're the victim of something rather than, you know, the agent of of of their own their own futures. So, I think that's kind of why you you see that divide in some ways. So what would a more fullthroated economic platform oriented towards what you found among around working-class attitudes look like versus a fullthroated leftward economic platform that is more the the college educated elite version of that?

28:26 Yeah., Yeah,, I, mean, I, think, it, would, be uh on the the fullthroated you know sort of workingclass oriented platform would be something along the lines of uh strong support for you know enhanced you know worker protections and and you know getting uh you know stronger union rights. Um it would be for increasing uh the minimum wage. maybe working-class people wouldn't be as jazzed about uh say, you know, a $20 minimum wage as uh as middle class people might be. Um so maybe it's it's also a matter of sort of

28:58 because, working, class, people, might, be more likely to lose jobs. Yeah., And, they, might, be, more, concerned about inflation. Um it would be for potentially even, you know, programs that would guarantee uh a job for people that need one from the government. Although the way that you present that you know, has huge impacts on the on the the way in which people perceive it.

29:18 The, way, you, do, it, would, also, have, pretty big impact on Absolutely., Hugely., Uh, but, and, then, in addition to that, you know, things that kind of go beyond, you know, where Democrats have been at in terms of exerting control over, you know, nobody wants to attack small businesses. Nobody wants to attack, you know, uh, people that are creating good jobs and communities, but there are big corporations that are really, really out of control and, you know, instituting policies, or, at least, attempting, to, that are going to try to rein in some of these excesses in terms of, say involuntary layoffs of of workers right? to say we are going to not give federal contracts to companies that don't make a commitment to some kind of you know voluntary package if they if they're going to lay off workers like like they do in Germany say like that would be really really important and valuable for working people and it

30:08 wouldn't be something that necessarily cost the government a ton of money. It wouldn't be something that would be perceived as, you know, oh my god, like uh the we're going to have this terrible problem with debt if if this comes in. Like maybe something like Medicare for all would, which by the way is also pretty popular, but it's also highly polarized, right? Like that's and so

30:25 well, the, how, you, describe, it, begins, to be I've done a huge amount of work on on healthcare over the years and which part of Medicare for all you're describing. Like you start talking about abolishing private health insurance, you start talking about raising middle class taxes. They couldn't get singlepayer done in Vermont

30:38 right?, Exactly., And, then, of, course there's a whole bunch of like more specific things related to the constituencies within districts. Like if you're more of a rural district then you're, going to, be, thinking, about, you know subsidies of different kinds to to help farmers you know smaller farmers succeed and and have more you know leverage over you know the big aggra business firms. You're going to want to see um different sorts of uh ways of incentivizing you know job creation of different kinds and job training programs etc etc. And then also you're going to want to defend and expand the most popular and most sort of organically uh sort of like American uh social insurance programs like you know social security and Medicare which are wildly popular among um working-class people and everybody else and we can build on those and we can uh use those as a foundation for a kind of really

31:28 robust progressive economic populism. On the other hand, a more redistributive populism would be one that's sort of focused on um yeah, universal basic income say or on um you know a sort of some version of a of a of a Green New Deal which is much more focused around um you know uh spending spending you know lots of money on programs that workingass people may be sort of skeptical are actually going to come back and benefit them in any way or on you know certain types of um you know means tested social insurance or things like that which are much easier to vilify and to demonize by Republicans.

32:04 So, then, let, me, get, at, something, else, you just touched on quickly. You said "Look, maybe if this were a different kind of system, parliamentary multi-party, well, those systems exist."

32:13 Yeah. And, in, every, other, rich, Western, country I know of, and they have different political parties, different political systems, their leaders made different decisions. You know, Germany was better at protecting manufacturing jobs than we were by a lot.

32:28 Yeah., They, have, all, seen, the, same, class deignment. They have all seen that class delignment go forward with the working class moving to the right. Yeah.

