Transcript

Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show

From The Ezra Klein Show · Episode page · Watch on YouTube

· 1 h 11 min · 11,764 words · 156 timestamped sections

This is the full, timestamped transcript of "Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show", an episode of The Ezra Klein Show published October 28, 2025 (1 h 11 min, about 11,764 words). It mentions 24 people, works and ideas, including Amid Seel, Hamas, Kamas, Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia.

What this episode is about

The discussion explores the complex dynamics of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly in the context of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. It contrasts American perceptions of a potential two-state solution with the more hardline views prevalent in Israeli politics, emphasizing the need to understand the realities shaping Israeli governance and public opinion.

Key takeaways

  • Ceasefires are like Wi-Fi connections; they can drop out any moment—just ask anyone holding their breath in Gaza.
  • The two-state solution thrives in the West, while Israeli politics favors a 'one-state with hands on the controls' approach.
  • Khamas controls 47% of Gaza, but the real estate market there seems as stable as a house of cards.
  • The U.S. hopes for peace; Israelis merely hope to keep the status quo without Hamas throwing a wrench into their plans.
  • In Israel, success is measured by hostages released, not by dreams of lasting peace—cautious pessimism is their national anthem.

Who speaks in this episode?

What is discussed, and when

  1. – 10:00: Amid Seel, Emiratis, Hamas, Kamas
  2. – 20:00: Saudi Arabia, Western values, Kamas, Emiratis
  3. – 30:00: Lebanonization, October 6th
  4. – 40:00: October 6th, Saudi Arabia, Abraham Accords, Iran
  5. – 50:00: October 18th
  6. – 1:00:00: October 6th, Palestinian statehood, Saudi Arabia, Western values
  7. – 1:10:00: Bob Bennett, Avigor Liberman, Benny Gantz, October 6th

Notable quotes from "Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show"

  • Government and the forms of politics that are in power in Israel see it. Amid Seel is the chief political analyst for Channel 12 in Israel. He is a political columnist there. He's the author of the newsletter. It's noon in Israel and.
    about Amid Seel · at
  • Authority. By the way, Israel is not the only one to have a strong disbelief in this option. The Emiratis and the Saudis too don't do not really believe in this. That's why…
    about Saudi Arabia · at
  • Five or six times since the ceasefire has begun that between the two goals of the plan, ending the war and eliminating Kamas, he prefers eliminating Hamas. That's why he keeps…
    about Hamas · at
  • Another, way, to, describe, it, that, you, that you've used it in other columns and interviews is that the Israeli goal is Lebanonization.
    about Lebanonization · at
  • And, I, think, somewhat, to, the, surprise, of many, the Abraham Accords hold through this whole period. So you recently wrote that Ron Durmer, Israel's minister of strategic affairs, a person who, counts Netanyahu as among his closest.
    about Abraham Accords · at
  • Actually set the terms of the entire regime. And that was the idea behind the peace agreement between Israel and the Amiratis, which is in my opinion the most important…
    about UAE · at
  • Yes,, I, came, to, the, conclusion, following October 7th that Israel's number one problem is the Palestinian one. I thought before that it's the Iranian one. It's not. however…
    about Iran · at
  • President Trump, a Democrat went office and there's a recognition that, Europe has now accepted Palestinian statehood in some abstracted way and, a, sense, that, Israel, cannot, maintain support here with the politics it has.
    about Palestinian statehood · at

Who and what is mentioned in this episode?

People

  • Amid Seel — Person · Main guest · 3 mentions · first at
    Provides an Israeli right/center-right analytic perspective on the ceasefire, demilitarization feasibility, education/media reform, and Israel's geopolitical strategy.
  • Ron Durmer — Person · Referenced expert · 2 mentions · first at
    Cited as Netanyahu's close aide and strategic thinker on reunifying governance concepts and expanding normalization (Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Syria).
    The difference now is that according to Netanyahu and Durmer if it's going to be reunite Ron, Durmer, his, very, close, aid.
  • Bob Bennett — Person · Referenced actor · 4 mentions · first at
    Presented as a likely leader of an anti-Netanyahu coalition and as emblematic of how Israel's dividing line shifted from security to identity/civil-society issues.
    Right?, Walk, me, through, the, anti-Netanyao coalition this developed. It looks like it would be led by Napali Bennett who traditionally in Israeli politics was understood on Netanyahu's right in terms of security.
  • Avigor Liberman — Person · Referenced actor · 1 mention · first at
    Used to illustrate the identity-based realignment: hawkish on security yet secular on domestic issues, moving between blocs in Israeli politics.
    Under, the, threshold is, under, the, threshold, for representation. Avigor Liberman who's a quite far right-wing defense minister in 2018.
  • Benny Gantz — Person · Referenced actor · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as part of the anti-Netanyahu coalition landscape; described as not credibly 'leftist' and as politically weakened in polling/threshold terms.
    Okay. And Benny Gans who is not I mean calling him a leftist is not I mean I, don't, think, leftists, would, claim, him ex, and, vice, versa., Okay., So, it's, about identity.…
  • Yair Lapid — Person · Referenced actor · 1 mention · first at
    Mentioned as a centrist figure within the anti-Netanyahu coalition constellation, relevant to how a governing alternative might (or might not) differ on policy.
    Than Benavir. But when you talk about domestic issues about civil society issues, they are more secular than Yay Gulam and Yay Laid. That's why a Victor Liban moved from the…

Companies & orgs

  • Hamas — Company · Core topic · 1 mention · first at
    Central antagonist in the ceasefire/prisoner-swap framing and in debates over demilitarization, governance of Gaza, and Israel's post–Oct 7 security doctrine.
  • Kamas — Company · Core topic · 2 mentions · first at
    Used interchangeably with Hamas in the transcript; central to claims about demilitarization, legitimacy, and continued presence in Gaza even after ceasefire phases.
    And eliminating Kamas, he prefers eliminating Hamas. That's why he keeps saying that if Hamas does not demilitarize, Israel would crush him if I, only, give, the, word, as, as…
  • Emiratis — Company · Referenced actor · 3 mentions · first at
    Referenced as funders/partners in Gaza reconstruction and as a regional 'moderate' actor skeptical of the current Palestinian Authority and supportive of reform.
    Authority. By the way, Israel is not the only one to have a strong disbelief in this option. The Emiratis and the Saudis too don't do not really believe in this. That's why…
  • Biden Administration — Company · Referenced actor · 1 mention · first at
    Referenced as proposing offers that would end the war with Israeli withdrawal; contrasted with the ceasefire's condition of continued Israeli presence until Hamas is dismantled.
    Hamas from Gaza. So, it has not happened yet. But unlike all the e offers made by the Biden administration and by many Arab countries, the war does not end when Israel is out…

Concepts & topics

  • Lebanonization — Concept · Core topic · 3 mentions · first at
    Describes an Israeli strategy for Gaza modeled on post-ceasefire Lebanon: enforce deterrence with frequent strikes and maintain forward positions rather than full withdrawal.
  • Palestinian statehood — Concept · Core topic · 2 mentions · first at
    Debated as increasingly unlikely in the guest's view, yet described as a 'presence' in normalization talks post–Oct 7 and as central to international legitimacy pressures.
  • Western values — Concept · Core topic · 3 mentions · first at
    Central to the guest's proposed long-term solution: reforming Palestinian education/media toward moderation as a prerequisite for peace and legitimacy.
    Anti-semitism, [snorts] hatred, to towards Jews anti-Western sentiment. People don't see any option of prosperity and peace and new Middle East with this Palestinian authority.…
  • IDF withdrawals — Concept · Referenced concept · 1 mention · first at
    Appears as a key tradeoff in proposed phase-two arrangements: Arab forces replacing Hamas would require Israeli withdrawals, which the guest suggests Israel wants to avoid.
    Moving forward with the next complicated and mostly fantastical phase. Arab soldiers placing Hamas with the heavy price of IDF withdrawals from the Gaza Strip as well as a…

