Transcript
Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show
From The Ezra Klein Show · Episode page · Watch on YouTube
· 1 h 10 min · 11,165 words · 86 timestamped sections
This is the full, timestamped transcript of "Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show", an episode of The Ezra Klein Show published November 21, 2025 (1 h 10 min, about 11,165 words). It mentions 237 people, works and ideas, including Fred Zakaria, Fared Zakaria, Ezra Klein, Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash: From 1600 to the Present, Donald Trump.
What this episode is about
The discussion centers on Fareed Zakaria's insights from his book "Age of Revolutions," where he examines the transformative shifts in the political landscape. Notably, he finds common ground with Steve Bannon, highlighting a shared recognition of the revolutionary nature of contemporary times and the fundamental changes affecting political systems globally.
Key takeaways
- Aligning with Bannon: When opposites agree, maybe the world really has flipped on its axis.
- Tea Party's Surge: Not your grandmother's economics—it's immigration, gender, and cultural shifts now.
- Republicans' Revolution: From pinstripe hierarchs to cultural crusaders—a rebellion decades in the making.
- Taming the Fringe: Gatekeepers held wild cards; an '08 quake has since opened Pandora's box.
- History's Echo: When populist insurgencies whisper loud enough, they eventually find lead roles.
Who speaks in this episode?
- Ezra Klein (Guest) · 31 min speaking
- Fareed Zakaria (Guest) · 38 min speaking
- Esther Klene (Guest) · 1 min speaking
What is discussed, and when
- – 10:00: The Republican Party, the Republican Party, Democratic Party, Sean Bannon
- – 20:00: cultural issues, Populism, France, Germany
- – 30:00: Identity politics, Bill and Hillary Clinton, Cultural backlash, Democratic Party
- – 40:00: Democratic Party, legal immigration, Identity politics, asylum
- – 50:00: New York City, New York, J.D. Vance, Annie Lowrey, Freedom
- – 1:00:00: Freedom, Autonomy, Liberalism, Patrick Denine
- – 1:09:31: Singapore, Lee Kuan Yu, South Korea, A Preface to Morals
Notable quotes from "Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show"
So, I've been reminded to remind you to please silence your phones because it's really hard to edit out. and I'm so thrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of…
about Fred Zakaria · atI think what we agree on is that something fundamental has changed in the political system. I began to think about this book in 2011 2012 with the Tea Party. And the reason was that.
about Ezra Klein · atAnd that rebellion, the more you looked at it, and the Scotch Paul, as you know did a wonderful book. She found that the core concerns of the Tea Party were not what the…
about cultural issues · atShould have pro protected our manufacturing sector better. Germany protected its manufacturing sector. The second largest party in Germany now is a right-wing populist party…
about Populism · atThe future of the Republican party, very pro-immigrant. you have the Republican party coming out with, an, autopsy, to, try, to, moderate, on immigration.
about The Republican Party · atConnect with people to put it very bluntly figuring out how to connect with people who didn't go to college and the Democratic party has lost the ability to communicate with…
about Democratic Party · atPart, and nothing is the only explanation, but in some significant part, this rise of identity politics has to do with having had 40 or 50 years of no wars, no massive upheaval steady economic growth in the Western.
about Identity politics · atDemocrats improve with white voters between 2016 and 2020 and Trump improves with non-white voters. And Trump's 2024 coalition is much more multi-racial than his 2016…
about Donald Trump · at
Who and what is mentioned in this episode?
People
- Fred Zakaria — Person · Main guest · 1 mention · first at
Primary interview subject discussing his book and political analysis - Fared Zakaria — Person · Main guest · 1 mention · first at
Interview subject discussing his book 'Age of Revolutions' and broader themes of populism, technology, immigration, and elite legitimacy.So, I've been reminded to remind you to please silence your phones because it's really hard to edit out. and I'm so thrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of…
- Ezra Klein — Person · Host / interviewer · 1 mention · first at
Leads the conversation, frames the arguments, challenges Zakaria on economics vs culture, immigration, and elite formation. - Donald Trump — Person · Referenced expert · 5 mentions · first at
Discussed in the context of political shifts and populism - Esther Klene — Person · Host · 1 mention · first at
Host of the podcast and moderator of the discussionI'm Esther Klene, a columnist and podcast host at the New York Times. And this tonight is going to be a podcast.
- Sean Bannon — Person · Referenced expert · 4 mentions · first at
Discussed in the context of political strategy and populismBegin fared with where you open the book which is one of the more unusual scenes I've imagined. So, you open the book around a conversation you had with Steve Bannon in Rome.…
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure / conservative movement builder · 3 mentions · first at
Used to argue that populist/illiberal currents existed long before 2016 within the Republican coalition and conservative intellectual history.Dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure (conservatism) · 2 mentions · first at
Used to argue that populist/illiberal currents existed long before 2016 within the Republican coalition and conservative movement.Dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure (conservatism / GOP intellectual history) · 1 mention · first at
Discussed via a biography to argue that populist/illiberal currents existed long before 2016 and were managed by party gatekeepers.Dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure (conservatism) · 1 mention · first at
Used to argue the GOP always had a populist/illiberal reservoir; Buckley’s early politics are cited via a biography.Dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure / conservative intellectual · 1 mention · first at
Invoked via biography to argue that populist/illiberal currents existed long within the Republican coalition and conservative movement.So, I've been reading Sam Tanninous's biography of William F. Buckley. And Buckley gets his start as or very early before even what we would think of his political career. He's a big admirer of Lindberg and the America First.
- William F. Buckley — Person · Referenced historical figure / conservative intellectual · 1 mention · first at
Used to discuss the Republican Party's long-running populist/illiberal currents and the role of gatekeepers/mandarins.Dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- Marie Le Pen — Person · Referenced contemporary political figure (comparative example) · 29 mentions
Cited as evidence that right-wing populism can surge even in high-welfare states (France), supporting Zakaria’s claim that culture/immigration—not only inequality—drives current politics. - Bill and Hillary Clinton — Person · Referenced expert · 4 mentions · first at
Mentioned as an example of a successful Democratic presidentTo convey the kind of authenticity he did. And that authenticity, I think, buys you. As somebody once said about Bill Clinton, if you can if about Clinton's success, if you can…
- William F.B. Buckley — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned in the context of political historyDividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- J.D. Vance — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned in the context of political shifts and populismYeah., JD, Vance, calling, New, York, a hellscape.
- Patrick Denine — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned in the context of elite formation and political strategyBring back some of those old certainties of religion and morality and tradition and community. But the key issue and this came out quite well in your conversation with him on this podcast.
- Lee Kuan Yu — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned as an example of a successful leaderLee Kuan Yu was this extraordinary combination. he was both a strategic genuinely a strategic thinker and yet he was you know he was one of the greatest implementers and executors that.
- Sam Tannenhaus — Person · Referenced author/biographer · 2 mentions
Cited as the biographer of William F. Buckley, used to support the argument about longstanding right-populist currents. - George Soros — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political analysisWoke agenda. And so I began to see that there was something changing in the politics. and Bannon and Soros, I think, would all agree that there's some kind of churn that has…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political historyPresidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Sam Tannenous — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political analysisDividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that among Buckley's people.
- John Gance — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political analysisMedia were just able to keep a lid on it until this period. But that's precisely the, point., I, mean, you, you, had, on your show John Gance whose wonderful book show reminds…
- Bernie Sanders — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of a left-wing politicianPoliticians of the left who have been who have commanded attention in this era, you look at Bernie Sanders, look at AOC and we're here in New York, you look at Zoran Mani. That…
- Zoran Mani — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of a new left politicianPoliticians of the left who have been who have commanded attention in this era, you look at Bernie Sanders, look at AOC and we're here in New York, you look at Zoran Mani. That…
- Barack Obama — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of a successful Democratic presidentPretty centrist in terms of their policies. They stayed at the cultural center of the country. Remember Obama was initially opposed to gay marriage.
- Daniel Bell — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political theoryThat I am certainly part of. I would point out Ezra so are you. the person who wrote about it most intelligently is the great Harvard scholar Daniel Bell who wrote a book called I think the coming of the postindustrial society. And he.
- Alan Erin Halt — Person · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political theoryLife you know in a modern time how do you how do you what do you do to bring back old values? There's a wonderful book called The Lost City by Alan Erin Halt, a journalist who…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 2 mentions · first at
Used as an example of the old GOP 'fall in line' era and party hierarchy (repeated nominations).Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Annie Lowrey — Person · Referenced journalist/expert · 2 mentions · first at
Cited for reporting on poverty policy and administrative burden ('time tax'); also identified as Ezra Klein’s wife in the conversation.The great journalist Annie Larry has written wonderful stuff who happens to be Ezra's wife has written wonderful stuff about how not only do we not provide much support for people who are.