32:39 It's, not, like, the, German, Greens, are, on top, right? And, so, in, all, these, other, systems, where you had different political leaders different political parties, different political systems

32:49 functionally, [snorts] the same thing happened. Yeah. Why? I, mean, I, think, you, know, for, a, lot, of the same reasons. I mean, there's this um there's this great paper by Peter Holl and Georgina Evans called Representation Gaps where they sort of look at like the just like the Democrats, the central left parties all throughout Europe moved away from a focus on sort of, you know workingass issues and it sort of leaves this, gap, of, voters, in, in, all, of these countries including in the United States who don't really feel like they have a home on either side and that opens up the space for populists to come in of the left or the right But unfortunately for for progressives, you know, it's almost always been much more successful on the right uh to come in and take advantage of that sort of feeling of alienation and sort of like political homelessness. And so I think that's a very similar tendency. But still, I

33:40 mean, the I'm not saying the parliamentary system, you know, is the is is the be endo, but I do think the fact that there's so much variation in the degree to which you're seeing, you know, successful or unsuccessful far-right parties and and and and left coalitions throughout Europe, you know that can be to some degree explained by that. But I want to stay on the the question of its crossnational nature

34:00 because, that, implies, to, me, something structural is going on that is upstream of the individual political choices that the parties are making. I mean you can think of every uh you know country as a kind of political market.

34:14 Sure., And, it, would, make, sense, that, in some political markets that, you know particularly in a two-party political market, one of the parties would make some bad decisions about how to do market fit. This is a very neoliberal way to to make this argument. Um it doesn't make a ton of sense that in all of these countries simultaneously none of them none of the parties no party from center left to left would realize oh if we just stop being a party of you know professional managerial class cultural elites and start talking about pocketbook issues again we'll pick up all these voters and become popular in the way we were in much of the 20th century. somebody would have done it and then the others would have followed along. Either something was pushing them all in this direction, they were all recomposing themselves in the same way.

35:05 I think when you see that much similarity Yeah. across, a, strategy, that, is, not, working out very well

35:11 you, have, to, assume, there, is, some, reason they're all ending up in some version of the same strategy.

35:17 I, mean,, I, think, it's, cuz, it, was, rational to do so, right? I mean, they were winning elections, you know, for a long time. And you know the some of the some of the central left parties in Europe just like the Democrats you know like even the SPD you know was

35:28 you, want, to, say, the, SPD, is oh, sorry, the, German, social, democrats, you know um kind of held on you know longer than I would have expected. I mean, it's not like the Democrats are this like completely weak party that, you know it's like they could still they almost won the last election, right? I mean they did win 2020. You know, they, you know, it's like they're still a highly competitive party and they've been doing that on this strategy of appealing more to higher educated and higher income voters. And, you know, those voters are a larger and larger segment of the population. They're still a minority and a very, you know, significant minority a smaller minority in a lot of the main the key swing states, but you know, they thought that um we can appeal to this coalition. Um and they were winning elections on the basis of that. And they, you know, it wasn't crazy to think that you could just give all the working

36:15 class, you know, what they what they viewed as the working-class reactionaries over to the right and then you wouldn't have to make all these sort of dirty compromises that they felt like Democrats have been making before. And you know, I don't think that that's a crazy logic. I mean, because it brought them, you know, victory time after time.

36:30 Is, it, a, logic, or, is, it, a, a, sociology, or a political economy or a culture? Both. And what I mean by that, you mentioned sort of off-handedly the Grossman Hopkins book, The Diploma Divide, which is great.

36:42 And, one, of, the, parts, of, it, that, you, were referencing there is so you have this change happening in in all these countries. the the the party on the left is becoming the more highly educated party

36:55 and, at, the, same, time, more, highly educated people are in [snorts] control of the media organizations, right? They're running banks, right? They're running uh nonprofits and so you have a more unified

37:09 elite, culture. Yeah., There's, a, party, becomes, a, party, of the institutions and the kinds of people who run institutions, you know, set the tone of that party and slowly the the right-wing parties and part of the populist right parties which are in most cases now eating the right-wing parties become the anti-institutional party.

37:29 Oh,, absolutely., And, these, are, these, are in compounding factors, I would say. You know, and a shockingly small percentage of of candidates have a working-class background of any kind. And so yeah, and and those things reinforce each other and you know the perception of the party as being elite and out of touch is reinforced by both of those things simultaneously compounding upon each other. There's also this question of of affect. Um one thing human beings are just very good at sussing out almost instantly is whether this person is like me.

38:01 Yeah. In, some, fuzzy, way, that, you, know, defines like me to me. And that is how we dress. It's how we talk. It's how we look. It's our haircut. It's how um it's who else we're around. You mentioned that the floodgates on this open up with Trump who despite being a billionaire who fires people on television um has a very different affect.