Places & events

  • Abraham Accords — Event · Core topic · 2 mentions · first at
    Discussed as Trump's major foreign-policy success and as the normalization framework Hamas sought to derail; expansion is framed as Israel's strategic answer to Oct 7.
  • Saudi Arabia — Place · Core topic · 7 mentions · first at
    Key prospective normalization partner; described as shifting from seeking vague Palestinian 'lip service' pre–Oct 7 to wanting more concrete Palestinian components post–Oct 7.
  • Iran — Place · Core topic · 2 mentions · first at
    Framed as a major threat and as linked to Hamas; also used to illustrate US-Israel strategic divergence (Obama/Biden vs Israeli threat perception).
  • UAE — Place · Core topic · 1 mention · first at
    Presented as a model for education reform and as a funder/overseer of Gaza reconstruction; central to Abraham Accords logic and 'moderates vs radicals' framing.
  • October 19th 2023 — Event · Referenced event · 1 mention · first at
    Cited as the expected 'due date' for Saudi-Israel normalization, used to argue Oct 7 aimed to derail the Abraham Accords expansion.
    Accords from happening. It was 12 days before Saudi Arab Arabia was to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The due date was October 19th 2023. Now the whole idea of the Abra…
  • October 6th — Event · Referenced event · 12 mentions · first at
    Referenced as the day Israeli security establishment failed to recognize the imminence of the Oct 7 attack, used to discuss misreading 'lose-lose' adversary logic.
    I keep asking myself why did the security establishment failed on October 6 to understand that this attack is imminent and my response I mean I can speak to you for hours about you know those SIM cards and alerts etc but at.
  • Jordan — Place · Referenced actor · 2 mentions · first at
    Cited among regional actors potentially involved in Gaza arrangements and as part of the group agreeing to Hamas demilitarization in principle.
    This war. Qatar supported it and Turkey supported it. And the fact that Qatar and Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority are agreeing to a plan according…
  • October 18th — Event · Referenced event · 1 mention · first at
    Used to illustrate early post-attack global sympathy for Israel (landmarks lit in blue/white), contrasted with later opinion shifts as war images dominated.
    World is focused on suffering the more you suffer the more sympathy you get now remember October 8th when The Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Building, Baner Gate were lit with…

Media & podcasts

  • Al Jazzer — Media · Referenced media · 1 mention · first at
    Cited (with misspelling) as a Qatari-linked media outlet whose tone is claimed to be shifting as part of regional bargaining around the ceasefire/Trump alignment.
    Israel and President Trump, that Kamas would no longer have this media branch named Al Jazzer to fuel hatred among all over the Middle East.
  • Al Jazeera — Media · Referenced media · 1 mention
    Used as an example of media narrative shifts attributed to Qatari incentives, tied to reducing incitement and 'fueling hatred' in the region.
    If you watch Al Jazzer... the winds change.

Full transcript with timestamps

We're a few weeks into the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas. It's a deal that has already been troubled by violence, but so far it is holding. If you're listening to that deal being talked about in the US, you're hearing it spoken about one way.

So,, this, long, and, difficult, war, has, now ended. You know, some people say 3,000 years, some people say 500 years whatever it is, it's uh the granddaddy of them all. But when I read the Israeli press, I'm hearing and seeing something very different. In America the dominant position on the Israeli Palestinian conflict is still a belief, a hope in the two-state solution. And Israel is just not. Israeli politics is well to the right of where America admits it is, where America even, I think, often realizes it is. One of my intentions in the way we've covered this conflict since October 7th is to not present either an Israel or a Palestinian politics that is different from the one that actually exists. And so I wanted to talk to someone about this deal who represented more the way the Israeli government and the forms of politics that are in power in Israel see it. Amid Seel is the chief political

analyst for Channel 12 in Israel. He is a political columnist there. He's the author of the newsletter. It's noon in Israel and a book recently published in English, A Call at 4:00 a.m., 13 Prime Ministers and the Crucial Decisions That Shaped Israeli Politics. And Seel as well to my right there are things uh I think you'll hear him say that many people listening to this will not like. But in order to understand this conflict, you have to take seriously where the Israeli public actually is on it and how the government that is in power in Israel and the coalition that might take power in Israel see it. As always, my email escy times.com.

I'm Seel. Welcome to the show. Hi, Eva,, how, are, you? I'm, good., I, want, to, start, with, the, state of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas. How do you understand what was agreed to?

Um,, well,, it, was, something, quite, minor. I I quite I'm quite skeptical about the chance of having peace, the biggest peace in 3,000 years or something like this. I think it was a ceasefire based on a prisoner swap deal. And this is it. Now, it's it's not something small in terms of the hostages and it was a a huge question and the warfare, but it does not end the war between Israel and Kamas. just it's it's like pressing the pause button when Israel still controls 53% of Gaza Strip and Hamas is in 47% and there is a plan pledge you name it by President Trump to actually unroot kamas one way or the other. Now Israelis are quite skeptical about uh I don't know Kamas just decide to demilitarize themselves but let's give peace a chance. How did Netanyahu sell it to his own coalition?

Well,, I, guess, he, he, he, doesn't, mention the term total victory anymore, but he says we got the hostages back, which 80% 90% of the public wanted, and we actually stay in Gaza Strip, and we don't withdraw from Gaza as long as Kamas is not demilitarized and dismantled. So, it's like saying there were three goals for the for the for the war. Releasing all the hostages, check. Dismantling Hamas as an army, check. The militarizing Gaza Strip and removing Hamas from from Gaza. So, it has not happened yet. But unlike all the e offers made by the Biden administration and by many Arab countries, the war does not end when Israel is out of Gaza and Kamas is still there. It's where Israel is still in Gaza. And there is an agreement that Israel will be there as long as Hamas is not demilitarized. And I think this is the most important thing. Kamas was not alone in this in this war. Qatar supported it and Turkey

supported it. And the fact that Qatar and Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority are agreeing to a plan according to which kamas is to be demilitarized means something which which didn't exist before. So there's been a lot of focus in American coverage of the deal on what gets called phase two, which is this demilitarized Hamas and the possibilities of international operations and a new Gaza. Mhm.

You, wrote, that, there, is, a, view, that Israel's unstated goal is to avoid moving forward with the next complicated and mostly fantastical phase. Arab soldiers placing Hamas with the heavy price of IDF withdrawals from the Gaza Strip as well as a future however unlikely return of the Palestinian Authority to the area. So if the if Israel's unstated goal is to not move forward to the the form of settlement or peace envisioned in that deal, what is the goal? Everyone would wish that kamas would be demilitarized with, you know by outsourcing. No one wants Israeli soldiers to die at a pace of two a week or five a week in order to to to have a mission that that can be done otherwise.

It's just the pessimism about the the option that kamas would see I don't know two battalions two amirati battalions and all of a sudden would release would give you know each and every kalachnik of rifle for instance. So it's about what I call in the Middle East cautious pessimism. So from the highest possible American sources I spoke I spoke to this week they don't think it's feasible. What they do see is a future in which in 5 years from now in the area controlled by Israel behind the what we call now the yellow line there would be a new

the, yellow, line, in, Gaza, being, this, 53% exactly the the Israeli line it's the Israeli controlled area in this area um there would be a recovery Raf would be rebuilt as a city funded by the Emiratis with a the radicalized education system and under Israel's security supervision.