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Used as an example of the older, disciplined GOP era ('Republicans fall in line') to contrast with Tea Party/Trump insurgency.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Used as an example of the old Republican establishment era ('fall in line') and party hierarchy before the Tea Party/Trump insurgencies.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Used as an example of the old Republican 'fall in line' era and party hierarchy/gatekeeping.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Used as evidence of the GOP’s former hierarchical, establishment-driven nomination behavior (“fall in line”), contrasting with Tea Party/Trump insurgency.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Cited to illustrate the old GOP 'fall in line' era and establishment nomination patterns.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Richard Nixon — Person · Referenced historical political figure · 1 mention · first at
Cited to illustrate the older 'Republicans fall in line' era and party hierarchy/gatekeeping.Presidential nominee, right? Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If…
- Francois Mitterrand — Person · Referenced historical leader (counterexample to neoliberalism thesis) · 1 mention · first at
Invoked to argue France did not undergo a Thatcher/Reagan-style neoliberal revolution, yet still saw strong right-populist backlash.Ronald Reagan. The person who was president of France in that period was Francois Mitron, a socialist. France has never had any of the neoliberal revolution. And yet it has…
- Paul Ryan — Person · Referenced political figure (pre-Trump GOP) · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as emblematic of a pre-2016 Republican future that was more establishment-oriented and comparatively pro-immigration.At other structural changes as recently in America as 2012. you have Paul Ryan as seemingly the future of the Republican party, very pro-immigrant. you have the Republican party coming out with, an, autopsy, to, try, to, moderate, on.
- Alan Ehrenhalt — Person · Referenced journalist / recommended author · 1 mention · first at
Recommended for his book 'The Lost City' as a lens on community, mobility constraints, and the tradeoffs between choice and social cohesion.Life you know in a modern time how do you how do you what do you do to bring back old values? There's a wonderful book called The Lost City by Alan Erin Halt, a journalist who…
- Lee Kuan Yew — Person · 33 mentions
Books & papers
- Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash: From 1600 to the Present — Book · Primary recommendation · 1 mention · first at
Central topic of the discussion, analyzing historical revolutionsThrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of Freed Zakaria GPS on CNN and author of the great book Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash: From 1600 to the Present, which came out in paperback on November 4th.
- The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society — Book · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a book analyzing the role of knowledge in societyThe person who wrote about it most intelligently is the great Harvard scholar Daniel Bell who wrote a book called I think the coming of the postindustrial society. And he…
- A Preface to Morals — Book · 2 mentions · first at
The one book that I have loved and have gone back to over and over is a book by Walter Lipman called a preface to morals. it was written in the 1920s during the jazz age and he…
- Escape from Freedom — Book · 1 mention · first at
It's a it's a message that actually will appeal to young people. The writer Eric from wrote a book called Escape from Freedom. And he says the real meaning of life is that you…
- The Lost City — Book · 1 mention · first at
Do you how do you what do you do to bring back old values? There's a wonderful book called The Lost City by Alan Erin Halt, a journalist who went back to Chicago to wonder you…
Companies & orgs
- the Republican Party — Company · 9 mentions · first at
Unusual, a kind of insurgency within the Republican party. Now remember, most people forget this now, but the Republican party used to be the stayed boring hierarchical party…
- the Democratic Party — Company · 7 mentions · first at
Nomination was able to be an irritant there were there was always the you know the switch over from the Democratic party for the white southern you know kind of old racist…
- New York Times — Company · Affiliation · 1 mention · first at
Employer of the host, Esther KleneI'm Esther Klene, a columnist and podcast host at the New York Times. And this tonight is going to be a podcast.
- CNN — Company · Affiliation · 1 mention · first at
Employer of Fred ZakariaReally hard to edit out. and I'm so thrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of Freed Zakaria GPS on CNN and author of the great book Age of Revolutions…
- Princeton University Press — Company · Referenced expert · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as the publisher of Fred Zakaria's academic dissertationIt's I think it's my fifth so I have an academic dissertation which was published by Princeton University Press and then I have five books after that.
- Wall Street Journal — Company · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
Cited as a source for statistics on wealth inequality discussed in the podcast.Statistic in the Wall Street Journal over the weekend that kind of made me want to take out a pitchfork so the net worth held by the top.1% of households in the US reached 23.3…
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis — Company · Data source · 1 mention · first at
Cited as the source for wealth inequality statistics discussed in the conversation.Second quarter this year from 10.7 trillion a decade earlier. So from 20 from 10.7 to 23.3 in one decade. That's according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The amount…
- Foreign Affairs — Company · 1 mention · first at
You, became, the, youngest, ever, managing editor of foreign affairs I believe at age 28. By 2000 you were editor of Newsweek International. so you've moved among American elites for decades now. You've moved among international.
- Newsweek International — Company · 1 mention · first at
Editor of foreign affairs I believe at age 28. By 2000 you were editor of Newsweek International. so you've moved among American elites for decades now. You've moved among…
- Fareed Zakaria GPS — Company · 1 mention
- Our World in Data — Company · 1 mention
Products & tech
- radio — Product · 5 mentions
- printing press — Product · 1 mention · first at
The Protestant revolutions follow the printing press. the Nazis and fascism are built at top radio.
- TV — Product · 1 mention
Concepts & topics
- Democratic Party — Concept · Key argument · 13 mentions · first at
Discussed in the context of political shifts and the rise of cultural issues over economic ones. - The Republican Party — Concept · Key argument · 9 mentions · first at
Discussed in the context of political shifts and the rise of cultural issues over economic ones. - Populism — Concept · Key argument · 5 mentions · first at
Analyzed as a driving force in contemporary politics - Identity politics — Concept · Core topic · 5 mentions · first at
Discussed as a significant factor in modern political shifts - cultural issues — Concept · Core topic · 4 mentions · first at
Highlighted as a primary concern driving political shifts, especially within the Tea Party. - Liberalism — Concept · Core topic · 4 mentions · first at
Analyzed as a political philosophy in the context of modern challengesThat things like the DEI stuff I think a lot of the woke agenda is deeply illiberal. I am an old-fashioned liberal in the sense that I believe Martin Luther King when he said…
- Social Media — Concept · Core topic · 2 mentions · first at
Identified as a transformative force in modern politics and communication.How do you think about the move to social media, what I now think of as algorithmic media that happens sort of roughly around the same time in all these countries and seems to coincide.
- Cultural backlash — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as a reaction to identity politics and multiculturalism.Yeah,, absolutely., In, fact,, you, know,, the the afterward is almost entirely about the cultural backlash from the right that has been produced by all these changes. So, and this is a very common pattern. the most the.
- open versus closed — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Presented as a new political spectrum replacing left versus right on economics.You're more likely to vote right for the Republican party because the values the spectrum is no longer left versus right on economics. It's what I call open versus closed…
- H-1B visa program — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Discussed as a flashpoint in debates over legal immigration.Immigration on which of course they are completely lock stack but legal immigration. So Trump goes on Laura Ingram and defends the H-1B visa program which is you're taking…
- Maslow's hierarchy — Concept · Framework · 12 mentions
Used to explain the shift towards identity politics in affluent societies.Part, and nothing is the only explanation, but in some significant part, this rise of identity politics has to do with having had 40 or 50 years of no wars, no massive upheaval steady economic growth in the Western.
- Tea Party — Concept · Historical reference · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as an early indicator of the shift in Republican party dynamics towards cultural issues.Think about this book in 2011 2012 with the Tea Party. And the reason was that the Tea Party represented something very unusual, a kind of insurgency within the Republican…
- Algorithmic media — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Highlighted as a technological shift contributing to political polarization.How do you think about the move to social media, what I now think of as algorithmic media that happens sort of roughly around the same time in all these countries and seems to coincide.
- Identity revolution — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Described as a shift towards identity-based politics in affluent societies.But a different kind of revolution can originate from a state of abundance and that is a case of the identity revolution. Tell me what you mean. So most of you have heard of…
- Neoliberal revolution — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Discussed as a potential factor in the rise of right-wing populism, though contested.And because so much of the time I'm thinking about what's going on in other countries. So look at France. France had no neoliberal revolution. France never had a Margaret…
- meritocracy — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Discussed as a factor in modern political and social dynamicsLet's focus on the American ones. How have they changed? I would say first of all, I have been one of the great beneficiaries of this move to a meritocratic elite. I came to this country literally knowing nobody with you know a.
- woke agenda — Concept · Referenced concept · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned as a cultural concern of the Tea Party and modern right-wing movements.Cultural issues. It was immigration. It was gender issues. It was multiculturalism. What's now called the woke agenda. And so I began to see that there was something changing…
- Postmaterialist values — Concept · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as a shift in political valuesTo trace what you're describing by identity revolution here because postmaterialist politics which is a big part of the story describes a much broader set of political concerns and what we think of as identity. Right?
- neoliberalism — Concept · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of left parties' shift away from working-class populism.Is something we in America find difficult to talk about but it is as you say the left has become largely populated by kind of an elite professional class which is the new kind…
- Maslo's hierarchy — Concept · Referenced concept · 1 mention · first at
Psychological theory mentioned in the discussion of human needsOriginate from a state of abundance and that is a case of the identity revolution. Tell me what you mean. So most of you have heard of Maslo's hierarchy, right? All human…
- First Principles Thinking — Concept · 1 mention
- Pareto Principle — Concept · 1 mention
- Cognitive Biases — Concept · Framework · 3 mentions
Mentioned in passing as part of the discussion on media and politics. - the American First movement — Concept · Historical reference · 3 mentions
Mentioned in the context of William F. Buckley's early political influences.Buckley gets his start as or very early before even what we would think of his political career. He's a big admirer of Lindberg and the America First movement of that age. Then…
- Stoicism — Concept · Referenced concept · 1 mention · first at
Philosophy mentioned in passing during the discussionPretty centrist in terms of their policies. They stayed at the cultural center of the country. Remember Obama was initially opposed to gay marriage.