38:27 Yeah. Than, Mitt, Romney,, right?, Than, George, W. Bush. And there is something here that I think is actually pretty tricky for for Democrats. I mean, you talked about how few uh now have working class backgrounds. And I find that people are much more comfortable talking about the issue positions. Like, yeah, if we just need to talk more about capping prescription drug prices, we're happy to do that. Then this other piece, which is I think better understood is fundamentally representation. Yeah. Right. Do I see myself in you?

38:58 How, do, you, think, about, that?, What, have your studies and surveys shown on that?

39:04 Yeah,, [snorts], I, think, it's, hugely important. You know, if people that are able to be relatable in meaningful ways and and talk in in terms that uh you know, working-class people understand and uh you know, don't find uh off-putting. You know, talking about hard work, talking about family, talking about tradition, talking about patriotism. All these things are things that Democrats just don't like to talk about, but they're things that most Americans, you know, find central to their identity. And um to the extent that Democrats are able to talk in those terms and are able to talk like a normal person in their district, you know, it's it's it's hugely important. And we do have some great examples of people who talk like that, you know, who are Democrats, you know, um in the House right, now., and, and and, you, know, for, like a Marie Gluen Cam Perez or you know Gabe Vasquez or you know Jared Golden you

39:54 know the policy stuff is is a separate question but just their affect is one of you know they just talk probably you know using more you know profanity using more self-deprecation talking in a way that's just sort of straightforward and um you know something that you know if they went to a to to a to a PTA meeting at their school they wouldn't be viewed as like a a snoody you you know, middle- class parent, right? And um I think that's I think that's hugely important. I mean, and you have somebody like a you know, like an Elizabeth Warren or something, you know, had all this great stuff, you know, but doesn't have that kind of that kind of a effect. And I think it's um

40:30 it's, worth, zooming, in, on, Warren, for, a minute. Um as a college educated liberal, I'm a big Elizabeth Warren fan and have been for a long time.

40:36 And, in, the, way, we, think, about, American politics, we group Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders together. They are the left wing of the Senate Democratic Party,

40:45 right?, And, if, you, look, over, the, years, at how they performed in their respective states, Bernie Sanders for a very long time uh has overperformed the Democratic party and Warren underperformed the Democratic party and she was very very strong among college educated liberals and weaker among working-class voters. And this I think shows up a lot that um you can have a form of left candidate who is very populist across a lot of measures.

41:14 Yeah., and, doesn't, read, as, working-class voters to these voters, right? I mean, I think if you pull the Harvard faculty on their preferred economic policies, they are extremely far-left. In fact, I suspect they're to the left of the median and working-class voter. Yeah.

41:31 But, they, would, not, do, very, well, in elections in Ohio. Yeah. And, there's, something, to, that.

41:36 Yeah., And, I, think, Yeah., I, think, that, you put your finger on it. There's also a policy aspect to this as well, which is that, you know, you can't, it's really important to remember that working-class people are in favor of a lot of progressive economic policies by overwhelming majorities. Um, but they also care about things that, you know Democrats um are more progressives anyway, are more squishy on, like, you know, not having a giant deficit or, you know, debt. They care a lot about inflation, you know, because working-class people got hit a lot harder by inflation than middle- class people did, right? Um, and they care about um economic opportunity and they care about, you know, small businesses thriving. And so, you know, just putting out this, you know, giant plat, you know, platter of um progressive economic policies that are going to uh signal to voters that you want to dramatically

42:28 increase, you know, government spending in ways that, you know, many of them who are extremely skeptical about government in general and haven't felt much positive coming out of government programs, you know, in their lives beyond maybe social security or Medicare, um, you know, they are going to be skeptical of of a lot of those programs. And so you need to also think about what are the types of progressive economic policies that really tap into you know, working-class voters sense of like we need good stable jobs. We need to have a chance at a middle class lifestyle that our parents had and that we feel is slipping away for us. And what are the ways in which government can help to provide opportunities that enable middle class and working-class film to really thrive as opposed to the framing of, you know, we need to have equality for for all different people and we need to have um we need to, you