So, what, you, said, is, that, you, now envision a two-state solution, but it is a two-state solution inside the Gaza Strip,

right?, [snorts] What, do, you, mean, by, that? I, mean, that, um, since, I, don't, believe, in the idea that Hamas is something that took over Gaza, taking uh uh out of the will of 2 million Palestinians, innocent Palestinians. So I don't see any way in which kamas can be fully be unrooted from Gaza. Okay. I think it will still be there as long as that as there are in Gaza young males between the age of 17 to 35 and as many kalachnikov as one can can see more than meets the eye there will be kamas in Gaza. And therefore the only way to actually create something else is in the 53% that Israel controls militarily. And then if you build there the new Rafa an Emirati funded Saudi funded uh I hope not Qatari funded city in which people have no weapons and there is an efficient police force no tunnels no Kalachnikovos no hatred then you can see a future. This would be the the the moderate Gaza and the other Gaza would

be the Gaza that lies in ruins um uh in in in Gaza city and the refugee camps in central Gaza.

When, I've, heard, this, vision,, it, seems extraordinarily uh putting aside a lot of questions about it, very hard to administer,

right? Are, is, there, movement, between, the, people in the two Gazas that you're describing here? Just think about I I it's not exactly the same. East Berlin and West Berlin,

you, know,, before, the, war,, before, the, the war in 1961, you could actually move through, but if you want to go to the so-called Israeli side or the the American side, I would call it, okay American Emirati side, you have to go w without your weapon and without being part of Kamas. But once you are there you

and, you're, going, to, run, security, vetting on people somehow. Yes., Exactly., And, and, then, I, guess, that then the the market uh would the market forces would actually determine the future of Gaza because where do you want to live? In the ruins of Gaza where no one pays for recovery and rebuilding etc. or in the new Gaza heavily funded more not democratic but more uh western than than the other. There is a there is a future for Gaza.

You, also, say, in, that, that, quote, I, read that Israeli society does not want to go to the point where the Palestinian Authority is ruling in Gaza.

Yeah., there, after, 32, years, of, having failed attempts to foster the Palestinian Authority as a partner for peace, I would say that 90 92% of the Israeli public does not believe in the idea of the Palestinian Authority because as long as its education system poisons the minds of a generation after generation of young Palestinians for anti-semitism, [snorts] hatred, to towards Jews anti-Western sentiment. People don't see any option of prosperity and peace and new Middle East with this Palestinian authority. By the way, Israel is not the only one to to have a strong disbelief in this option. The Emiratis and the Saudis too don't do not really believe in this. That's why they want a reformed Palestinian authority. But to be honest I think that a Palestinian authority that does not educate its its youngsters, its pupils for hatred, and does not pay for sleigh is not a Palestinian, authority., I, I I, don't, see

it I don't see it happening in this generation or two to come. I, think, it's, fair, to, say, that, most, of the players in the region and at this point the United States have not been they're not confident in the Palestinian Authority. I was actually surprised to see in Trump's plan an end state in which the Palestinian Authority was believed to be the the sort of final governing uh regime. But if you don't believe in that, if Israelis don't believe in that then is there any assumed future in which there's Palestinian self-determination or is this really forever under Israeli control?

Okay., So,, so, I, think, you, can, identify two streams within the Israeli rightwing. one a smidge smotidge and Benavir believes that there is no future. They do not believe in a Palestinian state. Even the Palestinians were to be Americans or Swedish. Okay this is the part of the right wing that said we want annexation. We want settlements in Gaza Strip and we want mass immigration. I don't think that the vast majority of Israel is is there. the must the the the vast majority or the lion shelf even the right wing believes in Netanyahu and their perception that says we actually had give we we actually have given three symbolic concessions to President Trump a a reformed a future for a reformed Palestinian authority a future participation of this reformed Palestinian authority inside Gaza and More important than this um the the image in the future of a reformed uh united West Bank and Gaza alto together. Now

Israel opposed it for many many years under Netanyahu. What's the difference? The difference now is that according to Netanyahu and Durmer if it's going to be reunite

Ron, Durmer, his, very, close, aid. Yeah, exactly., The, joke, says, in, Israel that Netanyahu is the closest person to Ron Durmer. Uh so so anyway that now it's not that the West Bank is going to take over Gaza but that a reformed demilitarized dradicalized Gaza is going to take over Juda and Samaria because according to the Amirati plan for instance it's not only that they are about to change the education system in Gaza but in Ramla as well I live 20 minutes from schools in which children are taught that uh um uh you should kill as many Zionist pigs as possible for instance. You can't you can't have peace with, with with, generation, after generation taught on these on these principles.

So, you, describe, the, ceasefire, deal, as giving a number of symbolic concessions to the the Trump administration

and, they're, based, on, these, benchmarks, right? So they could be more or less symbolic depending on how things play out.

Do, you, think, the, understanding, of, this deal is the same for the Trump administration and for the the Netanyahu government? Do you think they're aligned on what it will mean for benchmarks to be met or not met or do you think that there is a possibility of divergence in one way or the other on two sides?

I, think, it's, a, rare, case, in, which, you know usually in diplomacy you have a debates behind closed doors and you know in the news conference you try to actually uh marginalize it. Here it's exactly the other way around. In order to sell the plan for the Arab world Trump speaks mainly about ending the war rather than eliminating Hamas. However the main advantage of this plan is that President Trump articulated for at least five or six times since the ceasefire has begun that between the two goals of the of the of the plan, ending the war and eliminating Kamas, he prefers eliminating Hamas. That's why he keeps saying that if Hamas does not demilitarize, Israel would crush him if I, only, give, the, word, as, as as, Trump said. And that's why I'm quite confident that the the number one strategic asset of this ceasefire plan that kamas can no longer rule Gaza is there to stay. And as long as Trump is the president, I

don't see to be honest any option in which this kamas presence gets legitimacy. You're putting a lot of weight in this conversation and your your vision here. I remember this was actually true the last time we spoke too

on, the, power, a, reconstructed, education system could have for the future of how Palestinians see Israelis.

I, I, think, that, creates, two, questions. One is why you believe it is the education system as opposed to sort of lived experience checkpoints, that kind of thing. Um, obviously in Gaza, huge numbers of people have now

lost, relatives,, lost, lost, friends,, seen their homes destroyed. Perhaps, it, was, a, bad, idea, to, massacre Jews.

It, was, a, bad, idea, to, mask, Jews,, right? We're not we're not disagreeing on that.

And, it, was, an, immoral, idea,, right?, Not just a strategically bad idea. Um

but, it's, a, lot, of, work, for, an, education system to do. So, that's one one thing. But, but also, how is this work done? You've I know you're thinking of it being based on what's been done in the UAE. Maybe it's overseen by the UAE.

But what is being imagined here? Okay,, so, it's, it's, not, only, education. It's not only the pupils, but it's both the media. I'll give an example. Al Jazzer. If you watch Al Jazzer, all of a sudden you see that there is the the winds change. I suspect that this is the Qatari gift for this wedding between Israel and President Trump, that Kamas would no longer have this media branch named Al Jazzer to fuel hatred among all over the Middle East. So, it's media, it's education. I would say I would compare it not to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but to Japan following World War II or Germany. However, it is not the case. Why? Because there was only one Japanese state. The Middle East is still full with Arabic speaker Muslim countries that hate Israel. So even if you live in reformed Gaza and educated on Western values, you still you you can still follow, you know, influencers on TikTok that hate Israel. That's why I'm

more cautious. But when I see in the UAE and Saudi Arabia how it succeeded, I'm more optimistic. Now, yes, the ruins in Gaza are might be a bad service for living side by side in with harmony in harmony with the Israelis, but it can have exactly the other effect. I'll give an example. I visited Ramla a few weeks ago in the biggest mall. If I send you the pictures, you won't believe it's in Ramla. You would say to me, you would tell me it's in Abu Dhabi or in, I don't know, Cincinnati. Uh, it's better than every mall I saw in Israel. I walked there with Yamulka. No one told me anything. And Ramala was a a city that I don't know 20 years ago soldiers were lynched there. So things change and you can change them more rapidly as long as you recognize the problem. Is there a view eventually even just a pragmatic view on the second you know non- messianic stream of Israeli society

that, in, the, long, run, Gaza, and, the, West Bank should have self-determination of some sort from Palestinian government the government should be Palestinian even if it is not today's [snorts] PA today's Hamas or is the view that either it will be in Israeli control right we've moved back to occupation or that it will be under some kind of Arab [snorts] Consortium or I've seen people talk about the Jordanians or obviously you're talking about the the UAE and they're a big player in this that there is some other alternative 50 years from now, 5 years from now, let's say 10 years from now.