- Freedom — Concept · 8 mentions · first at
They caused enormous anxiety you know Kirkagard calls an it says anxiety is the dizziness of freedom and I think we live with that dizziness of freedom in the United States and…
- Autonomy — Concept · 4 mentions · first at
Press him on this and he skirted it is that it is denying people individual choice, autonomy and freedom because at the end of the day for it to mean anything this new…
- legal immigration — Concept · 3 mentions · first at
Should be in favor of. My own view is that the great battle that the left should be fighting is for legal immigration to make sure it is maintained, to make sure it's reformed…
- Housing — Concept · 3 mentions · first at
America faces and every blue run city in America faces is affordability around one central issue which is housing. and how you're going to get that to happen, it seems to me…
- hedge fund manager — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
Somebody who makes a lawyer in New York who's making3 or $4 million a year and somebody a hedge fund manager or a tech billionaire who's making a billion dollar a year. And we…
- feminist revolution — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
Identities, their political identities defined much more by the sense of who they are. So you have the feminist revolution, coming out of the Betty Friedan and all that stuff.…
- asylum — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
System or there was a mechanism in the immigration system that allowed you to come in and apply for asylum. So what a process that was meant to be for a few thousand dissident…
- Enlightenment liberal project — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
Is fundamentally going against the grain of history and that the liberal the enlightenment liberal project I believe at the end will succeed because it is in deepest sympathy…
- Free trade — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
Freedom. And as I say, economically, I'm much more comfortable with free markets and free trade for that reason. And I'm much less enamored of, governmental elites telling me what, what to do. I grew up in India and I saw all that.
- Trump administration — Concept · 2 mentions · first at
Anyway it is what you're not seeing is for example what also happened in the last few days which is the Trump administration has signal to South Korea that basically not only…
- America First movement — Concept · 1 mention · first at
Early before even what we would think of his political career. He's a big admirer of Lindberg and the America First movement of that age. Then like right out of college, he's…
- Red Scare — Concept · 1 mention · first at
Movement of that age. Then like right out of college, he's out there defending Joseph McCarthy and the Red Scare and that sort of profound populist insurgency and pressure in…
- capital gains — Concept · 1 mention · first at
For the guy who's worth 25 billion and makes nothing in income every year makes it all through, capital gains or borrowing against his stock portfolio. In other words, we have…
- stock portfolio — Concept · 1 mention · first at
Makes nothing in income every year makes it all through, capital gains or borrowing against his stock portfolio. In other words, we have an accumulation of wealth on the high…
- Protestant revolutions — Concept · 1 mention · first at
The Protestant revolutions follow the printing press. the Nazis and fascism are built at top radio.
Places & events
- the Tea Party — Event · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as a pivotal movement that signaled a shift in Republican party dynamics towards cultural issues.And that rebellion, the more you looked at it, and the Scotch Paul, as you know did a wonderful book. She found that the core concerns of the Tea Party were not what the…
- the 2016 election — Event · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as a turning point in American politics, marking the rise of Trump and the shift towards identity-based voting.Line, but was it just the structure of having gatekeepers? Because it's not that the desire for something like this only emerged in 2016. I think as now a number of the…
- The 2008 Financial Crisis — Event · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a critical event that destroyed the gatekeeping power of the economic elite.Business elite that believed fundamentally that economics was the dominant story. And the the08 crash really destroyed that the gatekeeping power of that elite and I think that is part of the big story here. But there is another story which.
- Tea Party — Event · Key argument · 2 mentions · first at
Discussed as a precursor to modern political shiftsPolitical system. I began to think about this book in 2011 2012 with the Tea Party. And the reason was that the Tea Party represented something very unusual, a kind of…
- the 2008 crash — Event · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Identified as a critical event that undermined the gatekeeping power of economic elites.Business elite that believed fundamentally that economics was the dominant story. And the the08 crash really destroyed that the gatekeeping power of that elite and I think that is part of the big story here. But there is another story which.
- COVID-19 pandemic — Event · Key argument · 13 mentions
Mentioned in the context of political and social impacts1.5 billion people moved out of extreme poverty in this period. you had many fewer wars and violence declined as Steven Pinker keeps pointing out. Not such a bad track record for the last 30.
- France — Place · Setting · 5 mentions · first at
Mentioned as an example of political shifts in EuropeSo I want to get at some of the other kind of structural dimensions you look at. So you write revolutions can erupt from desperation and despair as in France in 1789.
- Germany — Place · Setting · 4 mentions · first at
Mentioned as an example of political shifts in EuropeShould have pro protected our manufacturing sector better. Germany protected its manufacturing sector. The second largest party in Germany now is a right-wing populist party…
- New York City, New York — Place · Setting · 4 mentions · first at
Mentioned as a location of political and cultural significanceRight. New York City did not vote for Donald Trump. I think Zoron Mdani defends New York City's multi-ethnic heart, its fundamental cosmopolitanism in a genuinely.
- Singapore — Place · Setting · 3 mentions · first at
Mentioned as an example of successful nation-buildingMalaysia called Singapore which was you know its only natural resource was mosquitoes and he has turned it into a country a small country but is at absolutely central to the…
- the 2020s — Event · Contextual event · 3 mentions
Mentioned in the context of discussing current political dynamics and potential shifts in voter alignments.So the book has a new afterward and you write in it that quote the happiest countries in the world in Northern Europe are capitalist welfare states with an emphasis on community and clan often led by fairly humble empathetic.
- South Korea — Place · Setting · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned in the context of political and nuclear issuesAnyway it is what you're not seeing is for example what also happened in the last few days which is the Trump administration has signal to South Korea that basically not only…
- the 2010s — Event · Historical context · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a period marking significant shifts in political dynamics and the rise of populist movements.At other structural changes as recently in America as 2012. you have Paul Ryan as seemingly the future of the Republican party, very pro-immigrant. you have the Republican party coming out with, an, autopsy, to, try, to, moderate, on.
- Sweden — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of political shifts in EuropeThe same. But when you ask about this new politics, so let's go to a place like Sweden. Sweden does not have a huge income inequality problem. They've actually done a very good…
- The Protestant revolutions — Event · Historical context · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of how communication technologies can drive political revolutions.The Protestant revolutions follow the printing press. the Nazis and fascism are built at top radio.
- Great Depression — Event · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of historical political shiftsThe late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I…
- the Great Depression — Event · 1 mention · first at
Economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years…
- World War I — Event · 1 mention · first at
Dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I, the Great Depression, World War…
- World War II — Event · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of historical political shiftsThe late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I…
- World War One — Event · Key argument · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of historical political shiftsThe late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I…
- The 2024 Election — Event · Contextual event · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of discussing current political dynamics and potential shifts in voter alignments.Democrats improve with white voters between 2016 and 2020 and Trump improves with non-white voters. And Trump's 2024 coalition is much more multi-racial than his 2016…
- California — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of political and cultural dynamicsAnd you think about the place we're in right now, New York.
- Fontana — Place · 1 mention · first at
Right. It's it's it's the it's the guy in Montana looking at what's happening in New York and saying, Oh my god, this is no longer my country.
- Denmark — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as an example of political shifts in EuropeWe were praising you're seeing a huge amount of push back and I would point out the one left of center successful party by the way in Europe right now is the Denm is in Denmark…
- India — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of Fred Zakaria's backgroundOf, governmental elites telling me what, what to do. I grew up in India and I saw all that.
- Venezuela — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political and economic issuesDoesn't come from boats in Venezuela but anyway it is what you're not seeing is for example what also happened in the last few days which is the Trump administration has signal…
- Japan — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of political and nuclear issuesDon't go down the step because if you go down this that step, the Japanese will want to do it. And if the Japanese want to do it, another bunch of countries and then we will…
- Chicago — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned in the context of community and valuesBring back old values? There's a wonderful book called The Lost City by Alan Erin Halt, a journalist who went back to Chicago to wonder you wondering why the Chicago of his…
- the 1980s — Event · Historical context · 3 mentions
Referenced as a period marking the beginning of the shift towards identity politics and postmaterialist values.Think that is part of the big story here. But there is another story which is that over the last 30 or 40 years you are seeing a consistent shift of people moving away from…
- the 1990s — Event · Historical context · 3 mentions
Mentioned as part of the discussion on the rise of the meritocratic elite and the neoliberal revolution.Think you always these periods of change always help people who are risk-seeking and the center left has been in comfortable ascendancy since the '9s Think of the Blairites in…
- the 2000s — Event · Historical context · 3 mentions
Referenced in the context of discussing the evolution of political dynamics and the rise of identity politics.Think that is part of the big story here. But there is another story which is that over the last 30 or 40 years you are seeing a consistent shift of people moving away from…
- Symphony Space — Place · Setting · 1 mention · first at
Venue where the podcast was recordedAll right. Hello everybody. Thank you for being here tonight. Welcome to Symphony Space.
- the Red Scare — Event · Historical context · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as part of the discussion on historical populist insurgencies within the Republican party.Movement of that age. Then like right out of college, he's out there defending Joseph McCarthy and the Red Scare and that sort of profound populist insurgency and pressure in…
- the 1970s — Event · Historical context · 1 mention · first at
Referenced alongside the 1960s as a period of social change and the rise of identity politics.Upheaval steady economic growth in the Western world. And you see that when you look at the late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has.