43:17 know, spend all kinds of different money to to address different sorts of uh inequities in society. Those are those are valid goals and very important from from a progressive standpoint, but they don't connect as well, you know, with with working-class people. So, I think it is partly affect, but it's also partly the the policy, the suite of policies that you're that you're giving to to working- class voters. And you'll notice that a guy like Dan Osborne, you know, they're not going out there and and promoting the mo all like the suite of trillions and trillions of dollars of, you know, the the progressive wish list. They're doing some of that. Um

43:47 they're, not, Green, New, Deal, candidates. Absolutely, not., Yeah. Which, is, to, say, nothing, against, a, Green New Deal. I mean, it gets something else interesting that I've been thinking about a bit because I think it's pretty clear that in 2028 if AOC runs, which I think she's certainly considering, [snorts] you know, she's very likely to inherit the the Bernie Sanders lane.

44:06 Yeah. And, if, you, look, at, Sanders, and, and, AOC polling, they look actually quite different. Sanders, last poll I saw was something like plus 11 in his net favorabilities and AOC was45. So it's like they have like a 15ish gap between them and their policies are not very different. I mean at this point they're they're very unified, right? They're doing the the anti- oligarchy tour together. But what they have come to represent in American politics like Bernie Sanders with his mittens AOC at the the Met Gala. It it reads very differently, completely separate from how unified they are on issues.

44:43 Yeah., Yeah., Without, a, doubt., Although, you know, she does have a, you know majority. There's I don't know exactly but she has a huge amount of working-class people in her own district. So, we shouldn't understate.

44:53 I, think, these, things, um, overlap, with, an urban rural town that I think is really important. And I think Sanders comes from a not I think he does come from a state that has been that is heavily rural. Yeah.

45:04 And, he, codes, around, that., And, he's, like a old cranky white guy, right? These things all overlap on each other in weird ways. But I think it's also kind of interesting that Bernie has this positive perception among a lot of working-class people, which you know again, we shouldn't overstake because you know, he's taken a lot of positions that uh are very unpopular among, you know, a lot of uh people who are Republicans or independents. Um, you know, but that said, I do I think it's always kind of interesting that he he talks so much. I think he kind of has this uh popularity despite the fact that he's such a wonk, you know, like he talks, you know, he's always talking about like these specific numbers and he's talking about like, you know, facts and figures and stuff. He doesn't do any of the stuff that I would say would make a lot of sense. He's talking about anecdotes and like just really trying to

45:47 relate to people on an emotional level you know? He's very much like a machine and yet he's very popular just because he's very authentic, you know, and I think that's that's something that's very hard to capture. Well, I think there's also a dimension with Bernie that is somewhat unique to him, which is that he's an anti-party politician. Absolutely. He has traditionally not been a member of the Democratic party. He caucuses with them, but has made a point of running as an independent.

46:10 And, the, narrative, people, have, of, him., I always I have always thought this is very overblown, but nevertheless, is that the Democratic party organized to screw him.

46:18 Yeah., And, so, there, is, a, way, in, which going going back to the conversation we were having about the Democratic penalty and Dan Osborne running as an independent. I mean Bernie Sanders was functionally doing that in a much more left-wing guys before it was cool.

46:33 Yeah. And, he, maintains, I, think, some, separation from the broader parties. It continuously seen as an insurgent challenging and trying to change Democratic party as opposed to a part of it.

46:46 Yeah., Absolutely., And, we, need, a, lot, more people, you know, who are doing that. You know, Joe Mansion was doing that right? There's no reason why you couldn't have a progressive version of that like within the Democratic party right? You don't have to be a blue dog and also say I'm running as a Democrat and also like I'm very upset with what the Democratic Party has has become and what and you know what they've represented. Um, and so, you know, we need more people like that that are out there sort of tapping into this, you know, populist anger and anger not just at, economic, at least,, but, also, at, both parties. And I think you can do that you know, as a Democrat to some degree because we have all these examples of people doing it and and connecting effectively with people in their districts. And I think we need to see a lot more of that if we're going to do anything to address the Democratic

47:32 penalty in a lot of these competitive districts. There are a lot of ways of running against the Democratic party and I think people only imagine that the Democratic party that the choices are traveling along a line from Democratic socialist to to Joe Mansion.

47:48 Right. Right., Or, farther, than, Joe, Mansion, right? There's only moderating. There's moving left and there's moving right.

47:53 Right. So,, first, there's, no, one, line., There's, a left right line on economics, on cultural issues, on the system itself.