Okay., So, here, is, the, the, main, debate between the Israeli median voter and the um center left in in the US. The center left in the US says we should try and give Palestinians a state because that's how people are used to live. And Israelis say we gave them a state. Gaza was a state. This was the outcome. Because when Israel evacuated the settlements in 2005 unilaterally it actually abandoned Gaza. And Israelis were under the impression that if you build a big wall, you can forget about Gaza. And the outcome was was horrifying for Israelis. The Palestinian Authority was something like 60% state, right? It failed in the second inif with,200 casualties over 5 years. And we and when we gave them a state in Gaza, we got 1,200 casualties in 5 hours. So that's why Israelis don't even want to talk about it. Now, if you speak about 10 years from now, I guess we'll see something closer to, you know what, I

feel easier to speak about 20 years from now because this is the the time frame for raising a new generation. Um, I would say that you'll have 60 70% statehood with reformed entity. I I don't want to call it the Palestinian Authority, but something like this living really side by side in peace with Israel. And a Palestinian would say none of these things were anywhere close to a state. They did not have control of their own borders. They could not leave and come at will.

There, was, a, siege, functionally, a, siege and control of the borders and you know barring different goods coming in and out which is partially why you got the tunnels in Gaza. But in the West Bank too you have checkpoints. You have a tremendous amount of Israeli control over daily life. I've been through it. It's it's striking and visually apparent the moment you step foot in it. And they would say that the reason you have this ongoing conflict is that the conflict for the Palestinians is ongoing. That in none of these 60% 50% states that you're describing was there anything like genuine self-determination, freedom and that in that condition there will never be any kind of stability.

I, I, refuse, to, call, it, a, cycle, of violence because it bases the idea is that we do something they revenge and vice versa. It's not the case. There was a wide agreement in Israel towards a two-state solution. But what we have to unroot to the conclusion from October 7th. The only reason it didn't happen in the West Bank is because the IDF is still there. The support, I think we spoke about it in Jerusalem a year and a half ago. The support, the level of support for the October 7th massacre in the West Bank was even higher than in Gaza Street because they were not to pay the price of, you know, uh um bombing etc. So we should be very cautious before we give anything. I mean the the last attempt to have a real peace, you know, not a cold piece, but a piece between like Germany and France. That was the perception in the '90s, you know, this multiculty era following the fall of the Berlin wall, new Middle

East, Paris and Rabbina are in office the center left controls. Michael Jackson is in is has a show in a concert in Tel Aviv. That was the sentiment. I lived in a settlement and even in this settlement far from the eye, okay, far in the right, we we could smell or we could we could feel the winds of change okay? Uh and and it collapsed here not because of Israelis, but because they didn't want peace. And as long as we don't take care of the idea that the Palestinian image is not of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, but of from the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free. And I believe when they say it, I don't think it's just a slogan, just in a campaign at as long as we don't change it, it's we're not going to see peace in as we as we as we describe it. So, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that Arab governments strongly oppose the idea of dividing Gaza, arguing it

could lead to a zone of permanent Israeli control inside the enclave. I, mean,, that, seems, more, or, less, what we're talking about, permanent Israeli control inside the enclave. But in that world, the journal reported they're unlikely to commit troops to police the enclave on those terms. Do you think Israel's going to face a choice between the involvement that you and others are are hoping for from the UAE and from others Saudis and having the level of [snorts] control, involvement, security presence that you're describing?

To, be, honest,, I, don't, think, any, any, of any of the the actors know what is going to happen. No one knew about Berlin that is going to be divided into two cities. No one. by the way, two days before the the the wall was built. Um it's a reality created. But when you know like like Sher in Sherlock Holmes stories when once you rule out every possible that doesn't make sense, the last one is here to stand. And I don't see Hamas demilitarizes itself. I don't think the IDF would soon invade Gaza again with full engines and five divisions and hence I think the only option is is what I described. I don't think this is it's it's perfect. I just try to envision what's going to happen in 5 years from now.

No,, I, appreciate, the, the, the, realism you're offering on that from the Israeli perspective. One reason I think that the two-state solution language caught my eye is that this feels more in a way like the West Bank solution for Gaza.

Exactly. And, you, know,, in, this, case,, the, role, of the PA is being played by the UAE and some sort of Arab consortium. But that sets up this other set of dynamics which we're seeing play out with incredible force and violence in the West Bank right now which is that

there, is, a, lot, of, pressure, particularly over time in Israeli society for expansion for annexation for settlements to be returned to Gaza. That this is not a situation where what Israeli society wants is Palestinians living in a thriving Israel UAE controlled

Gaza., I'm, not, sure., Listen,, I, I, I, come from the most ideological settlement in Judea and Samaria. And yet I allow myself to say that the vast majority of Israelis when they speak about right-wing ideas, they don't think about annexation or about settlements in in in Gaza Strip. They think about being a right-winger in Israel or being hawkish means that you think the only solution to protect Israelis is not by is neither speeches by a US president nor I don't know uh uh treat international treaties by but by uh Israeli soldiers with boots on the ground where it's needed. So this is why Oslo Accords [snorts] the the the collision between the leftist idea of the Oslo Accords and the right-wing idea of annexation actually led to the outcome you have just described in in Judaan Samaria in the West Bank which is an Israeli permanent security presence in areas in Palestinian areas but no

annexation. It's not a coincidence. Uh so so the out this is going to be the same outcome in Gaza in my opinion a heavy security presence with no other presence.

Another, way, to, describe, it, that, you, that you've used it in other uh columns and interviews is that the Israeli goal is Lebanonization.

Exactly. What, is, Lebanonization? Uh, okay., In, the, past, Lebanonization meant something really bad. um Israeli military presence when you suffer from uh uh booby traps or terrorist attacks and you bleed two three soldiers a week or a month following the war. Uh Lebanonization means something way more positive that you have a ceasefire but this ceasefire is really kept and you enforce it with uh a heavy fire when needed. whenah tries to rearm itself. Israel attacks since the ceasefire almost a year ago 11 months I think Israel attacked more than a thousand times and didn't even dare to attack back even once because they are deterred. So this is the the I think this is what Israelis want from Gaza.

Now when you have a very very uh um uh big perimeter you know that this imminent threat no longer exists and then you can attack from the air once you, see, I, don't know, a, tunnel, being built for instance and when I was in Israel uh a year ago June I was talking to people who lived on the border with Lebanon and at that time they were furious right they felt completely unsafe they would say look I can Hezbollah from my house. Since then obviously, Israel has it functionally destroyed Hezbollah. I mean, it's not gone as an entity, but the threat it poses is significantly

Israel's, most, significant, victory, since the 1967 war. But, the, reason, I, ask, about, it, is, because as of, you know, not very long ago, many Israelis seem to me to feel that the Lebanonization strategy had been a failure and there had been a lot of

the, first, Lebanonization. Great., So,, so, you, mean, the Lebanonization of like the last year?