- World War II — Event · Historical context · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a period of upheaval that preceded economic growth and identity politics.Economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years…
- Great Depression — Event · Historical reference · 1 mention · first at
Cited as a period of significant economic hardship preceding postmaterialist values.The late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I…
- the 1960s — Event · Historical reference · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a period of significant cultural and political change.Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years of steady economic growth. You begin to see people's identities, their political identities defined much more by the…
- the 1920s — Event · Historical reference · 2 mentions · first at
Mentioned as a period of cultural and political change.Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years of steady economic growth. You begin to see people's identities, their political identities defined much more by the…
- The COVID-19 pandemic — Event · Historical reference · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as part of recent global upheavals.Inequalities and dysfunctions obviously cause enormous anxiety, anger whatever but the age we are living in. I would argue these things get channeled through cultural…
- the 1600s — Event · Historical reference · 1 mention · first at
Mentioned as a period of historical significance.Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years of steady economic growth. You begin to see people's identities, their political identities defined much more by the…
Media & podcasts
- Freed Zakaria GPS — Media · Business focus · 1 mention · first at
Fred Zakaria's show on CNNReally hard to edit out. and I'm so thrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of Freed Zakaria GPS on CNN and author of the great book Age of Revolutions…
- The Wall Street Journal — Media · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
Cited as a source for statistics on wealth inequality discussed in the podcast.Or do you want all these things closed well let's not leave economics quite yet I read a statistic in the Wall Street Journal over the weekend that kind of made me want to take…
- Wall Street Journal — Media · Referenced work · 1 mention · first at
Cited as a source for statistics on wealth inequality.Or do you want all these things closed well let's not leave economics quite yet I read a statistic in the Wall Street Journal over the weekend that kind of made me want to take…
- Rick and Morty — Media · 1 mention
- Joe Rogan Experience — Media · Referenced work · 10 mentions
Mentioned in passing
Full transcript with timestamps
All right. Hello everybody. Thank you for being here tonight. Welcome to Symphony Space. I'm Esther Klene, a columnist and podcast host at the New York Times. And this tonight is going to be a podcast. So, I've been reminded to remind you to please silence your phones because it's really hard to edit out. Um, and I'm so thrilled to be here with Fred Zakaria tonight, the host of Freed Zakaria GPS on CNN and author of the great book Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash: From 1600 to the Present, which came out in paperback on November 4th.
Congratulations. Thank, you, so, much,, Ezra., It's, a, huge pleasure to be here.
This, is, book, number, one, for, you. uh it's I think it's my fifth uh so I have an academic dissertation which was published by Princeton University Press and then I have five books after that. So this is the sixth book but um as as a friend of mine says you never talk about your academic uh dissertation. It's like the the little indie movie that you made before before you went to Hollywood.
So, so so, the, one, that, really, represents you before you sell out. Exactly., Okay,, the all right the run of show tonight is we're going to chat for a while. You a number of you have kindly submitted questions which I have chosen with extreme uh discretion and prejudice that I will ask at the end. Um and we're going to have a great time. So I want to begin fared with where you open the book which is uh one of the more unusual scenes I've imagined. So, you open the book around a conversation you had with Steve Bannon in Rome. And I got to say I found this chain very funny. Um, Steve Bannon quotes George Soros approvingly to you, saying we live in revolutionary times. Bannon says he's agree Bannon says he agrees with Soros. And then your whole book is agreeing with Steve Bannon.
So, what do you all agree on? I think what we agree on is that something fundamental has changed in the political system. You know, I began to think about this book in 2011 2012 with the Tea Party. And the reason was that the Tea Party represented something very unusual, a kind of insurgency within the Republican party. Now remember, most people forget this now, but the Republican party used to be the stayed boring hierarchical party that just went along with the party elders doing whatever they were told. Right? It used to be the line when when choosing a nominee, a nominee, you'd say the Democrats fall in love with their presidential nominee, right? Uh Kennedy Clinton, Obama, the Republicans fall in line. This is a party that five times nominated Richard Nixon for their national ticket. Right? If you add up the number of Bushes they've nominated it's probably another five. So this party is having an internal rebellion.
And that rebellion, the more you looked at it, and the Scotch Paul, as you know did a wonderful book. She found that the core concerns of the Tea Party were not what the Republican party used to be about, which is economics and balancing budgets and cutting deficits. It was cultural issues. It was immigration. It was gender issues. It was multiculturalism. What's now called the woke agenda. And so I began to see that there was something changing in the in the in the politics. and Bannon and Soros, I think, would all agree that there there's some kind of churn that has taken place where we've left the old leftright debate over economics and we've moved into a different world, a different age with a different set of uh dividing lines. But wasn't that always just a sanitization of the Republican party? So, I've been reading Sam Tannenous's great biography of William F.B. Buckley and he makes a point that
among Buckley's people. We we we just talked about this. So So isn't that a Senate Isn't that sanitizing the Republican party? So I've been reading Sam Pannenous's uh Great. I'm retaking this for the podcast. This is this person's fault. Um we do it one more time.
It, might, be, more, fun, to, do, as, the outtakes. Yeah., Right., Yeah., We'll, make, this, the cold open. Um doesn't that sanitize the Republican party? Ignore a big part of its history. So, I've been reading Sam Tanninous's biography of William F. Buckley. And Buckley gets his start as uh or very early before even what we would think of his political career. He's a big admirer of Lindberg and the America First movement of that age. Then like right out of college, he's out there defending Joseph McCarthy and and the Red Scare and that sort of profound populist insurgency and pressure in the Republican party. You have, of course Buchanan in the 80s and the '9s. You have David Duke. There was always this reservoir, this reservoir of interest in this kind of politics pulsing on the side and the edge of the Republican party. So, was it really that I mean, yes, some Republicans fell in line, but was it just the structure of
having gatekeepers? Because it's not that the desire for something like this only emerged in 2016. I think as now a number of the histories that have sort of looked at the Republican party from this vantage point make very clear the desire for something like this was always there. The parties mandarins and arguably the media were just able to keep a lid on it until this period. But that's precisely the, point., I, mean, you, you you, had, on your show John Gance whose wonderful book show reminds us that as you say Buchanan was there but he was a marginal figure wasn't able to to get the nomination was able to be an irritant um there were there was always the you know the switch over from the Democratic party for the white southern uh you know kind of old racist uh uh vote. But these were all kept in check by the Mandarins who were largely a kind of country club business elite that believed
fundamentally that economics was the dominant uh story. And the the08 crash uh really destroyed that that that the gatekeeping power of that elite and I think that is part of the big story here. But there is another story which is that over the last 30 or 40 years you are seeing a consistent shift of people moving away from asserting their voting purely their economic interests and voting more their cultural gender racial identity. So if you go back 40 or 50 years, you could predict pretty pretty tightly how somebody would vote based on whether they made more than the median income and were white collar versus whether they made less than the median income and were blue collar. And generally speaking, people who were blue collar voted left. People who were white collar voted right. And that wasn't just true in the United States. You could go to Europe and you'd find that was the labor conservative divide. you could go
to France. That was the socialist uh Republican divide. And that has changed as you well know. Right now, we're in a situation where if you make more than the median income, you're more likely to vote left for the Democratic party. And if you make less than the median income you're more likely to vote right for the Republican party because the the values the the the spectrum is no longer left versus right on economics. It's what I call open versus closed largely on culture on you know do you want more immigration do you want more multiculturalism do you want more trade uh do you even want more open technology or do you want all these things closed closed closed well let's not leave economics quite yet uh I read a statistic in the Wall Street Journal over the weekend that kind of made me want to take out a pitchfork so the net worth held by the top.1% of households in the US reached 23.3 trillion in the
second quarter this year from 10.7 trillion a decade earlier. So from 20 from 10.7 to 23.3 in one decade. That's according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The amount held by the entire bottom 50% increased to $4.2 trillion from 900 billion over that period. So let me just do this. What do you think when you hear that? So I think that we have massive increasing inequality. We have it in at a scale that most people are not even able to comprehend because it's really what you're talking about is not the real story is not about the.1%. It's not even about the 01%.
It's about the 0001%. In other words, we have essentially the same tax policy for somebody who makes a lawyer in New York who's making3 or $4 million a year and somebody a hedge fund manager or a tech billionaire who's making a billion dollar a year. And we have the same tax policy, in fact, a favorable tax policy for the guy who's worth 25 billion and makes nothing in income every year makes it all through, you know, capital gains or borrowing against his stock portfolio. In other words, we have an accumulation of wealth on the high end that is extraordinary. I mean, and and it's and it's it's something that we have no public policy knows what to do about. As I say, you're taxing the guy who makes $4 million and $400 million the same. But when you ask about this new politics, so let's go to a place like Sweden. Sweden does not have a huge income inequality problem. They've actually done a very good job. They have
very high taxes. They have lots of redistribution. Sweden has a major upsurge of right-wing populism that is fundamentally driven by culture and immigration. You say maybe it's that we should have pro protected our manufacturing sector better. Germany protected its manufacturing sector. The second largest party in Germany now is a right-wing populist party motivated largely by cultural issues. Maybe we should have um coddled people with a bigger safety net. Nobody coddles people with a bigger safety net than France.