48:03 Yeah., Bernie, Sanders, is, an, anti-system figure. Bernie Sanders radiates a dislike for a contempt for capitalism and the way it functions and the American government and the way it functions where he really believes it's corrupt where some people just don't. Um, you see in Iowa, Rob Sand is running for governor and he's running as a Democrat who just doesn't like parties doesn't really think we should have parties, right? He's a moderate and he's running against the Democratic brand in a very different way than than Bernie Sanders does. I mean, you mentioned Jared Golden in in Maine and you know he's pro tariffs and you can run against a Democratic party from the left. You can run against it from the right. You can run against it as corrupt. You can run against parties as out of touch right? There's a million ways to do it.

48:48 But Joe Biden, who had moved quite to the left, was a fundamentally pro-system politician, right? Right. And Kla Harris coming after him was also a very pro-system politician even as her voting record was very very liberal.

49:02 And, I, think, people, mix, all, this, up, as one thing, but there are many things and you can choose, you know, to to be pointing in different directions on them at the same time.

49:11 Yeah,, without, a, doubt., And, also, it's it's not you know this idea of like being an authentic workingclass person who like kind of reads working class like that also doesn't necessarily tap into this sort of you know genuinely populist anti-system mentality right like like I think Tim Walls is an interesting example of that you know where he's like this guy who you know seems like created in a lab to be like the the liberals version of like a workingclass dude you know and he kind of is you know he got the plaid shirts like me and he's got the you know he's he was the coach and everything and you know, he, talk, he's he's, plain, spoken, but he doesn't have that like listening to his speeches I mean and you know he's a great politician and everything but listening to his speeches he doesn't have that fire that sort of like anger that sort of like just just like Bernie level like this system is just out of

49:57 control it's corrupt it needs a fundamental reckoning and until we have more Democrats that that have that kind of feeling about the system then I don't think many people are going to take seriously that they really care about making fundamental or really uh significant changes to the status quo like Kala Harris talked about you know there's a couple you know corporations generally play by the rules you know but you know some are doing price gouging pharmaceutical companies and you know we need to clamp down on that that's what we call like populist light you know the populist strong populism which we try to test is sort of like you know corporations have been screwing over workers for decades you know American workers are the backbone of this society and we need to do everything we can focus like a laser on making their quality of life better and for, you know, giving them the American dream

50:43 that they deserve. And we need to stop these rapacious corporations from running roughshot over our politics and our economics. And that kind of messaging that taps into that sense of just like complete disillusionment with you know, political and economic elites in this country, I think really resonates with working-class people and um I think more Democrats should be doing it.

51:04 We're, talking, obviously, in, New, York, City right now. What have you thought of Zoran Mandani? Well, I think, you know he's an exciting candidate for for for New York City, you know, and and to the extent that um you know, I've been on the on the left for a long time and, you know, I think he represents a m maturation of the you know, of the US or at least, the, New, York, City, uh, left, in terms of, you know, just a couple years ago, you you wouldn't really imagine a Democratic socialist candidate like him like just being so focused on on breadandbut economic issues. you know he might have gotten, you know critiqued for not focusing enough on all the other issues that that people in his base would have cared about. And, you know, so to that extent, I think it's it's positive growth and, you know, it shows, at least, the, charisma, that, he, has and the ability to to be super relatable. You know, those aspects of

51:50 his campaign are things that Democrats can learn from. But of course there's other areas in terms of the context specific nature of his you know own political views and the types of economic policies he's focusing on that you know you wouldn't want to generalize you know beyond places where it would be appropriate to do so. And the extent that people say, "Oh, well, Mom Donnie won in New York." And so that shows that you can go to, you know, whichever other place in the country and have whatever views you have, however progressive they may be on, you know, social and cultural issues and have whatever positions you've, ever, taken,, is, not, going to, be, an issue. Of course, that's not true right?

52:26 I've, been, thinking, a, lot, about, how generalizable his media campaign is. Yeah. [snorts]

52:30 Because, the, thing, about, New, York, City, is it is soaked in media. Yeah. It, is, very,, very, digital., Yeah,

52:37 it, is, very, easy, for, candidates, to, go viral here because they also get attention from outside.