Yes., the, the, first, the, the, the, early period lemonization meant is that your enemy is 1 inch from your border with commando divisions and you uh uh trust the international the legitimacy or the the international border being sacred. The new lemonization says that you have outposts, military outposts behind or or or, I, mean, in in, far, from, your international border and you attack when needed. That's what I meant. So this so this is when you talk about Lebanon as it actually exists, when you talk about Gaza as it is coming to exist, when you talk about the West Bank as it as it currently exists, the theory of the Israeli mainstream, you you call it the the right, but it seems to me to be the center,

is, that, there, is, no, security, without actual constant boots on the ground presence, surveillance, like there is no trusting an agreement. there is no pulling back. That either you are there and you can see it and you have operational control of it or you are not safe. And that the lesson Israeli society has taken from October 7th and also I suspect from attacks [snorts] on Iran on Hisbellah and Syria is that the one thing it can trust in is its own exact

military, strength. Exactly. Exactly., And, it, came, I, I, mean, it, came exactly when President Trump talked about Greenland. Now I know President Trump is not going to invade Greenland right? But his his uh talking points about invading or annexing Greenland or taking over the Panama Canal, I think articulated something that Israelis can understand. It's not imperialism. It's that the the legitimacy or that international borders used to be sacred, but it's no longer the case. And when you you see Russia invades Ukraine and you multiply it by a thousand because Kamas and Iran are not even Russia, they're way more monstrous.

You can't trust only uh um um international guarantees or borders and you have to be wherever there is a danger. This is the main lesson from October 7th. Trump's view of [snorts] power, of strength, of geopolitics, of treaties, of of all of it is very different than Republicans and Democrats who preceded him.

But, but, you, just, got, something, I'd, be interested to to hear you reflect more on, which is how does Trumpism, the rise of right-wing populist parties in many other countries, particularly in Europe uh how has that affected Israeli politics, its sense of what is possible what is desirable? M so in 20 when I go back to 2016 following Super Tuesday in March 2016 when Trump actually took over the uh Republican party Netanyahu told his staff be like Trump. He he repeated those three words be like Trump. And then Netanyahu shifted from the TV Netanyahu to the Facebook Netanyahu. Okay. From Netanyahu the elder statesman. Listen.

Think about, I don't know, not Ronald Reagan, but even more boring than this. Um, George Bush um, some something like this. He turned into Donald Trump. Now he's no Donald Trump. He he is and he's way more educated. He got better English, but but he changed. And in my opinion, this is why in an absurd way, the right wing in Israel or the power of the populist right, the radical rightwing in Israel is way smaller than in the US, the UK, France and Germany. Why? Because you you still have the founding father of the right Benjamin Netanyahu. Natao is two at the price of one. you is both the elder statesman that gets the agreement of the US to attack Iran and for a annexation of of the Golan Heights and the recognition of Jerusalem and at the very same time he is that the Netanyahu that speaks quite I don't know viciously about the left.

So so once Netanyahu resigns you'll see a spike in my opinion in the representation of the far right in Israel., I, don't, know how, many, people, are aware of the fact that both Smidge and Benville combined got only 10% of the popular vote in Israel. 10%. Uh just just compare it to the uh reform party in the UK these days.

Mhm., So, Trump's, I, think, most, significant foreign policy success of his first room was the Abrahamic courts. Mhm.

And, that's, based, on, Netanyahu, and, and and him and Kushner and and others um realizing and and this comes from some of the, Gulf, states, too, that, there, is, a transactional relationship that is possible with surrounding Arab states.

Right. Absent, any, change, in, Israel's relationship with the Palestinians. Exactly.

And, I, think, somewhat, to, the, surprise, of many, the Abraham Accords hold through this whole period. So you recently wrote that Ron Durmer, uh, Israel's minister of strategic affairs, a person who, uh counts Netanyahu as among his closest aids, believes the chances of Israel signing peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and even Syria have now increased. There's a belief there that they're now with the ceasefire on the cusp of an expansion of the Abraham Accords,

right?, Why? Okay,, so, there, is, a, gigantic, fight, over the last two years, which is rarely spoken. The main idea behind October 7th behi I mean behind killing as many Jews as possible was to stop the normalization process the Abraham Accords from happening. It was 12 days before Saudi Arab Arabia was to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The due date was October 19th 2023. Now the whole idea of the Abra Accords were based on denying the liberal idea that the way to have Israel involved in the Middle East with normalization uh this way go through Ramallah the Palestinian capital city. Many many Arab countries refused to base their commercial relationship, their even relationship with the United States on the idea that a very old unelected dictator named Abbas is going to actually set the terms uh of of the entire regime. And that was the idea behind the peace agreement between Israel and the Amiratis, which is in my

opinion the most important development in Israel's history, save only the six day war in 1967. And that's why I, as a right-winger, I wrote against annexation of the settlements a few weeks ago because what I heard from my friends in the UAE is that this is uh it would be too much on their on their plate uh to digest. This is one thing. Now the the the apart from the military operation the best Israeli answer to October 7th would be to expand the Abra courts. Thus proving that strate strategically speaking, not not even morally speaking but strategic strategically speaking October 7th was a failure. And that's why in my opinion uh Israel's effort should be based on expanding the peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Syria. And from what I hear, there is an option that the agreement with Syria would be more than merely a security agreement. What are these agreements now based on? I mean, I think this is

partially what I'm trying to draw out that for a very long time, the relationship between Israel and his neighbors was understood to be ideological isn't quite the right word

right? But, based, on, an, assessment, of, the moral and ethical condition of the Israel's relationship with the Palestinians,

right?, And, there's, been, a, move, towards these bilateral agreements that are much more transactional

because, in, my, opinion the, the, Amirati, signed, a, peace, treaty with Israel because they no longer saw the Middle East as a battlefield of Jews versus Muslims but of radicals versus moderates or if you want a Shia versus Sunni and Jewish states. That was the main idea behind it. But even in these countries, there's been a huge amount of anger over um the devastation and the death toll in in Gaza. So what are the chits being traded back and forth? Um so here's the thing because there was a change following October 7th. Prior to October 7th, all the Saudis wanted was I I'll put it in an undiplomatic way, a lip service regarding the Palestinian question. Okay. Now prior to October 7th, the Saudis wanted something quite vague uh that even even Smidge and Bengav would green light. Following October 7th, they nonetheless wanted a bit more. Now I don't know what this more is. I suspect that the idea of the

Palestinian Authority somehow symbolically hypothetically being involved in Gaza Strip would be uh part of the agreement was that Saudi Arabia would base the normalization on this idea. So this would be the Palestinian ingredient of the um of the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. My mistake as a as a commentator was that prior to October 7th, I thought that Netanyahu's main achievement was that he choked the idea of Palestinian statethood. I still think that there is not going to be a Palestinian state in in our lifetime. But following October 7th, there is a presence to the to this um idea. One of the things going the other direction though

is Israel has become such a capable developer of technology and weaponry right?

And, then, highly, technological, weaponry in particular right? That, it, seems, to, become, a, kind, of, I, I don't want to call it soft power, I want to call it medium power

that, is, at, the, base, of, many, of, these agreements. um both that Israel is part of your security umbrella and it's a a way station also to a close relationship with America particularly under Donald Trump but even in Europe where a tremendous amount of public opinion and state level opinion has turned against Israel

right Israel, as, a, seller, of, weaponry, to, to Europe um Germany, puts, an, arm, embargo, on, Israel but decided to buy um missiles in two billion euros

so, something, is, happening that has become a kind of bargaining chip or more than almost like a foundation it seems to me of how Israel understands it is going to maintain relationships without substantial change amidst the Palestinians and and this is a very sort of Trumpish transactional

although, I'm, not, a, big, fan, of, the, idea of Israel being first the mistress of the Middle East and now the mistress of Europe

can, you, say, what, that, means uh, the, idea, in, Hebrew, who, uh, we, say, a mistress in the Middle East. That is to say that we don't have I mean we are not married to I don't know Saudi Arabia or the Emirates but we we meet at night when no one sees

the, relationships, are, all, clandestine. Exactly., Now,, here, is, the, here's, the, the the the dangerous idea behind it in in Europe because I think Netanyahu failed to understand the depth of the the international crisis Israel has gone through because he knew more than you and me know about the real relationships. Okay? Because he knew the the the how how many European countries uh beg for Israeli technology and and weapons. But when it comes to soft power, soft power is based on the idea that your brand is very strong. And in with Israel, this the exactly the other way around. It was exactly the other way around that while Israel turned always to almost to be a pariah state, the the consumption of Israel technology and and weapons went went up. And that's why I think Israel should invest more in its in its branding if you want to.