France's percentage the government the state percentage of you know uh GDP is I I forget it's like 58 55 58% highest in the in the in the western world and you know right now Marine Leend if the election were held tomorrow she'd be the next president of France. So my point is the the income you know these income inequalities and dysfunctions obviously cause enormous anxiety, anger whatever but the the age we are living in. I would argue these things get channeled through cultural um discontents and you see that with immigration being the issue that that got Trump elected and then reelected and Trump is very smart politically. He knows what works. A and that tells you that there's something going on here that we're not capturing.
An entirely materialist conception of politics, I think, is not meeting the moment. Well, if if I were to take this from the more materialist left, uh I want to spend one more moment on this. I think what they would say is it's that the left parties aren't meeting the moment. So, so you I always find it strange how much symmetry you have in political trends across very different countries, right? As you say many of those countries have they have different tax structures, they have different economic structures, but one thing they all have in common is that the left in those countries has become a much more highly educated and usually richer coalition. uh Petti uh with co-authors has done a lot of work on this talking about the Brahman left that has sort of emerged in in wealthy countries all across the world and and the argument you'll hear I don't myself totally buy it but I would like to hear
your your thinking on it is that as these parties have become not the working-class parties of the past but the educated parties of the present the highly educated parties of the present that they became became what's called neoliberal that they gave up on the old class struggle and that as such the the sort of choice on economics muddled and that led to the class realignment that you're talking about where you know instead of the Democratic party winning the working class and Republican party winning the the rich Donald Trump won you know most voters making less than $50,000 a year. uh do you buy that that it's simply the the abandonment of you know working-class populism uh among the parties of the left? No. And I'll tell you why. Because you if and it really helps to have a comparative perspective and because so much of the time I'm thinking about what's going on in other countries. So look at France. France had
no neoliberal revolution. France never had a Margaret Thatcher, never had a Ronald Reagan. The person who was who was president of France in that period was Francois Mitron, a socialist. France has never had any of the neoliberal revolution. And yet it has perhaps the strongest of the right-wing populist movements. And so I think I I think it doesn't fundamentally get, as I said the moment we're in. But I do think that there's a very important point it makes and I try to make this in the book. There is a so if the culture is one piece of this class is another and this is something we in in America find difficult to talk about but it is as you say the the left has become largely populated by kind of an elite professional class which is the new kind of uh managerial elite technocratic meritocratic elite and that reality has distanced it from the working class. But why? because of culture because they no
longer speak or understand or or articulate the values of that working class on cultural issues. As you know Ezra, the polling is very clear. The public is very content with the Democratic Party's positions on economic issues. The place where they where particularly the working class disagrees with the Democratic Party is not on its economic policies, it's on its cultural policies. So, I agree with you that uh if you if you're looking for the signal immigration is often the strongest signal. But if you're looking at the time series when does the populist surge begin happening uh across Europe and America um to some degree elsewhere, it it it doesn't quite fit. And this goes to a big part of your book, which is looking at other structural changes as recently in America as 2012. You know, you have Paul Ryan as seemingly the future of the Republican party, very very pro-immigrant. Um, you know, you
have the Republican party coming out with, an, autopsy, to, try, to, moderate, on on immigration. It was not a new issue. We didn't just start having immigration uh across the Western world in 2016, but some things are changing. Around 2012, 2013 is when you have a majority of Americans getting a smartphone. periods of revolution and you look at them historically across the book. One thing they often coincide with is upheavalss in the communication architectures. The Protestant revolutions follow the printing press. Um the Nazis and fascism are built at top radio.
How do you think about the move to social media, what I now think of as algorithmic media that that happens sort of roughly around the same time in all these countries and seems to coincide with the breakdown of all of those gatekeepers of those established parties of of the ability to to kind of hold any line against right-wing populism.
It's, a, it's, a, great, point, and, it's, it's fundamental to it. the you know there are these tidal waves that are going that are that are changing the world that I try to describe in the book and technology may be the the single most important it's the kind of the the one that begins it all so if you think I'm glad you brought up the uh the the the authoritarians of the 20s and 30s because they really did play off the the invention of radio and what they used radio for was as a kind of one to many broadcast system that was able to create a kind of nationally unifying messages that got across all the, you know, the small villages and towns that used to have their own little pamphlets and their own little local media as it were.
And that that ability to nationalize the message, to centralize the message, to to to send it across Germany or Italy hugely important. So if you think about every coup that would take place in the 20s, 30s, 40s, you try to get two places. You try to get the presidential palace and kill or imprison the president and you try to take control of the radio station. Later on it became you take control of the presidential palace and then you would take control of the TV station. So those one to many broadcast systems reinforced hierarchy.
The one we're in now, which is a highly distributed network system where every node is as powerful as any other produces the the the collapse of hierarchy, the empowerment of individuals, the empowerment of radical extreme voices, whether they be a QAnon conspiracy theorist, anyone can rise if they can create something that produces virality. And that is fundamentally anti- you know hierarchical. I think of your politics as you know I would call it like roughly center left. And I cannot think of a single center-left politician who rose since the age of the smartphone who seems attentionally capable who's been a star of this era. I could think of many right-wing politicians who have. But you think about Biden and then Harris. You think about Mcronone, you think about Merz in Germany, Kier Starmer in the UK.
This has been a period when the center left in various countries seems completely attentionally outmatched, seems to be having a very difficult time generating its own native talent. Why do you think that is? I think that does get to the class issue that you were talking about. the center left got very comfortable being the kind of meritocratic technocratic elite that always had the the the right answer, you know, the kind of smarty pants answer that everybody in this in the would would congratulate them on. Um, and the right became increasingly seen as the kind of crazy uh out of control rebels. And because of that structure, I think the right was more willing to take more risks, to embrace more novelty and new technologies and to be more disruptive.
Um, and and Trump obviously is the per is the extreme example of that. But I think it's generally been true that the right you know has been more willing to experiment to be risk-seeking because in the rights image it is you know this this might sound odd given that they control the presidency, the house, the senate and the supreme court but they see themselves as out of power because what they are thinking about is this cultural uh professional elite that they sit outside of and they are outside of that power and that me means that they've been more willing to you know embrace cryptocurrency, embrace uh you know unusual podcasters, embrace new medium um and there's there's a part of it is I think you always these periods of change always help people who are risk-seeking and the center left has been in comfortable ascendancy since the '9s Think of the Blairites in Britain, the Clintonites uh in in in the US, then the
you know the Obama administration. There was a kind of polished assuress and certainty with which they were running the country. And by the way, I broadly speaking agree with what they were doing. So I'm not saying that as a criticism, but it does mean you you you are going to be you're not going to be the person who upsets the apple cart.
And, so, one, argument, then, is, simply, that their time is done. If you look at politicians of the left who have been uh who who have commanded attention in this era, you look at Bernie Sanders, look at AOC and we're here in New York, you look at Zoran Mani. That is is part of your theory of this turning of the age of this new structural period is that it just requires a new left. It can't have this left of the professional classes this left of of caution and courtesy and and and etiquette, this left of small ideas. When you look around um you know I many people would argue this is simply a populist age. The populist right is thriving.
There needs to be a populist left. And that doesn't just mean a a question of class. It's also a question of of attitude and not just policy but attitude towards the system itself. attitude towards these structures of professional formation that you're talking about. Attitude towards whether this whole thing is worth preserving in such a similar way to what it's been in the past or it needs to be really fundamentally overhauled. I think you put it very well. But but I would say that the the kind of the politician of the future on the left will have to be populist in spirit and tone and that these things are not trivial. That that this is so much of what makes the the message get through and to be seen as not part of this comfortable elite even if by the way you are. you know, Zoram Mandani grew up on the Upper West Side and and uh you know, went to very good selective uh school, but his his style of
campaigning, the everyman folks, the I mean, I think he was absolutely brilliant on social media. I don't think I don't think there is another politician in America who was able to use social media as well as he did and to convey the kind of authenticity he did. And that authenticity, I think, you know, buys you. As somebody once said about Bill Clinton, if you can if about Clinton's success, if you can fake authenticity in politics, you've got it made. And Bill Clinton knows how to fake authenticity. Um and I you know and I and I so I think there some of it is is that more than my concern is that the democratic party whenever it hears the words populist says we have to go to the far left on economic policy and that's not what the data shows and that's not what you know the look the two successful Democratic presidents since Franklin Delano Roosevelt are Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and what you
know they're the two two-term presidents What they had in common was they were pretty centrist in terms of their policies. They stayed at the cultural center of the country. Remember Obama was initially opposed to gay marriage. Clinton gives his sister soldier speech and yet they had a way of communicating that told ordinary people I'm on your side, you know. So I think that a lot of this is not about coming up with some grand uh you know economic uh uh you know social democratic democratic socialist call it what you will a grabag of policy it's about figuring out how to connect with people to put it very bluntly figuring out how to connect with people who didn't go to college and the Democratic party has lost the ability to communicate with people who who didn't go to college and and as I say I think if there's a policy ISS issue largely it's it's around issues of culture and class not economics and and technocracy.