52:42 So, the, signal, that, the, algorithms, are getting is that everybody is interested in Zoran Mamani. I mean the number of people who are watching Zoran Mamani videos is often you know if you add a couple of them up just significantly more than the number of people who are in in New York City like

52:56 and, so, there, [snorts], is, a, dimension where New York City has a tendency to have very very media savvy mayors right? Eric Adams, say what you will about him, the guy is a showman.

53:08 Yeah., Yeah., Yeah., And, you, know,, I, think, it's, a, little, bit less true for Delasio, but it was true for Giuliani. Donald Trump, who comes out of New York City, is a showman. [snorts]

53:17 And, so, New, York, City, is,, you, know,, you look at the people it produces. They are great at attention. And it's not possible to get that much attention in the same way in rural districts in Ohio or in Oklahoma or and so you have to do other things. I mean, you have to rely more on paid media, right? It and it's not to say that these things have no relevancy. They actually have a lot of relevancy for a national campaign right? Presidential candidates are working in that attentional space, too.

53:50 Yeah., But, of, course,, he's, going to, get vilified like crazy in every swing district. And so, um, his face and everything he said is going to be on TV um, as the the face of everything that's wrong with the Democratic party. So we're going to have to deal with that as well.

54:02 Well,, I, think, that's, a, a, a, place, where the Democratic Party is going to have to get better at being a big tent and knowing how to describe itself

54:10 as, a, party, that, has, many, different, types of candidates and people in it.

54:13 Y, in, a, way,, it, has, a, lot, of, trouble, doing right now. Absolutely. And, that, goes, in, both, directions,, right? It goes for Zoran Mdani on the left and then it goes for allowing candidates to to moderate in places like a Nebraska or a Kansas or an Ohio um you know in a different direction. And it you know the parties did not used to be nearly as nationally unified as they are now. This is a historical aberration from where we've been. And I I think this is going to become more important. Can you actually treat that as a strength, not something you're always explaining away?

54:49 Yeah,, absolutely., Just, like, you, said, that's going to have to go in both directions. The degree to which, you know, progressives in the in the in the coalition are willing to say, okay, you know, we we have folks here that we don't agree with on everything, but we recognize that they're helping to, you know, build our bench and, you know many of them, you know, are also great economic populace. So, we have things that are commonalities with them, but some of them are not, and that's, you know, that's okay, too. We need to have the broadest bench we can possibly have.

55:13 And then on the other hand, the the sort of more, you know, blue dog or centrist Democrats of different kinds, you know need to be amendable to the fact that the Democratic party, especially in, you know, urban areas, uh, is just very very different than it is in in the rest of the in the rest of the country. So yeah absolutely.

55:29 How, how, much, do, you, think, about, the, way that the problem of the Democratic Party's bench becomes uh self it feeds on itself, right? The weaker the Democratic Party gets among working-class voters, the weaker it gets in rural areas, the weaker it gets among um voters without a college education it just becomes harder

55:50 for, the, Democratic, party, to, find candidates in those groups because they're just fewer of them. Yeah.

55:55 And, they're, more, unusual, when, you, do find them. Yeah., Uh,, and it it is often felt to me that the Democratic Party should spend a lot more money on recruitment and talent discovery than it seems to.

56:09 Absolutely. But,, you, know,, I, also, know, that, one, of the ways that the Democratic, you know the the DC, which runs um, you know House recruitment and the the DSC, they look a lot for which candidates can fund their campaigns. And when you start

56:22 that's, why, you, don't, have, so, many working class candidates right?, when, you, when, you, begin, with, a question of where are you going to get the money for the candidacy you know then that's obviously going to point you towards more moneyed candidates

56:32 but, this, is, a, deeper, problem, than, just candidate recruitment which by the way I completely agree that you know and there are some states where the say the AFL CIO or you know sometimes even you know Democrats you know have candidate training programs directly targeted toward working-class cate like New Jersey is a great example of that where they have the unions there have a huge amount of workingclass and union candidates candidates like hundreds of them all around the state because they've had this super concentrated effort to get, you know, union and working-class people into office and running for office. And there's no reason why you can't have programs like that in other states. And that's not going to be having working-class candidates is not the, you know, beall endall, but it's it's a big part, it's an important part of the story. Um, but I think the deeper issue is just the