I, think, it's, more, than, branding., But, but I that, does, open, up, that, that, does, open, up that question which is that

my, read, of, Israel's, geopolitics, right now is, that, it, is, thriving, where, the relationships are transactional, right?

And, it, is, suffering, where, the relationships are more values based. And that's beginning to include America. So we just had a New York Times Sienna poll which for the first time since our polling is asked this question going back to 1998.

You, had, more, Americans, sympathizing, with the Palestinians than the Israelis. Now the poll is very narrow. I think it was something like 35 34.

No. But, you, look, at, the, age, split, in, that poll and uh Americans over 65, 47% are more sympathetic to the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians. between 18 and 29 61% are more sympathetic to the Palestinians and 19% to the Israelis. And I think there's a tendency to say it's just a leftist thing, but Megan Kelly, the right-wing commentator, she has told Tucker Carlson that everybody under 30 is against Israel

right? Tell, me, how, you're, understanding, this., I mean, what's going on in America also it's like Europe, other places, the the numbers look much worse even than that

right, for, Israel., How, do, you, see, this?, to, be honest it's too early to call uh so I don't know if it's something generational that something that's going to change uh with time you know years pass you leave university the heavily kata heavily funded by kqatar university and you you understand the situation more one thing second the war today the world is focused on suffering the more you suffer the more sympathy you get now remember October 8th when The Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Building, Baner Gate were lit with a blue and white flag. And to be honest, the image that frightened me the most as an Israeli wasn't the horror pictures from from Sed and the Kibbutim, but to see I felt it was blue and white because I said, "Wow we look so miserable that even in France, we got legitimacy." Okay, now we won the war. We decisively won the war.

I can explain you for hours why abducting the Bibbas family and murdering them with bare hands is not something that you can compare to the death of of Palestinian children from from Israel bomb bombardment. However I'm fully aware of the fact that the images are so strong that I can't convince millions and millions of of Tik Tok followers. And that's why I think the the most dramatic thing for Israel is first of first and foremost to end the war and to move to a new phase of normalization, peace, having Israel either mentioned positively on the press or even better not mentioned at all. You see that Netanyahu went for a few podcasts and all of a sudden you could see that Netanyahu I mean he didn't really control the medium right for the first time.

He he went on the Nelk Boys, which is a sort of I, don't, know how, to, describe, it, manosphere podcast that Trump has been on many times. They got so much backlash from their own listeners, right

that, they, needed, to, apologize., And, one of them said he was told that having Netanyahu on is like having a modern-day Hitler on. And he went on to say he thought that was a good point.

Mhm. So, that's, I, mean, that's, a, right-wing coded in this country. That's something different happening.

I, agree., So,, I, think, there, was, a, damage, a permanent damage. I still think it's smaller than people think. Now, it's elastic. The the public opinion is elastic, especially when it comes to something to Israel and the Palestinians. It's it's not abortions or or weapons or I don't know, Trump. It's not something that is I mean, it's something that you can change your mind on. People tend to forget that following Yungipu war, Israel's rating fell both in the states and Europe uh following the oil embargo etc. and that Israel's positioning in the states was very low following the first Lebanon war in 1982.

The very same picture of a very long war in highly populated Palestinian areas. So I think it can change but we can't base and this is something more dramatic. We can no longer base our relationship with the United States on the values of the 20th century because even evangelicals the new generation doesn't see is Israel through the lenses of a biblical happening but through the lenses of social justice. Exactly like the African-American community used to see the Jews as you know Moses coming from slavery in Egypt. And over the last few decades, they see Israel as a white colonialist power. So I mean there's a lot to work on. And

so, so, something, bigger, than, that, seems like it has changed to me. And I, I, feel, like, I, have, a, good, sense, of, US politics.

Yes. And, it's, not, just, the, polling. It's, what, is, considered, conceivable, in politics around Israel. And right now we're in New York City. Zoran Mdani is likely to become very very likely to become the next mayor. his views on Israel that would have made you absolutely unelectable

I, think, in, almost, anywhere, in, the country but particularly in New York City a very Jewish city just a couple of years ago and it's not just that he is going to win the election most likely it is that what he is showing a lot of other Democrats is that they can express something closer to where their politics on Israel have actually gone right tried very hard to weaponize Israel against him completely completely failed. Eric Adams uh was running on the combat anti-semitism or end anti-semitism ballot line. Completely failed.

The, most, Jewish, city, on, earth in, the, most, Jewish, city, on, earth., And, so or, at least, city, with, the, most, Jews, on earth. Um that shifts things. And one reason I think it shifts things one one thing that it is getting at is we're talking about how this is happening on the right but Netanyahu really over the past 15ish years 20 years threw in with the right and began to choose to polarize Israel and America right going around Barack Obama to the Republican Congress. Members of Congress, I have the high privilege and distinct honor of presenting to you the Prime Minister of Israel, His Excellency Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israel, had, a, bit, of, an, interenium, with Joe Biden, who was a much older generation of Democrat and had an older Democratic generation's views on Israel. Personally, it's one of the the issues where Biden was quite, I think, to the right of his own administration on on how a lot of his staff would have liked to to approach this issue.

Israel, seems, to, be, betting, a, lot,, right, on, [snorts], continued, Republican dominance, presence in in America. That if you imagine the next generation of Democrats being in power here and Israel needing American support in a time of of of conflict and and crisis, it seems to me it's going to look very, very, very different. both because of the views but also because

I, don't, think, American, Democrats, anymore believe that they have to be more pro-Israel than they actually are. Two years ago before the war, I met with the IDF chief of staff back then. And he told me when when they are to buy air jets, jet fighters, uh you buy a jet fighter that its life expectancy is 40 years for. And he said that when we decide which fighter jet to buy, you take into account that in the next 40 years, 10 terms, there is going to be a US president that would put an arm embargo on Israel. That's what he said in 2023. Now, I think you and me would agree, you and I would agree that had Kamala Harris got elected and Israel invaded Gaza City, we would we would already we would have already seen it right? Uh so yes, it's there. I think that the question of whether who are on the cusp of that already happening.

That's a good point. Exactly., And, and, and, then, again, uh, it's a chicken and egg question. I don't think Netanyahu is to be blamed to for the you know for the fact that Israel became a partisan issue because each and every topic on the in the US including the weather became partisan. So maybe maybe he should

he, made, choices., I, watched, this, happen particularly Obama particularly in the Obama administration.

But, tell, me, something., Yeah., when, when Obama got elected for the first time, I remember people say that he doesn't have uh the sympathy for Israel in his kishkas, in his guts, right? It's not that it was by the way Obama got elected before Netanyahu came back to office and when Obama and Netanyahu met for the first time, Obama told him not even one brick in the West Bank and he apped the Iranian regime. I fully agree it takes two to tango but I think it was

but, made, a, series, of, strategic, decisions because he did not want to take pressure or at least he wanted to see if he could if Obama was really capable of bringing pressure on him. Look, I'm an American Jew. I have more Israel in my Kishki, so to speak.

Okay, but, I, think, Israel, would, have, been better off if they had listened to Obama on settlements. Now, I recognize that you and I have a different view on this. But even in the last two years, there's been a rapidity of settlement construction in the West Bank that outpaces the last, I think, 20 years according to

more, than, more, than, ever. More, than, ever., So, there, are, there, is, a world in which Israel made a strategic political decision

to, say, well, we, want, to, make, sure, that the democratic side of the aisle in the US feels kinship here feels we're taking into account some of their concerns and we're going to hold ourselves back on certain things for that reason. Israel decided not to do that, right?