So I want to get at some of the other kind of structural dimensions you look at. So you write revolutions can erupt from desperation and despair as in France in 1789. But a different kind of revolution can originate from a state of abundance and that is a case of the identity revolution. Tell me what you mean. So most of you have heard of Maslo's hierarchy, right? All human beings start with the needs that are very basic and then when these are achieved they begin to ask themselves more about things that I think Ronald Inglehart called postmaterialist values and they start to want to express their identity as a woman as a person of this origin as a as somebody who has the you know this ethnicity that this religion and what I argue is that In in some significant part, and nothing is the only explanation, but in some significant part, this this uh this rise of identity politics has to do with having had
40 or 50 years of no wars, no massive uh uh upheaval steady economic growth in the Western world. And you see that when you look at the late 60s and early 70s most dramatically when after 30 years of economic growth and you know coming out for the previous generation remember has gone through World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and then you have 30 to 40 years of steady economic growth. You begin to see people's identities, their political identities defined much more by the sense of who they are. So you have the feminist revolution, you know, coming out of the you know, Betty Friedan and all that stuff. You have people identifying much more with their ethnicity, you know Jewish Americans, Hispanic Americans all all that kind of thing becomes comes to the four. And so it's it's it's it's not entirely inappropriate to say that it is a product of a certain degree of material um uh achievement. But I I want
to trace what you're describing by identity revolution here because postmaterialist politics which is a big part of the story describes a much broader set of political concerns and what we think of as identity. Right? Postmaterialist politics is about the movement towards thinking about the desoiling of the environment, not just the pace of growth and and wage gains. It describes, you know, as you as you talked about the feminist revolution but it also describes consumer politics and, you know, safety and consumer products and and all these different things that become part of the everyday life of, you know, wealthy democracies starting in the 60s and 70s.
we talk about something more specific when we talk about identity politics and I want to think about that more specifically in two ways because I think we associate it with the left and I think you're critical of its form on the left but right now I think we're seeing a particularly grim form of identity politics overwhelming the right and so first what are you describing specifically as identity politics not just postmaterial materialist politics identity revolutions, not just postmaterial ones. And what is the form it takes not on the left but on the right?
Yeah,, absolutely., In, fact,, you, know,, the the the the afterward is almost entirely about the cultural backlash uh from the right that that has been produced by all these changes. So, and this is a very common pattern. I mean, the most the the easiest one to think about is the reaction in Germany in in the 20s and 30s to what people forget was the most liberal country in the world with the most liberal constitution in the world. Way more more liberal than the American Constitution or American practice. And there was this huge cultural backlash from the right uh that took the form of xenophobia, anti-semitism and of course anti-democratic uh uh backlash. So I I think you know history doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes. And I think what we are witnessing is a is an enormous cultural backlash on the right and that backlash in some ways yeah is it is its own identity politics in some sense. Um
I think Steve Bannon once said this to me. I can't remember whether it was on the record or not, but here here I go. Um, he said something to me where he said "You guys," meaning, you know, you all you centrists and leftists, you think you're going to win the elections because uh you're going to bring out all the minorities and women and things like that. All we have to do is to crank up white male voting by 10 or 15% and that'll overwhelm everything. In other words, if we can get whites to act on their identity politics and to and to weaponize that, you know, remember the country is still whatever 65% white and and and that is what you're describing I think. Because so this is the theory of Trumpism in 2016 and both sides more or less agree on what's happening there. These these famous articles that that predate Trump on the missing white voter and but then the way the Trump coalition evolves,
Democrats improve with white voters between 2016 and 2020 and Trump improves with non-white voters. And Trump's 2024 coalition is much more multi-racial than his 2016 coalition. And it's very particularly built on gains among Hispanic voters. And I think this violation of the political narrative on both sides kind of threw everybody for a loop. But you now see Hispanic voters are swinging sharply towards the Democrats in this year's elections, the ones that happened just a few weeks ago. polling is showing Trump losing Hispanic voters very quickly. I think after 2024 um, MAGA convinced itself it didn't need to choose between cruelty to immigrants, a sharply ethnationalist vision of the American state and having a multi-racial working-class coalition.
Now, maybe it looks like it does have to choose between those paths. Yeah, I think I think you're you're you're quite right. So, let's go back to to um the campaign. Uh I think that this is one of the areas where Trump is actually quite intuitive uh and and and and intuitively gifted politically because there was an effort effectively to woo these people um on the basis of their class identity not their ethnic and racial identity. But I think you're right that at the end of the day, the ethnationalist part of the party precisely because it has become this workingclass party of cultural grievances around immigration and things like that is so large that the policy that they ended up enacting uh is turning is turning people off. I mean, I'm I'm sure you saw this, but in the in the recent poll, the most dramatic shift was Asians. Um the the it's a 40point swing I think in New New Jersey. Um uh Asian-Americans, you know
are back to 75% levels of voting for the Democratic party. And so I think you're right that they will have to choose. And I wonder whether at this point this is honestly the left's greatest opportunity. I I wonder how much you can do to write this because having done what they've done, um I think you have sewed an element of distrust in, you know, Hispanic and Asian voters who are going to think, "Yeah, you can say nice things to me, but then when you get into power, you'll turn ice on my on my relatives or my friends or people who who I could imagine identifying with or I, you know, who I could imagine myself in their shoes. It's I think that this one may be a very hard uh hill for the Republicans to climb again.
Creating an opportunity for the Democrats is not the same as Democrats taking an opportunity.
You, know, that that's what you all clap for you, know. So, as you were saying earlier, one thing that Democratic Party, one thing liberal parties around the world have struggled with quite a bit is is a question of immigration and I think they struggle with it because it pits their values against each other. On the one hand, there is a belief in borders. Relatively few members of even, you know, left and center left parties believe in open borders. And at the same time, there's a belief in the dignity, the value of every person. a fundamental respect for people who are risking their lives and leaving their families to create a better life. Uh and often a narrative certainly in America this is a country of immigrants. My family immigrated here. So what liberal parties end up in this balancing act and right now what I think they want to do is just rebalance in the other direction. We just, you know, turn the
dial way up on border security. That's different than having an actual affirmative vision. a clear description of what immigration is to them, is to a country, what the policy should be trying to achieve. So then if you think that an opportunity is opened up what should Democrats do with it? What should the the liberal position on immigration actually be?
That's, very, well, put,, uh,, Ezra, because, I think it is, you know, it gets at sort of what is the first principle approach here. So the I think the most important thing people need to understand is that the immigration crisis that the United States and Europe has been dealing with over the last 10 years is very different from the one they were dealing with 30 years ago. So 30 years ago when you talked about an illegal immigrant, you were talking about people who were fertively crossing the Mexican border you know, by uh hook or by crook somehow trying to come in and if they got in they would run away from the police because they had to make sure that they were never seen and they'd go into the shadows of the economy. That is not what is happening now. People when they cross the border don't run away from the police. They run toward them because they have realized that there was this I
would call it a hole in the immigration system or there was a mechanism in the immigration system that allowed you to come in and apply for asylum. So what a process that was meant to be for a few thousand dissident who were fleeing persecution uh has turned into the primary gateway that people are using I would argue to fundamentally game the system and so you are getting now millions and millions of people who come here and say the magic words I have a credible fear of prosecution of persecution sorry so the whole thing is a disaster what we have done is we have allowed the immigration process to be taken over by this one loophole that was meant to exist for a small number of people in extreme need because of political or religious persecution. And what you now have are economic migrants.
You have cartels that have been built around it. uh you have a you know there are places where an entire village will sponsor somebody and pay the cartel so that person can come into the United States and and you know and find a way through the asylum process to then disappear. We've got to shut all that down. That has nothing to do with being being you know left-wing or empathetic. You you cannot let everybody in. You know the United States cannot be open to every potential migrant in the world. There has to be a process. There has to be the categories.
There have to be rules. People have to apply. And so I think we're finally beginning to understand that. And once you do that, you can then have a more a serious conversation about what is the kind of immigration that we should we should be in favor of. My own view is that the great battle that the left should be fighting is for legal immigration to make sure it is maintained, to make sure it's reformed to make sure it's, you know, it's done in a humane way. Maybe you want to shift the skills versus family unification you know, part of it. This is we take in the vast majority of people we take in through family unification. There's a very small number who come in uh on a skills-based system. Most countries in in Europe do the opposite. What's happening on the right is you're seeing a big fish on the right on not illegal immigration on which of course they are completely lock stack but legal
immigration. So Trump goes on Laura Ingram and defends the H-1B visa program which is you're taking 80,000 people out of the 1 million legal immigrants the United States takes every year. It's a tiny number, but it became this flash point because there's a large number of people on the MAGA right who want those numbers to go way down. And that would be a fight worth having politically because I think the country broadly speaking believes that we have been enriched uh by immigration by legal immigration. So the the book has a new afterward and you write in it that quote the happiest countries in the world in Northern Europe are capitalist welfare states with an emphasis on community and clan often led by fairly humble empathetic elites. Perhaps there's a lesson there for all of us. So aside from try your best to be a tiny northern European country, what specifically is the lesson there for all of us?
Um, so one lesson is I think that you you can you can you can build a decent life for people who are not who are not rich and we do a very bad job at that. Um the great journalist Annie Larry has written wonderful stuff who happens to be Ezra's wife um has written wonderful stuff about how not only do we not provide much support for people who are unlucky in life and are are poor or haven't had the you know the opportunities we've had. I believe so much of one's success in life has to do with that kind of luck and opportunities. We make it so hard on those people. First, we don't give them much in the way of helping them move up the ladder. And then we make it insanely complicated, what she calls the time tax. You know, you make it impossible for people to actually get even the benefits that they they're available.