57:15 presence of organization in rural and small town areas, which there's just not there's nothing there. Like, you know my my dad's family comes from a small town in in in rural Indiana and like there's just literally no infrastructure of any kind for, you know, progressive candidates of, you know, to emerge because there's no unions anymore. You know, there's no there's no organizations like civic associations that people can join. And so I actually think that's a big part of the story is is let's take some of this billions of dollars that the Democrats spend on, you know, paid media every time and let's put 10% of it, you know, into building grassroots yearround grassroots organizations in, you know, red and purple states to try to not even the Democratic party itself, but in just civic associations that are doing good work uh to try to, you know, solve community problems. And that's where

58:07 some of these candidates can bubble up. And that's not a short-term project obviously, but the hollowing out of civic institutions and of you know the the presence of any kind of you know associational mechanism that could identify, and, and and, sort, of, shepherd those sorts of people toward uh running for office is I think a gigantic problem um that we just need to invest a well we're hardly investing anything in that and it's not the Democratic party needs to do that unions need to do that and it's a longer term project but otherwise you know we're literally seating the vast geographic majority of the country to to conservatives in their associations, right? And we don't need to do that. It's that's that's not inevitable. And that problem and the problem of authentic and strong candidate recruitment, I think, go hand in hand.

58:55 As, American, politics, has, nationalized, individual, candidates, are, held, much, more to account for their entire party.

59:02 Absolutely. Than, used, to, be, the, case., So, you're running as a Democrat, you're running as a Republican. In 1994 it was easier to run as a very different kind of Democrat or a very different kind of Republican than now where people say, "Yeah, I know you, Sherid Brown. I've known you forever, but I know what the Democratic party is, too, and you vote for Chuck Schumer as majority leader." Yeah. Right. Or the flip right? who might run a moderate Larry Hogan in Maryland who was ma, you know the governor of Maryland and a popular politician there, but he loses because people know that if he goes to the Senate as Republican, he will vote for John Thun and that will empower the Republican party. People are making a very very rational uh calculation there.

59:42 The D or R next to somebody's name particularly if we're talking about the House or Senate

59:46 is, more, important, than, their, name, by, a lot. Yeah. But, getting, the, parties, to, a, point, where people feel represented by them, right? Lowering for the Democrats that Democratic penalty in rust belt states is really really really important.

1:00:00 Yeah. Because, people, are, are, weighing, the party so heavily in their voting decisions now. The party itself is a brand they kind of like in the places where you actually need to win.

1:00:11 Yeah., Yeah., Well,, I, mean,, one, question I, you know, I I think it's an open one that I, you know, um don't really have a great answer to is, you know, what is the most effective means of changing that that brand? because it's certainly not going to come from, you know, the the party leaders, you know, saying different stuff cuz, you know, they don't nobody really listens to them anyway. I think it's going to come through these politicians, you know, on the ground trying to, you know, district by district, uh, tell a different story about the Democratic party, uh, until we can find, uh, a point at which, you know, more working-class people in in in in a diverse more diverse array of contexts are willing to take Democrats seriously. And that means that Democrats need to start winning seats in some of these, you know, much more difficult contexts. And they need to start learning how to be more effective at

1:00:58 messaging. You know, it's is it it's not is it moderating? Well, sometimes, but it's also sometimes just like taking a progressive position, but you know talking about it in a way that's that that's resonant with people. So, it's like, okay, well, we want to have um a reasonable position on immigration. It doesn't mean we need to, you know, go to Trump land on this and and be, you know dehumanizing and treat immigrants with with like disdain and and all the things that they're doing, but it means we need to say, you know, people that are playing by the rules, you know, that have been here in the United States and contributing to our economy, they're they're a meaningful part of our society and, you know, if they're not criminals um, you know, they should, you know have a pathway to citizenship. That's a viewpoint that the vast majority of Americans agree with. And it's not a conservative position. It's a

1:01:40 progressive position. And so, you know is that moderation? Well, I mean, maybe compared to, you know, open borders or something, but it's still a it's still a robustly progressive position. And I think there's a lot of things like that that Democrats could do. Um, you know that would both uh be amenable to people in their coalition that they need to keep on board and also, you know, enable them to message more effectively among people that are very skeptical of Democrats currently.

1:02:04 I, think, people, have, gotten, way, too pessimistic about changing party reputations.

1:02:08 Okay. We, have, watched, it, happen, over, and, over and over again in the past couple of decades. Bill Clinton substantially changed the reputation, whether you think that was for better or for worse of the Democratic Party.