And, it, and, in, many, ways, like, kind, of spat in their face, Biden ended up humiliated. I think there were real decisions here on the Israeli side and particularly on Netanyahu side and you could, have imagined, it,, you, know, playing out differently with different prime ministers.

But, West, Bank, is, Westbank, is, easy., How about Iran? Do you see any scenario in which Obama

Westbank, is, easy?, Why, didn't, Israel, do it? No,, I, mean, I, mean, no,, it's, easy., It's easy to speak about it. But the differences between Israel and between democratic administrations and Israel is not between democratic administrations and Netanyahu because each and every Israeli saw Iran as as a the biggest threat to to the Jewish existence since the Holocaust. Now we know that Obama and Biden didn't consider for a second to attack for instance or even to allow Israel to attack and I guess Kamalah Harris wouldn't either. So, so it's not only the easy Palestinian questions.

It's about it's something really bigger than this. President Obama came to office and he apped enemies and pissed off friends.

I, I, think, it, is, almost, axiomatic, that that Democrats have a different view of what create security than Republicans do. Yeah. Prime Minister Netanyahu, I understand it's addictive stuff to have to inhale the Trump administration because you have the most pro-Israeli approach because his enemies is yours. I know it's addictive, but maybe this problem is to be fixed with a different prime minister and a different president. I think when I look forward into the future of this and when I try to put together the two parts of this conversation we've been having, you have Israel pursuing uh a lot of settlement building and control of the West Bank. There's been a lot more violence. Um you have the indefinite reoccupation of much of Gaza.

[snorts] You combine that then with these poll numbers, these changes in support here and it's not just like Israel can wait for the war to end. It is setting itself up in a structural position where the effort is going to be and possibly quite successfully to make it into a parttheid South Africa, right? and that that is the the the strategy and also the risk it has opened up for itself by maintaining so much control in in both places. How do you think about that?

The, main, difference, between, Israel, and South Africa is that the black community in South Africa didn't try to massacre each and every white. It wasn't the case there. And and here we speak about South Africa. But let's imagine that the clerics signed an agreement with Nelson Mandela only to find out that Nelson Mandela our Yaser Rafat actually initiated a second inifal a war against the whites killing 1,200 of them and sending suicide bombers to Cape Town and you

I, understand, the, argument, that, it's, a that it's a different situation. What I'm saying is that the the international view that you have, you know, roughly 7 million Palestinians without any self-determination.

No,, they, have, they, have, a, civil, one,, but they got more than they have now. And they decided that it's more important for them. They decided twice, both in the West Bank and in Gaza, that it's more important for them to kill as many Jews as possible than to get more independence. That's the thing that we Westerners fail to understand that. Why? I I keep asking myself why did the security establishment failed on October 6 to understand that this attack is imminent and my response I mean I can speak to you for hours about you know those SIM cards and alerts etc but at the end of the day they fail to understand that there are people who have a lose-lose policy we know win-win policy this is good for all we know win-lose policy like in Russia versus Ukraine that Russia tries to take something. It's evil, but it's it's it's digestible.

We fail to understand a lose-lose situation in which I know I'm going to suffer. I know my people are going to die. I know Gaza is going to to line ruins at the end of this war, yet I want to kill as many Jews and Israel. I think they I think many I don't want to speak for God knows Hamas but I think that another way of saying you know why this does not seem stable to me the the situation you've described is that I mean they felt accurately like they were losing and that you know we talked about you said like look this is not a cycle of violence it's you know it's one side creating to I've had many Palestinians on the show I've talked to many, of them, in, our, reporting, you, know to them the violence is every day it is ongoing it ceaseless in Gaza and in the West Bank, right? They understand the condition they are living in as a condition of of structural violence. And I don't I don't disagree with them on

that. And, the, the, thing, that, is, going, to create the the ongoing pressure if you combine an international community that is less sympathetic to Israel, but Israel having much more control over these two places. I agree that it has many differences from the South African situation,

but, the, image,, you're, speaking, about, the image. I I mean I'm speaking about both the image and the reality that that people are going the idea that forever you will just have a situation

where, you, have, 7, millionish, people, um five, okay well, I'm, including, actually, is, Israeli uh Arabs in Israel who have a different situation than than

people, debate, this, in, different, ways, I don't mean to go into it too much that there is a that that that seems like it is a situation in which Israel is going to have a lot of trouble in the long term with not just international standing but eventually questions like sanctions and other things.

Yes,, I, came, to, the, conclusion, following October 7th that Israel's number one problem is the Palestinian one. Um I thought before that it's the Iranian one. It's not. Uh however I cannot in order to get legitimacy giving a license for people who see me treat me as an an evil enemy that should be eliminated in each and every way. That's the that's the main thing. So I think we should wait patiently for a new generation to come. I think that the most urgent mission of our generation our generation, both in the US and in Israel, in in the UAE, is to base the education system in the Palestinian Authority, not on hatred, but on Western values, on moderate Islam. I know it can succeed. How? Because this is exactly what happened in the UAE and in Saudi Arabia. And they changed the minds of Muslims in both countries. You see a decline in the level levels of anti-semitism. And since I'm no racist

I don't think that Islam is about killing as many Jews as possible and hating as many Americans as possible and and cheering and give candies in the streets when sep 911's disaster happened uh as as happened in Gaza. Uh and I think it takes time. It it t it takes time. It takes I would say 20 years. In 20 years from now, if we start today you'll see a major change in both what you call the West Bank, Judea, and Samaria and in Gaza Strip.

I, think, the, the, question, that, many people want to see change in Israel of here is whether or not if Israel sees its politics collapsing in other countries, right? You have after President Trump, a Democrat went office and and there's a recognition that, you know, Europe has now accepted Palestinian statehood in some abstracted way

and, a, sense, that, Israel, cannot, maintain support here with the politics it has had. Does I could see that going one of two ways. I can see that going under certain leaders and under certain conditions towards trying to create some space for the international opinion to express itself and a change in Israeli policy. I could see it in Israel becoming more inward-looking more focused on weapons development trying to be less reliant on others. I mean, there was an interesting quote I thought from Netanyahu where he said that Israel is going to have to adapt to international isolation, become an Athens and a super Sparta

in, terms, of, weapon acquiring. Yes. So,, tell, me, about, I'm, sure, people, in Israel are are thinking about this somewhat given how aggressive the and total the international anger has been. What are those two paths? Uh [snorts] I don't see any chance that Israelis are going to change their mind regarding Palestinian statethood because it's not about diplomacy. It's not about public opinion. It's about fear. People saw what happened on October 7th that they will not be willing to give an opportunity for this 5 minutes from their home in Jerusalem Tel Aviv. 10 minutes the most. This is one thing.

When it comes to cooperation I think there is room for a a party that would say, "Okay, we are quite tired. We want to rest a few years. We will be prepared. Our soldiers would would would guard everything, but we want to to breathe some air, international air economic air, etc. Um, and that's that's the next I think the next government would see a significant ingredient as I just described.

There, will, be, either, in, October, 2026, or sometime before then if this government falls uh elections.

Israeli, politics, isn't, structured, the way US politics are. Here we're used to thinking in terms of two parties that battle it out there. It's two coalitions of different parties

right?, Walk, me, through, the, anti-Netanyao coalition this developed. It it looks like it would be led by Napali Bennett who traditionally in Israeli politics was understood on Netanyahu's right in terms of security.

In, terms, of, security, uh, certainly, at, an earlier point um was harshly critical of how, open, Netanyahu, at least, claimed, to be to a two-state solution for instance.

Exactly., Um, you, have, Benny, Gce, who, in you know November of 2023 I think was widely considered to be a plausible next prime minister for Israel. Now his blue and white coalition

under, the, threshold is, under, the, threshold, for representation. Avigor Liberman who's a quite far right-wing defense minister um in 2018.

Yay, Laid, right, who, is, more, the, more centrist. Yes Golan, who's, represents, the, left, in Israel and is inside this coalition too.