And these northern European countries they, they they, treat, they, treat, people well who who are poor, but they treat them with dignity. They treat people who are imprisoned with dignity. there's a there's a there's a lesson there I think about how to treat human beings in a in a in a in a good society. The harder point, the harder part to do is there is in in that part of Europe particularly, but more generally speaking in Europe, there is a tie to the community, to the land, to history to a sense of your life revolving around a certain kind of communitarian identity that is very hard to replicate in the United States. you know, the United States is this big brash u churning uh you know, economic entity where people move people um there there's there's a much greater sense of you know you're you're always trying to remake yourself. It's it's the story of reinvention. everyone is Jay Gatsby at some level and that turns out
to leave a lot of hollowess inside that leaves a sense of you know where do I fit in and I think so much of what has happened in in America in the last 10 or 15 20 years is this growing sense of hollowess particularly for example for men this is something Richard Reeves uh you know talks about a lot and I don't I think that that part of Europe in particular small clan-based uh, community oriented, has managed to keep that sense of identity and keep that sense of purpose and community. And how you do that it's it's in a way the fundamental challenge for liberal societies because what liberalism did was it it it broke away it broke away from the the certitude of faith the you know the the certitude of tradition the certitude of community and it said you're free to make your own life and you didn't define your life the happiness of your life exactly as you want no no no priest is going to tell
you this no commisar is going to tell you this no dictator is going to tell you this and what you people found was they they caused enormous anxiety you know uh Kirkagard calls an it says anxiety is the dizziness of freedom and I think we live with that dizziness of freedom in the United States and that's a harder one how do you fill that hole in the heart that people get when they are confronting these the modern life without the the certainties of the So this has become a popular critique of America and I have to say that I only half buy it and as you were talking I was thinking about an interview I did with Yor Hazone who is a Israeli based political theorist uh and sort of the founder of the national conservative movement which I associate JD Vance with and and others with and you know he would say to me or he said to me on the show you know really when a a polity becomes over 15% not the people of its fundamental clan
it begins to break apart. I, think, that, in, general, uh, natons, think that uh that 15% of the American population is foreignb born that it is the maximum that it's possible to for for for the country to take before it like it literally starts falling apart. they they really do believe in the possibility of uh of factional and tribal tribal violence.
And, I, thought, about, the, place, I'm, from, California, and I thought, well, that's wrong. And you think about the place we're in right now, New York. You're telling me, not you, but the imaginary national conservative here on the stage, that New York City doesn't have identity, that it doesn't have a pulse unto itself, that it is not a place that people become a fierce partisan of. I'm Californian. I find the level of fierce New York City partisanship quite irksome. Um there's this strange dynamic where it is in in the places where you have sort of crossed this what I think the national consort as some tipping point at which point solidarity should no longer exist. that the the political economy of it does not seem to me to be that what happens is that solidarity does not exist in that place that there's no solidarity anymore in Los Angeles or San Francisco or New York City. It's that other places that have
not passed that tipping point seem to become somewhat increasingly repulsed and distant from the places that have that, you know, you have the these increasingly divergent urban rural divides. You have uh a sense of immigration taking over and destroying places that you don't live in. Right. New York City did not vote for Donald Trump. I think Zoron Mdani defends New York City's multi-ethnic heart, its fundamental cosmopolitanism in a a genuinely stirring way. Um, you know, as do, you know, various Californian politicians.
So, there's something here that always feels wrong to me because the backlash is not coming from inside the place that is supposedly lost, the thing that should hold it together. The backlash is coming from other places that have a growing anger at these centers of cosmopolitan industry and belonging. I like what you're saying and I think the way I'd put it is the Ezra Klene amendment to Kirkagard is uh it is the anxiety is the dizziness of somebody else's freedom. Right. It's it's it's the it's the guy in Montana looking at what's happening in New York and saying, "Oh my god, this is no longer my country."
Yeah., JD, Vance, calling, New, York, a hellscape. Right., But, that, is, but, but but, here's the point. You have to take this seriously because the the the the gale winds of modernity do produce all this change. You you are losing some of those anchors of the past. There's no question the United States has secularized very rapidly in the last 30 or 40 years. And as a national political unit that means that there is going to be this push back. And it even you see this even in those small northern European countries we were praising you're seeing a huge amount of push back and I would point out the one left of center uh successful party by the way in Europe right now is the is the Denm is in Denmark the social democrats in Denmark have done very well by being sticking to their guns by being resolutely left of center on economics but being very tough on immigration and multicultural uh issues and so there is
a way I think to hold that center. So, I, I, want, to, focus, on, another, part, of what you said about the the northern European states which are in in your telling sort of often led by fairly humble empathetic elites. So you have degrees from Harvard and Yale.
Yes., Guilty, as, charged. You, became, the, youngest, ever, managing editor of foreign affairs uh I believe at age 28. By 2000 you were editor of Newsweek International. Um, so you've moved among American elites for decades now. You've moved among international elites for decades now. You have firsthand experience here. Let's focus on the American ones. How have they changed? I would say um first of all, I have been one of the great beneficiaries of this move to a meritocratic uh elite. I came to this country literally knowing nobody with you know a with dark skin weird name to the extent anyone could figure out what the name was when they realized it was Muslim that was even worse. So I I would still argue that the last 30 or 40 years during which this meritocratic elite came to power, first of all, there's a profound and positive transformation because what it was replacing was a old
boys network where what mattered more was whether or not you were a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, what family you came from, what prep school you had gone to. And it's I think a much better what what what we have replaced it with though imperfect and often gamed and I I accept all the criticisms is much better. I would also argue I know we're getting a little far a field here but you know the people are always trashing the last 30 or 40 years. Uh let's just remember what happened in the last 30 or 40 years. You know communism was was defeated. The you know the large parts of the world embraced democracy and liberal values. I just saw this in world in data which is a wonderful website.
1.5 billion people moved out of extreme poverty in this period. Uh you had many fewer wars and violence declined as Steven Pinker keeps pointing out. Not such a bad track record for the last 30 or 40 years. So I think that the the rise of the meritocracy is not fundamentally the problem. The problem is this. What ended up happening is the very fact that it was meritocratic started to make people be become very smug, very self-satisfied and believe that they deserved everything they had. After all, you know, I exerson grew up in poverty and look, he made it to, you know, to become a amazing financeier or a hedge fund manager or or a tech mogul. And you begin to think, well, it's all because of my my skills and my and my merit. But then you also begin to think that the person who's at the bottom of the heap also deserves his or her status. You know what I mean? And I think that's profoundly mistaken because a lot of
what helped you was luck, was randomness, was, you know, a lucky break here or there. You or or the fact that you have a particular skill that is useful at this moment. I think we forget that and we we do become less empathetic and I do think all of us myself included uh you know it's it's very important to remember that the people who have not managed to do as well in society uh you know they just didn't have as the lucky break you did they didn't have the chance you did and and most importantly you know they're they're all human beings created equal and we we the way we treat the very poor in this country I think is is one of the greatest shames in this country.
So I want to pull you out uh as we sort of come to a close of this part here and move to audience questions. I want to pull you out on what that would mean for the next generation of people who want to be in charge, right? That you listen to the new right. You listen to people like Patrick Denine. They are very explicitly engaged in a project of elite formation, right? They're trying to create this new breed of, you know, counterrevolutionary nationalist elites. He Denine calls his preferred regime aristo populism.
So, but we have been tracing through this conversation a story of elite failure on the left. Failure to be able to communicate in a way that that matches the moment, failure to represent the the views and and opinions of the the societies that these people are supposed to serve. um and then ultimately failure to maintain enough trust to maintain the popularity and faith of the systems that they once built. So what would your project be if you take seriously that we're in this age of revolutions in a a new structural era that needs new leaders?
If it's not going to be the rights arises populists what should these new leaders be like? So you're you're quite right to point out that the right is trying to engage in this in this new project and what you're seeing again if you if you go back to our original conversation about the core of this being a cultural project for people like Patrick Denin the the core of this is an attempt to reshape remold society so that you you bring back some of those old certainties of religion and morality and tradition and community. But the key issue and this came out uh quite well in your conversation with him on this podcast.
The key issue for him and you tried to press him on this and he skirted it is that it is denying people individual choice, autonomy and freedom because at the end of the day for it to mean anything uh this new conservative nationalist project is saying we will force you to have fewer divorces and fewer abortions and fewer gay adoptions and fewer uh openly uh gay people. Right? It was it is an effort to use those ideas to deny people choice to deny them freedom, to deny them autonomy. And I think in that sense it is fundamentally going against the grain of history and that the liberal the enlightenment liberal project I believe at the end will succeed because it is in deepest sympathy and resonance with what has really been the greatest aspiration for human beings for the last 500 years which is to have greater freedom to have greater choice to have greater individual dignity and respect. And you
know what the left should do is try to identify with those aspirations and to find a way to make societies work in a practical common sensical way. You know don't go don't don't go crazy but remember that that is your history that is your heritage that is your mission. Uh and if you do that, I think if you offer people the the you know the the alternative between a right that says at at base we are trying to deprive you of that choice, that autonomy, that freedom and the left which celebrates those things but in in in all spheres like economic, political, social. I think that's a winning message. It's a forward-looking message. It's a it's a it's a it's a message that actually will appeal to to young people. The writer Eric from wrote a book called Escape from Freedom. And he says the the real meaning of life is that you get to live it. And what he means is that you you know that is the only meaning of life
that you get you get to live it as you want. And that's a very powerful message I think at heart.