1:02:19 Donald, Trump, substantially, changed, the reputation of the Republican party changed who votes for it. Barack [snorts] Obama changed the the Democratic party in in his era, at least.

1:02:27 Well,, what's, the, common, denominator, in all those cases? Party, leadership,

1:02:30 right?, But, it's, not, going, to, become, the current party leadership. So,, so, that's, what, I, was, about, to, say. So, I think a a thing that is a bit distinctive about the Democratic party in the past couple years is I think in a strange way, it's been leaderless. Absolutely.

1:02:42 I, think, that, Biden, ran, as, a, consensus candidate in a very strange year, the pandemic year, and he was just sort of everybody could agree on him in the Democratic party. And he he built this big coalition with the Bernie side of the party. And he was a very coalitional candidate in a way that really decided not to try to reshape what the Democratic party was. He was trying to bring all the factions in and keep them on board. And by then he was already very weakened as a communicator and party leader

1:03:12 right? And, then, 2024, is, such, a, strange, year with him dropping out and then the nomination being passed to Kla Harris with no primary at all. There's no time for a party leader to exert control over what the story of the Democratic Party is, where it is going left, where it's going right, where it's just changing its position. And so you've had the Democratic Party, I would say, even as it has been very ambitious on policy

1:03:39 it, has, been, in, a, state, of, communicative drift. Yeah. At, the, national, level

1:03:44 since, 2016. Y. And, so, then, what, the, next, party, leader does in 2028 is going to really matter.

1:03:51 And, what, kind, of, leader, the, Democrats pick. Is it somebody who is understood as trying to change the party? Somebody understood as representing its current mainstream? that will really decide what the, future, of, that, looks, like, at least in the immediate term.

1:04:04 Yeah., But, but, that's, probably, going, to depend to some degree on the test cases from 2026, right? So it's partly why you know, it's really important to sort of get a lot of these folks out there that are, you know, I think the more promising candidates to provide these models that um we could try to push for you know, in 2028. You know, I don't want to speculate about 2020. I have no idea. But um I you know it's somebody like these candidates that we're talking about you know who are from a rus belt state or from a more of a red state and you know that have this very very kind of relatable attitude and who are really driving home economic populism and have sort of attitudes that are you know out of step with like the way Democrats would traditionally talk. Like that's the kind of candidate that that we need.

1:04:46 Um whether or not we'll get one, who knows? I, think, that's, a, good, place, to, end. Always a final question. what are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

1:04:53 Um,, well,, I, guess, to, to, be, nerdy,, I'll say a couple that are similar to the you know, along the lines of what we're talking about today. So, one is, um very similar to the point I was just making, this book by the Scotch Pole and and Laney Newman called Rust Belt Union Blues, which talks about the hollowing out of associational life and in the rust belt and the ways that's affected um, you know, the move to the right in those areas. Another one is this beautiful book that's a few years old now um called We're Still Here by Jennifer Silva, which looks at working-class life in Northeast Pennsylvania and just shows the utter disillusionment that working-class people have with all institutions and the the depth of the problem that we have in trying to rebuild trust in institutions. And then I guess for something different, I just read a fantastic um tour to force history of uh the 500 years of uh Latin American and

1:05:46 US political and economic development by the historian Greg Grandon. It's called America Medica. Highly recommended um if you want to get a sense of the ways in which Latin America actually shaped the United States in in surprising uh respects.

1:05:59 Jared, Abbott,, thank, you, very, much. Thank, you,, Ezra., I, appreciate, it. Hey, hey hey.

Questions about this episode

Who speaks in "Can Economic Populism Save the Democratic Party? | The Ezra Klein Show"?

Ezra Klein (Guest), Jared Abbott (Guest).

What is "Can Economic Populism Save the Democratic Party? | The Ezra Klein Show" about?

The Democratic Party's identity as a champion of the working class is increasingly contradicted by its diminishing support among lower-income and less-educated voters, as highlighted by Donald Trump's successes in these demographics. Two primary theories explore this shift: one suggests a return to economic populism is necessary for Democrats to regain the working class, while the other posits…

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How long is "Can Economic Populism Save the Democratic Party? | The Ezra Klein Show"?

The episode runs 1 h 6 min; the transcript is about 13,341 words in 172 timestamped sections.

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