8%, of, the, popular, vote., How, would, that group govern? Where would they differ?

Oh,, it, won't., My, 10-year-old, child, asked me, um, why don't you vote for the for the center left? I told him because they are leftists. So, he said, what is a leftist? So, I had hard times to explain to him because 20 years ago, it was he's for evacuating the settlement where your grandfather lives. Okay. Nowadays, no one really offers seriously to evacuate settlements. So what is the watershed line in Israel these days? And

is, it, a, center, left? Okay., Navali, Bennett, is, the, center, line. Exactly., Now, here's, the, thing., Who, is this awful monstrous left that is going to try to defeat Netanyahu? According to to the right wing, it's Natali Bennett the former CEO of the Yesha Council, the settlement movement. Avid Liberman, a settler himself who once said that Israel should hang each and every of the Arab Knesset members like in Norberg. Okay. And Benny Gans who is not I mean calling him a leftist is not I mean

I, don't, think, leftists, would, claim, him ex, and, vice, versa., Okay., So, it's, about identity. First and foremost, what I believe is that the more religious you are, the more you tend to vote for the right wing. That's the real the the debate over the judicial reform was not about the judicial reform, but but about whether Israel is more Jewish than democratic or more democratic than Jewish.

And, the, rightwing, here, is, the, Netanyahu coalition. Exactly., Now,, it's, a,, you, know,, it's quite a miracle that the leader of the so-called religious Jewish uh Sepharadic relatively lowerass camp in Israel is this secular atheist millionaire, the son of a professor from Jerusalem.

We're, acquainted, with, these peculiarities uh in American politics at this point.

By, the, way,, it's, not, peculiarity, because the politics of identities is not something that I believe in. Uh, I think it's a woke way of describing things and that people don't vote for someone like them. If you have a bird, you'll vote for someone with a bird. It's ridiculous. You vote for someone that you believe would represent your values the most. So, this is the water line and that's why that's why in my opinion the ultraorththodox parties who are not part of the right wing at all. They are anti-settlement, anti- annexation are a a a basic part of Netanyahu's coalition because it's about Judaism. But I would like to offer something else. We moved in 2020 from one generation, the security generation towards the identity generation. And that's exactly the point where Israel went through five consecutive election campaigns. Why?

It's like the summer league in the NBA okay? where you still try your to to get accustomed to your new basketball team but it takes time because you used to be from for the Chicago Bulls and now you are for the New York Knicks.

What, was, the, dividing, identity, line, that created it? It's just religious identity is the way you see it.

The, the, religious, one, and, I'll, give, you an example. Okay. A Victor Liberan in terms of security, he's the most hawkish figure in Israel. His voters are former USSR immigrants uh who are more hawkish than Benavir. But when you talk about domestic issues about civil society issues, they are more secular than Yay Gulam and Yay Laid. That's why a Victor Liban moved from the so-called rightwing to the so-called left. Although he is not leftist because it's not the left you we used to know. The same applies for Nafali Bennett. In terms of security, yes, his is forexation is is allegedly more hawkish than Netanyahu.

But when it comes to, you know, civil society things, etc., and domestic issues, he's the leader of the moderate small Yamula voters

small, yam, voters,, good, lines,, who, who believe in, for instance, public transportation during Saturdays, during Shabbat. This is the main change. Uh let's imagine let's speak about the the last coalition to defeat Netanyahu in 2021. It's it was called the coalition of change. But when you try to really analyze where the change is you couldn't find the change in the policy towards Gaza which was the same in the policy towards Iran which was the same in the polic policy towards settlements which was exactly the same.

Even in terms of economy, it wasn't a social justice coalition, but even more hawkish, more capitalist than Netanyahu's right-wing coalition. So the main change was changing the living address of Sar Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu's Netanyahu's wife. So there was no change and that's why you see the the Israel's political system reshapes itself. If you are American hoping for a change in terms of policy, you'll get quite disappointed

uh, towards, the, Palestinians, towards, the, Palestinians,, towards, Gaza, I would say even more than this that a a coalition controlled by Bennett Liberman, Golan, etc. would never be able to sign this Trump ceasefire plan because the right-wingers would would kill them. Netanyao would say this is a surrender to the to Hamas.

And, do, you, think, there's, a, good, shot that Netanyahu just survives the next election?

Yes., But, I, have, to, explain, something about Israeli politics in the US. When you have Trump versus Harris, one of them must win, right? Because someone has to get 270 votes on the electoral college. In Israel, you can either win, lose, or having the the the vote the election undecided. Why? Because in Israel you have Arab parties that traditionally do not take part in coalitions. There was one exception four years ago, but it was under the, you know, the COVID crisis which was a domestic issue. As long as Israel has its complicated strategic relationship with the Muslim world, I don't see any coalition formed on the basis of a of an Arab non-Zionist or sometimes anti-ionist party. Hence, if they get at least 10 seats out of the 120. So, if you get 61 seats, you won the election, right? If you maybe you won the election, 61 out of 120 out majority. But if you get 50 you didn't win the election, but you

didn't lose it either because you blocked the center left change block from from forming a coalition. According to each and every poll following the deal reached in Gaza, Netanyahu got 51 at least. Netanyahu lost the outright majority. But as a result of October 12th ceasefire and Iran being defeated being defeated, Netanyahu secured himself from not losing the election for the time being. Of course time and again he he outnumbers his his his opponents and it's it's too early to call but I would say that something dramatic would have to happen in order for Netanyahu to directly lose the next election.

Do, you, think, his, government, will, stand until October 2026? No,, but, I, mean, the, last, coalition, to survive a full term in Israel was in 1988. I know it sounds weird for Americans, but in Israel there are no fixed terms. So Netanyahu succeeded in the mission that most of the governments failed to reach the forest year the final year of his term and it's amazing no one believed it including Nat himself the day after October 7th

then, always, our, final, question, what, are three books you'd recommend to the audience

yeah, so, um, I, recommend, two, English, books and two books in English and one in Hebrew um the first is the accident accidental president about President Truman's first four months by AJ Bame I think great book the second is not exactly a book about presidents uh but a book about the history of how to write history of president it's un an unfinished love story by Doris Goodman um

Doris, Karns, Goodman exactly, but, yeah, good, because, yes, she was married to President Jin Johnson President Kand's special adviser and it's a brilliant book about how to write about history. And the third is a book in Hebrew and uh it's a book written by my father. It's called the Messiah in Debor. It's about David Benoran. Bengorian was the founding father of Israel. A mixture of George Washington and I don't know Thomas Jefferson and um he was a very he was considered a very secular leftist leader at the time. But my father reveals how deep inside he was very Jewish and how the right wing should fall in love with him in retrospect. And if you want to understand Israel, so yeah, it's better for you to study Hebrew, to learn Hebrew as fast as possible and read it.

Sele, thank, you, very, much. Thank, you, so, much. Hey, hey hey.

Questions about this episode

Who speaks in "Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show"?

Ezra Klein (Guest), Amid Seel (Guest).

What is "Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show" about?

The discussion explores the complex dynamics of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly in the context of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. It contrasts American perceptions of a potential two-state solution with the more hardline views prevalent in Israeli politics, emphasizing the need to understand the realities shaping Israeli governance and public opinion.

What is mentioned in this The Ezra Klein Show episode?

24 people, works and ideas are mentioned, including Amid Seel, Hamas, Kamas, Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia, Lebanonization. Each one on this page links to its own page with every episode that mentions it.

How long is "Is Israel’s Plan Endless Occupation? | The Ezra Klein Show"?

The episode runs 1 h 11 min; the transcript is about 11,764 words in 156 timestamped sections.

More from The Ezra Klein Show

About this transcript: the episode's spoken words as captioned on YouTube, split into timestamped sections. Reclip.Me locates every person, work and idea in the text, keeps the time it is first named, and quotes the words around it verbatim. Last updated January 24, 2026.