But, but, wait, the, Sarah, elites, on, the left were giving that message. If anything I think from rest analysis they were giving it too much. Right. the the sort of critique of this form of liberalism is that it is acid on the bonds of community, acid on the bonds of tradition. So what needs to be different about that?
So, I, I, look, I, think, that, where, the, left went wrong is is in areas that were became fundamentally illiberal. I think that things like the DEI stuff um I think a lot of the woke agenda is is deeply illiberal. I mean, I am an old-fashioned liberal in the sense that I believe Martin Luther King when he said, "I want my children to be judged by the content of their character, not the color of their skin." And to a large extent, what happened was the left started to judge people by the color of their skin, not the content of their character. So, I would like to see a return to a celebration of that individualism, that autonomy, that freedom. And as I say, economically, I'm much much more comfortable with free markets and free trade uh for that reason. And I'm much less uh enamored of, you know, governmental elites telling me what, you know, what to do. I I grew up in India and I saw all that.
You know, I would like to see a much greater emphasis on on individualism and freedom in in you know, in which was at the heart of the enlightenment liberal project. So that's a such a beautiful uh segue to our audience questions. We got a lot of questions on Mam Dani. We're here in uh New York City. He was just very recently elected. I'll choose this one. How do you think, and I think the how is important there. How do you think Mandani will deliver on his promises? Um that's a challenge. Uh look, I actually would would turn the tables uh on you. the the the single most important uh challenge that every city in America faces uh almost every city in America faces and every blue run city in America faces is affordability around one central issue which is housing. Um and how you're going to get that to happen, it seems to me it's pretty simple economics, right? If you want to lower the price of something, you want
to produce a lot more of it. Um I I have not yet seen the the the level of ambition that I would hope to see in terms of how you are going to massively change that equation and dramatically increase supply and this is where I think you know the left gets gets caught up in its own problems. you know, you wrote a whole book about this and you know, maybe I'm, you know, at this point we're all, you know, so influenced by your by your book that I'm probably, you know, channeling some part of some by some some, piece, of, it., But, I, think, that, you know, what what tends to happen is that even when the left says it wants to solve the problem, it has a 10step review committee process. you know reviewing the review process to make sure that the old old rules have been taken down. And Donald Trump just demolishes the east wing of the White House, right? And I have to say that when I look at that, aesthetically, I
was appalled, but I kind of was a bit jealous that, you know, like he just gets stuff done, whatever he wants to do. who I don't agree with with many of those things, but you know there there's something about getting stuff done and actually achieving. So if you want to build housing, figure out how you're going to do it at scale and only the market is going to be able to do the scale you need. So if you can't solve that problem, in my opinion, everything else is trivial. It's it's housing that that will make all the difference. And on housing, you cannot defy the laws of economics. If you want the prices to go down, supply has to go up.
Uh, we, didn't, get, to, talk, as, much, foreign policy as I always like to talk with you, but but I did think this was an important one. So, we're watching this tremendous shift of American foreign policy to focus on this hemisphere right? I mean, even Trump was initially a big pivot to to Asia guy, but now we're we're drawing it back in. The invasion is already here. Um, we're going to focus on dominating, as far as I can tell, our our own hemisphere. What is the the impact of it going to be? This question sort of describes it as the impact on US foreign policy but I think more the impact on the US.
What does it mean to be treating uh our primary foreign policy problem as both immigration from and relations with you know the countries to our south? It is a huge shift. What we have gone from is ever since the the end of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency, the United States has conceived of its role in the world as being the most powerful country in the world which had an open expansive uh rule-based conception of what the world should look like and reordering the world around those those lines. And what Trump is doing now in Trump 2.0 0 which was which is as you point out different from Trump 1.0 he's retreating from that. So it's not just the going after these boats in Venezuela to show that you're going after fentinel which doesn't come from boats in Venezuela but anyway um it is what is what you're not seeing is for example what also happened in the last few days which is the Trump administration has signal to South Korea
that basically not only can they have nuclear submarines but they can enrich nuclear material themselves. So for eight decades now, the United States has tried to maintain a system to discourage nuclear proliferation even among our closest allies. And what we would tell countries like South Korea was we'll give you all the fuel you need. But don't go down the step because if you go down this that step, the Japanese will want to do it. And if the Japanese want to do it, another bunch of countries and then we will end up in a world where you will have 20, 30 countries that have the capacity to make nuclear weapons. And that is a world of greater disorder, of greater risk, of greater uncertainty.
And you know, we've gotten we've gotten off so far with nuclear deterrence and it's worked pretty well, but there have been many near misses. There have been many uh possible accidents. And imagine a world, you know, a multipolar world in which suddenly you have 20 or 30 countries that have nuclear weapons and the possibilities for miscalculation misunderstanding accidents. So, and that's just one piece of the unraveling of that world. The other one is the unraveling of the global economic order that we had built and sustained and maintained by believing by being the primary advocate for free trade in the and and for for essentially not having politics dominate economics in these areas. What we are now is the highest we have the highest tariffs of of any ma major uh you know certainly in the free world by far. So we far from being the exemplar and model of an open world economy have become the exemplar and
model of a closed world economy. So I think that the these are these are huge consequential shifts that the Trump administration has put into place and my worry is that they they will have a long legacy even even when the next if a if a Democrat comes in next. Over the years you've spoken to just a truly enormous number of world leaders of top policy makers. Who's been for you your most memorable interview?
Probably, Lee, Kuanu,, the, founder, of Singapore. Um, most mostly you find people and I'm sure you find this as right who are in in the in the world of you know, the leaders and heads of state and things like that. They're people who are kind of men of action. Uh and then you know you meet another set of very impressive people who are men of ideas. Lee Kuan Yu was this extraordinary combination. Um he was both a strategic genuinely a strategic thinker and yet uh he was you know he he was one of the greatest implementers and executors that you could ever ever find in the world.
He took this sandbar at the tip of Malaysia called Singapore which was you know its only natural resource was mosquitoes and he has turned it into a country a small country but is at absolutely central uh to to the world trading system with a per capita GDP that is today higher than the United States. Um it's extraordinary and what he would often say to me when we would talk is the most extraordinary achievement he was proud of was that he had a polyglot population of Chinese Malaise, Indians, expats and he built a nation out of it. Um and that there had been no major racial or religious riots for 50 years in in in Singapore. You know, that was something that he took enormous pride out of. And and there's a very in strategic and enforced reason it happened. He forced public housing on 80% of the population. They all had to live in multi, you know, multithnic quarters. Uh so imagine, you know, the
the Johnson administration's fair housing policies, but times 10 and enforced. Um and so very very extraordinary guy.
And, then, your, final, question,, what, are three books you'd recommend to the audience?
So, given, the, kind, of, things, we're talking about, I was thinking about uh what what to recommend. The one book that I have loved and have gone back to over and over is a book by Walter Lipman called a preface to morals. Uh it was written in the 1920s during the jazz age and he first identifies not first but he identifies very powerfully this problem of modern societies that you lose faith in religion and tradition and community and certainty and you don't replace it with anything and it leaves you with a hollowess inside. And it's a wonderful book called a preface to morals. The other one is um when we talk about this technocratic elite uh meritocratic elite that um I am certainly part of. I I would point out Ezra so are you. Um the person who wrote about it most intelligently is the great Harvard scholar Daniel Bell who wrote a book called I think the coming of the postindustrial society. And he
identified preiently that the the future was going to belong to people who had knowledge and that knowledge was going to become the most important determinant of whether or not you were elite or not. Um and the final one uh is you know again back to this question of how do how do you recreate this uh this this life uh you know in a modern uh time how do you how do you what do you do to bring back old values? There's a wonderful book called The Lost City by Alan Erin Halt, a journalist who went back to Chicago to wonder you wondering why the Chicago of his youth seemed so community oriented and why what what did they do that that was lost and he discovered that it was so community oriented because everyone was so poor they couldn't move. They all had to go to church because if you wanted to get a bank loan, the bank manager would always call the priest to ask if you had good character. They all used to hang out at
the movies together cuz nobody's houses had air conditioning, you know, and suddenly you realize it was all the denial of choice that made it happen. And in a weird way, it makes you realize for all our problems, you know, we've we've come a long way.
Questions about this episode
Who speaks in "Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show"?
Ezra Klein (Guest), Fareed Zakaria (Guest), Esther Klene (Guest).
What is "Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show" about?
The discussion centers on Fareed Zakaria's insights from his book "Age of Revolutions," where he examines the transformative shifts in the political landscape. Notably, he finds common ground with Steve Bannon, highlighting a shared recognition of the revolutionary nature of contemporary times and the fundamental changes affecting political systems globally.
What is mentioned in this The Ezra Klein Show episode?
237 people, works and ideas are mentioned, including Fred Zakaria, Fared Zakaria, Ezra Klein, Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash: From 1600 to the Present, Donald Trump, Esther Klene. Each one on this page links to its own page with every episode that mentions it.
How long is "Fareed Zakaria Thinks Steve Bannon Got One Thing Right | The Ezra Klein Show"?
The episode runs 1 h 10 min; the transcript is about 11,165 words in 86 timestamped sections.
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About this transcript: the episode's spoken words as captioned on YouTube, split into timestamped sections. Reclip.Me locates every person, work and idea in the text, keeps the time it is first named, and quotes the words around it verbatim. Last updated February 23, 2026.